




Queen Mary University of London 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
 





The Intergovernmental Dimension of 
Local Government Financial Stress: 














Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of 





STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
 
I, Dennis de Widt, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work.  
 
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does 
not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright 
or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. 
 
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the 
electronic version of the thesis. 
 
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by 
this or any other university. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. 
 
Signature: Dennis de Widt 





















This thesis investigates the relationship between intergovernmental structures and 
financial stress in local government. The research compares three European constitutional 
systems: England, as a centralised case; Germany, representing a federation; and the 
Netherlands, constituting a unitary-decentralised system. The impact of 
intergovernmental structures on local finances is identified by concentrating on three core 
institutional arrangements: intergovernmental financial regulations, grant funding 
systems, and local tax space. The thesis applies a mixed methodological approach. Based 
upon a unique panel dataset, the econometric research identifies the institutional causes 
of local financial stress. The statistical results are complemented by 48 elite interviews, 
conducted among intergovernmental stakeholders across the three systems.  
The thesis applies an innovative policy dynamics framework. Findings 
demonstrate that local financial stress should be primarily understood as a manifestation 
of a set of inter-related institutions. The results show that despite the constitutionally 
stronger position of local government in Germany, local financial error accumulation is 
stronger than in the English system, with the Dutch system occupying a position between 
the two. A more centralised structure carries a high risk of implementing 
intergovernmental design failures; however its fluid institutional structure generates a 
higher capacity to comprehensively address financial errors. More decentralised 
structures, in contrast, prolong institutional adjustments, resulting in intergovernmental 
arrangements that are stable over time but contain larger risks of local financial error 
accumulation.  
The research findings have both theoretical and practical implications. The thesis 
expands second-generation fiscal federalism beyond its dominant focus on the meso-level 
and demonstrates that a higher sensitivity to constitutional varieties improves the cross-
system applicability of political economy theories. The thesis also develops an integrated 
policy dynamics framework that contributes to stronger theory building in public 
administration studies. Practically, the thesis provides relevant knowledge to 
policymakers on how to improve the sustainability of local government finances within 
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The financial crisis starting in 2008 has brought discussions about the design of political 
institutions to the forefront of political discourse. While the crisis was triggered by a 
banking crisis, it brought to light weaknesses in the institutional architecture of 
government systems. In Europe, criticisms have concentrated on weak monitoring 
capacities by EU institutions on Eurozone members, and a lack of fiscal resources at the 
EU level for organising a European response to financial crises. While several major 
institutional reforms have been implemented in the post-2008 period, the long-term 
effects of the reforms on the budgetary behaviour of European governments are difficult 
to predict. 
 The response to the financial crisis by governments in Europe is one illustration 
of the complex relationship between economic variables and political institutions. The 
design of political institutions has major consequences on how changes in the economic 
environment affect governments, including their finances, and how governments respond 
to financial challenges. Political institutions generate contrasting pressures on political 
actors: some stimulate coherent and efficient policies, but others lead to a prioritisation 
of the short-term over long-term benefits. Institutions affecting policymaking are not only 
of a legal nature. Informal practices, such as normative understandings and expectations, 
can have as big, or even bigger consequences than legal institutions on how governments 
operate (cf. Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). 
When analysing institutions, three different analytical levels can be distinguished 
(Peters, 2005; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). The constitutional structure sets out the 
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institutional framework at the macro level. Specific institutions can be found below the 
constitutional level. An illustration of a specific institution in the domain of public finance 
is the division of government tax revenues across government layers. A third institutional 
level specifies the secondary features of specific institutions, such as, continuing with the 
example, the spending freedoms attached to taxes that are allocated to different 
government levels. Despite widespread interest in the influence of political institutions, 
fundamental issues remain unanswered. Most importantly, it is unclear how the 
interactions between different institutions affect governmentental performance (Jones, 
2001; Jones & Thomas, 2012).  
The development of new institutionalism explains the lack of an integrative 
explanation as to how government output is affected by multiple institutions. In contrast 
to the comprehensive theoretical approach that was typical for system analysis in the 
1950s , the three new institutionalisms that emerged in the 1980s all emphasise different 
aspects of government systems. Rational choice theory concentrates on the process of 
decision making; sociological institutionalism offers a strong explanation for preference 
aggregation; and historical institutionalism maintains a distinctive focus on historically 
evolved power asymmetries (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Due to the theoretical fragmentation 
in institutional analysis, scholars show difficulties in evaluating how, and to what extent, 
governmentental performance is the output of interactions between multiple institutions 
in a system. 
 The original system approach developed by Easton (1965) was a comprehensive 
analytical approach, aimed at explaining the entire political process, from societal inputs 
into the political system to the resulting decisions or policies, including their 
environmental outputs. While its ambitious scope means that system analysis is a difficult 
framework to operationalize, it makes a valuable contribution by pointing out the 
relevance of the wider configuration of political systems for understanding the behaviour 
of individual components within those systems (Parsons & Shils, 1951).    
 This thesis argues that to enhance theoretical progress in the study of government 
systems, as well as the field’s societal relevance, a higher degree of integration among 
institutional approaches is essential. Less ambitious than Easton’s system analysis, an 
integrative approach is applied to analyse how interactions between institutional 
components affect the performance of government systems. Dissimilar government 
systems have been selected for this purpose, with a focus on their intergovernmental 
structures. Statistical data from public finance provide relevant indicators regarding 
government performance. Interactions between government levels are likely to intensify 
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during periods of financial stress, as financial resources become scarce and competition 
for access to these resources intensifies. The development of financial stress will be 
affected by institutional factors, and this thesis builds a framework based upon core 
concepts from policy dynamics theory that enables the analysis of how dissimilar 
intergovernmental systems develop and respond to financial stress. The thesis 
concentrates on the actor that has become particularly exposed to the consequences of 
resource competition: local government. 
 
 1.2 The local level under pressure 
The local government level is responsible for around 33% of total public sector spending 
in the EU (OECD 2012) on average. Austerity measures implemented across Europe 
since the start of the financial crisis in 2008 increasingly affect the financial position of 
European local governments (LGs). In England, the local authority of West Somerset has 
been labelled ‘unviable’ in an assessment by the English Local Government Association 
(LGA), whereas the English Audit Commission identified 12% of English LGs at on-
going risk of not balancing their budgets (Audit Commission, 2012, p. 5). Financial stress 
also characterises local government in the German state North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). 
In NRW, local financial distress is not a new phenomenon: in 2004 more than 40% of the 
NRW LGs found themselves in special financial emergency arrangements organised by 
the NRW state government. That many NRW LGs were unable to balance their budgets 
even during strong economic upswings suggests a complex relationship between 
macroeconomic developments and local financial stress.   
The most obvious factor leading to deteriorating LG finances are economic and 
structural features of an individual LG, or macroeconomic trends. A second factor 
contributing to local financial stress are local budgeting decisions. A third factor is the 
intergovernmental institutional framework in which LGs operate. The intergovernmental 
framework is most important as it will determine how worsening local, or national, 
economic conditions are translated into individual LG finances. In addition, 
intergovernmental regulations affect LG budgeting, and will so affect local causes of 
financial stress, and responses towards it. The territorial distribution of government tasks 
provides another intergovernmental factor with potentially significant effects as to the 
development of LG financial stress. This indicates the correspondence of 
intergovernmental frameworks with systems, and specific institutional components, such 
as intergovernmental regulations, constituting their subsystems. Figure 1.1 provides an 
illustration of such an intergovernmental constitutional system. The intergovernmental 
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system constitutes the focal point of this research and is, in line with Easton (1965), 
referred to as the black box. 
 




The impact of the intergovernmental institutional context on LG financial stress 
has remained unclear for two reasons. First, social science is characterised by a lack of 
integration among scholarly disciplines. This strongly applies to the highly specialised 
scholarly world of public finance and public financial management (cf. Schick, 2014). 
Second, there has been an ignorance by researchers for local government, and local 
finances in particular (cf. Bailey, 1999).  
Using a multi-theoretical and European comparative approach this research aims 
to answer the question:  
 
What effects do differences in intergovernmental institutional design have on local 
government financial stress? 
 
The literature indicates that three intergovernmental institutions fundamentally affect 
local finances: (1) the regulatory framework in which LGs operate; (2) grant funding 
systems; (3) and local tax space (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). Based upon this, the 
empirical investigations in this thesis analyse how the system specific design of each of 
these intergovernmental institutions relates to LG financial stress. The following three 
sub questions have been formulated:  
 
- How do systems of intergovernmental regulation and supervision affect LG 
financial behaviour? 
- What are the consequences of grant funding systems on the evolution of LG 
financial stress?  
Local political and 
administrative processes 








- (Local) economic cycle; 
- Demographic structure; 





- To what extent does the nature of local tax space determine local level 
responses to financial stress?  
 
Analysing these questions will help to understand the causes of local financial 
stress, as well as responses towards it. The focus on how different intergovernmental 
contexts relate to LG financial stress, means that the research will generate vital 
knowledge regarding the circumstances under which the interactions within government 
systems enhance systemic risks. These research findings will strongly contribute to theory 
development on policymaking within multi-level governance systems (Hooghe & Marks, 
2003; Jensen, Koop, & Tatham, 2014).1 The thesis builds upon pioneering research in 
policy sciences on error accumulation processes and error correction mechanisms, an 
analytical framework that enables a more integrative analysis of the institutions operating 
in intergovernmental financial systems (Jones & Thomas, 2012; Workman, Jones, & 
Jochim, 2009). As such, answering the research questions will not only improve scholarly 
understanding of the institutional dimension of LG financial stress, but will also advance 
theory development on how different systems of multi-level governance give rise to 
different policy dynamics, and consequently generate dissimilar risks of error 
accumulation, and demonstrate diverging institutional capacities for mitigating those 
risks.  
 
1.3 Analysing LG financial stress 
It has been argued that it is ‘easier to theorize about local governments than study them’ 
(Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). Conducting an empirical investigation into 
financial stress at the local government level in multiple countries increases the 
methodological difficulties. Most importantly, an adequate and feasible indicator of local 
financial stress has to be found that carries relevance in different country contexts. There 
is little consensus in the literature on the question which indicators can be applied to 
determine LG financial conditions (cf. Dollery, 2009; Honadle, Cigler, & Costa, 2004).    
                                                          
1 Intergovernmental relations (IGR) and multi-level governance (MLG) are closely related but show some 
differences. Whereas IGR broadly refers to relations within the public sector and is widely used within 
US government studies, MLG focuses on vertical government relations in Europe generally and the EU in 
particular (Ongaro et al., 2010, p. 1). There have been little interconnections between both approaches, 
which seems less to do with the overall relatively minor differences in topical choice, and more a result of 
generational differences within the scholarly community, combined with a likely desire among MLG 
scholars to re-establish the study of vertical government interactions in a methodological rigorous way 
(e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Hence, for practical reasons, and given the analytical focus in this thesis on 
both the horizontal and vertical relationships between government actors, this thesis refers to the 
theoretical framing of government relationships as IGR, but this does not exclude MLG. 
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 When searching for adequate indicators of LG financial stress it is important, first 
of all, to recognise the specific nature of the finances of LG entities. In contrast to the 
private sector, LG’s are not profit making entities and their budgets are mainly 
consumption driven (Bailey, 1999). Due to this, a reduction in LG expenditure may 
indicate local financial stress. Jacob and Hendrick (2013b, p. 39) refer to the ability to 
provide adequate public services as a municipality’s ‘service-level solvency’. Jones and 
Walker (2007, p. 396) define local financial distress as an ‘inability to provide services at 
pre-existing levels’. The difference between financial stress and financial distress is 
normally defined as the latter representing a more advanced state of financial stress, near 
financial collapse (Cahill, James, Lavigne, & Stacey, 1994; Capalbo, Grossi, Ianni, & 
Sargiacomo, 2012). As the focus in this thesis is not limited to the small group of LGs 
facing such extreme financial conditions, but financial pressures in a wider sense, the 
term financial stress is used instead of distress. By taking the evolution of local service 
levels into account, Jones and Walker’s (2007) definition has the advantage that it 
prevents LGs who radically reduce their public services being classified as without, or in 
less, financial difficulties compared to LGs whose finances are in decline but maintain 
their level of public service provision.  
However, using public service levels as an indicator of local financial stress is 
unfeasible in the quantitative and country-comparative design of this study. Using the 
indicator would require a vast amount of data related to income and expenditure of 
different local public service areas, preferably over longer periods of time. It would also 
require detailed and historical information about service level standards used within the 
three selected systems, as potential adjustments of standards may strongly affect financial 
stress levels at the local level. Due to the primitive state of many LG statistics, vast 
collections of mostly primary data would need to be collected. The controversial and often 
problematic attempts to collect such data (cf. the English Audit Commission) explains 
the limited amount of existing research that uses data on public service levels, and 
indicates the methodological difficulty attached to any attempt to use data related to 
public service standards in a statistical research. The methodological difficulties and 
labor-intensive nature of collecting such data are multiplied in a country comparative 
study, and would go beyond the research capacity of the single investigator.  
Another indicator of local financial stress is the occurrence of a municipality’s 
financial default. Financial defaults of LGs have been particularly observed in the US. 
Since its introduction in 1937 until 2011, around 600 US LGs filed for a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy petition, the majority of them small, special-purpose districts such as water 
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districts or smaller rural municipalities (De Angelis & Tian, 2013, p. 312). Notable cases 
of large LGs have been California’s Orange County in 1994, the Pennsylvanian capital 
Harrisburg in 2011, and, the largest municipal bankruptcy filing in US history, Detroit in 
2013. It needs to be underlined that the American federal regulations on local government 
bankruptcies generally prevent a local financial default to result in a complete default of 
local services (Cahill & James, 1992). With the exception of the Swiss case of Leukerbad 
in 1998 (Uebersax, 2005), LG bankruptcies have been scarce in Europe due to the absence 
of special legislation facilitating local bankruptcies. However, most European countries 
have special arrangements in place to respond to local financial crises. The degree of 
formalization of these arrangements differs strongly between countries; hence, there is 
limited transparency under what local financial stress conditions the arrangements start 
to operate. Because of this, the arrangements constitute a potentially relevant indicator of 
LG financial stress, but their institutional features have to be considered carefully.  
The most obvious indicator of local financial stress is when a LG fails to balance 
its revenues and expenditure flows on a regular basis. This would be translated into 
deficits, and increasing debt levels. A problem, however, arises when attempting to use 
local deficit as a stress indicator. Due to their use of a double-book keeping accounting 
system, many European LGs are subjected to the balanced-budget rule. Hence, they are 
prohibited from running a formal deficit on their current account (Dafflon, 2002). Real 
local deficits might occur but will be reflected in reductions of local reserves, or increases 
of local assets. A more tangible indicator than local deficits is offered by local debt.   
Local debt poses an increasing risk for local finances across Europe, for two 
reasons. First, pressures on current revenue expenditure are increasingly absorbed into 
capital expenditure borrowing. This ‘capitalisation’ of local financial stress occurs despite 
formal borrowing restrictions being in place, which leads to questions regarding the 
adequacy of intergovernmental monitoring structures on local finances. Second, in 
several countries, including Germany, current revenue pressures are widely dealt with at 
the local level by issuing short-term debt (Gröpl et al., 2010). Although offering 
substantial interest rate benefits, short-term liquidity poses significant interest rate risks 
and refinancing risks to LGs. As LGs are involved in the provision of core services to 
citizens, and intergovernmental liability structures in the potential case of a local financial 
default are marked by ambiguity, growing local debt levels may have serious implications 
as to the sustainability of local service delivery. Hence, LG debt provides a relevant and 
tangible indicator of local financial stress. As borrowing might also occur for legitimate 
capital investment purposes, this thesis transforms LG debt figures in order to provide 
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more robust financial stress indicators. In line with transformations common in the 
literature (e.g. Cropf & Wendel, 1998; Benito & Bastida, 2004; Ashworth, Geys, & 
Heyndels, 2005), debt figures have been translated into three different local financial 
stress indicators.  
The first adjustment of the debt indicator is measured on a per capita (p/c) basis, 
providing a better indicator of local debt size for comparable purposes. The second 
adjustment is to correct the debt figures for local reserve levels. Stable or reducing debt 
levels might be a consequence of declining local reserve levels, and increasing debt levels 
might be paralleled by a build-up of local reserves (Jacob & Hendrick, 2013, p. 13). 
Therefore, correcting debt for changes in reserve levels provides a more adequate stress 
indicator compared to an indicator solely based upon debt (cf. Audit Commission, 2012). 
Third, debt has been calculated as percentage of total local income. The usefulness of this 
debt ratio can be demonstrated by comparing it to equity as an indicator widely applied 
in the private sector. Whereas equity for a private sector firm illustrates capital invested 
in a company by its shareholders, equity in case of LG does not exist out of financial 
capital, but is invested in municipal property, such as school buildings (Cheng & Harris, 
2000, p. 195; Lei, 2009). Due to this particular character of LG equity, a situation might 
occur where a LG without equity on its balance sheet might have fewer difficulties 
balancing its budget, compared to a LG that holds significant equity.  
The development of LG income is also crucial to the affordability of LG debt. 
LGs with growing income, for example due to a rising population, will experience a 
relative reduction in the costs of debt, since the relative share of borrowing costs in the 
total local budget also reduces (assuming interest rate is a given constant). The opposite 
situation occurs if a LG faces a structural income reduction, and the costs of their debt 
increase as borrowing costs occupy a larger share of the local budget. Many European 
LGs are confronted with the second scenario due to factors such as cuts in grant funding, 
and population decline. These two categories of LGs demonstrate that the ‘burden of the 
debt’ (Domar, 1944) will differ significantly across LGs depending upon their income 
development.2 This provides a rationale for using LG debt indicated as percentage of LG 
income. 
Given the current state of empirical research, the availability of primary data, and 
cross-country differences in public service levels and accounting systems, this thesis 
                                                          
2 Cf. Domar (1944) demonstrated that the burden of the national debt is determined by the size of the 
national economy. A growing national economy will increase tax revenues, and so reduces the relative 
costs attached to debt, whereas a declining economy, and hence government income, will increase the 
‘burden of the debt’. 
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argues that adjusted debt figures provide the most suitable quantitative indicators 
currently available to make cross-country analyses on LG financial stress. This view is 
supported in the international public finance literature, in which debt, rather than other 
financial indicators, is used as primary indicator to evaluate the financial position of 
government entities (e.g. Musgrave & Musgrave, 1980). The quantitative debt indicator 
will be used in addition with qualitative evidence on local financial stress, through the 
deployment of elite interviews with policymakers across the three systems.    
 
1.4 Intergovernmental structures of the selected systems 
This section shows the basic intergovernmental outline of the selected constitutional 
systems, and provides descriptive statistics about the financial position of their local 
governments. The selected systems are England, as representative of a unitary-centralised 
system, Germany, representing a federation, and the Netherlands, constituting a mixed or 
decentralised-unitary system.  
Indicated by its UK population share of 84%, England occupies a special position 
within the UK. Although English voices can be heard favouring an exclusive English 
government, in practise the UK government operates as a regional central government for 
England (Hazell, 2006). This is illustrated in LG finances by the application of the Barnett 
funding formula for Scotland, Wales and Northern-Ireland, which, as a general grant is 
specified by the devolved governments, whereas UK central government departments 
apply much more specific funding criteria towards English LGs (Mitchell, 2003).  
Germany is divided into 16 Länder, including the areas covered by the three city 
states. In line with its federal structure, the organisation of German local government is 
largely determined at the level of the Länder. Inter-state intergovernmental differences 
led to the decision to concentrate on one German state. North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 
has been selected as it is the largest German state, both in terms of inhabitants and the 
size of its economy. It therefore constitutes a good example of the institutional framing 
of LG financial stress in one of Germany’s most prominent states. The Dutch system 
unites decentralised and unitary features in its state structure, reflecting the country’s 
historical periods of being a republic, as well as a French inspired unitary system. While 
the selection of the systems, and their historical evolution, is further discussed in chapter 







Since the abandonment of the Regional Development Agencies in 2012, a regional level 
has been completely absent within England. Figure 1.2 shows that NRW has two types 
of authorities active at the regional level: government districts and regional authorities. 
The five government districts in NRW (e.g. Detmold) perform a double function: they 
are the first executive agencies for the state government, and they fulfil a coordinating 
and supervisory role towards the counties and county-independent cities. The two 
regional authorities in NRW are responsible for several social services. In the Dutch 
system, the provinces (e.g. South Holland) constitute the regional level, with their main 
responsibilities in spatial and regional economic planning. 
 
Local level 
The local landscape is most homogenous in the Netherlands. All LGs have the similar 
legal position of municipality (gemeente), and, hence, they demonstrate a high degree of 
homogeneity in their tasks. The main distinction at the local level in England and NRW 
is between two-tier and single-tier authorities. In the two-tier authorities, tasks and powers 
are split between the county, and the authorities below them. Around 40% of the English, 
and 60% of the NRW territory is served by two-tier authorities. The English counties (e.g. 
Oxfordshire) are officially known as non-metropolitan counties but since the abolishment 
of the metropolitan counties in 1986, the designation ‘metropolitan’ has become 
superfluous, hence, they will be referred to as counties. The English counties are around 
twice the population size of their NRW counterparts (Kreise, e.g. Lippe) and a similar 
scale difference applies to the population served by the lower tier in the two systems.  
The LGs in the counties differ between England and NRW. In England, they all have a 
similar status as districts (e.g. Oxford), whereas the NRW system further divides them 
into county-dependent LGs with and without city status, referred to as county-dependent 
cities and county-dependent municipalities (kreisangehörige Städte, e.g. Bocholt vs. 
kreisangehörige Gemeinden, e.g. Engelskirchen). The difference in status is used by the 
NRW state government to differently allocate tasks to localities, in practice often resulting 
in (bigger) county-dependent cities conducting more administrative tasks by themselves 
and being less reliant upon the county.3 
Next to the counties, there are country-free areas. In NRW, these are chiefly 
covered by one type of LG: the county-independent city (kreisfreie Stadt, e.g. Bonn). The
                                                          
3 In addition, the county-dependent cities in NRW are further divided into 125 midsized cities (more than 
25,000 inhabitants) and 35 big cities (more than 60,000 inhabitants). 
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Figure 1.2     Core intergovernmental structure of the selected systems: England, Germany/North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), and the Netherlands (2012) 
                                                          England                                   NRW/Germany                      The Netherlands 
National level  pop.  pop.  pop. 
   UK central 
government 
(Westminster & 
Whitehall –  London) 
63.18 mil. 
German federal 





(Rijk – The 
Hague) 
16.77 mil. 
Regional level      pop.            % UK pop.     pop.       % German pop.      pop.             % Dutch pop. 
   





NRW state government 











Sub-regional level    Ø pop. % English pop.  Ø pop. % NRW pop.  Ø pop. % Dutch pop. 
   - - - 5 government districts 
(Bezirksregierungen) 
3.51 mil. 100% 
- - - 
  2 regional authorities 
(Landschaftsverbände) 
8.77 mil. 100% 











level 27 counties  796,367 
40.1% 

























































56 Unitary Authorities  216,300 22.8% 
23 county-independent 









1 city region 
(Städteregion Aachen) 
541,521 3.1% 
33 London boroughs 





N total LG entities                                         354               427            415   
Source: own illustration; data: 2012 national statistics (CBS, Destatis, DCLG, ONS) & own calculations.
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only exception is Aachen, whereby as an administrative experiment, the former county 
Aachen has been merged with the county-free city Aachen. The English system illustrates 
more institutional variety in the county-free areas compared to NRW. Institutionally most 
similar to NRW’s county-independent cities are the English Unitary Authorities (e.g. 
Bristol). The English metropolitan districts (e.g. Manchester) differ somehow from NRW 
county-independent cities, as many of them have joint service delivery boards. The 
institutional structure of the London area is relatively unique – and also unique within the 
English structure. With a split between boroughs (e.g. Tower Hamlets) and the Greater 
London Authority (GLA), LG structures in the London area are best comparable to the 
previous English two-tier metropolitan structures.  
Despite the use of different labels for LGs across the systems, and differences in 
the tasks they conduct, there is a clear main distinction among the LGs inside, and 
between the systems. On the one hand, there are single-tier LGs that are (largely) 
responsible for all public services provided in their area. These are the Dutch gemeente, 
the NRW kreisfreie Stadt, the English Unitary Authority, and, largely in practice, the 
English metropolitan districts and London boroughs. The London boroughs can be treated 
as unitary, since the most important executive tasks of the GLA – , transport, police and 
fire services – are also delivered by separate authorities outside the London area (cf. 
Lockwood, 2013). On the other hand, there are two-tier LGs in which services are split 
between the county, and the authorities below them. These are the English Districts and 
Counties, and the NRW Kreise, kreisangehörige Städte, and kreisangehörige Gemeinden. 
 
1.5 The state of local finances: comparative statistics 
The intergovernmental distribution of debt can be analysed either vertically or 
horizontally. A vertical perspective is illustrated in table 1.1 and shows a (strong) 
concentration of debt at the central level in the UK and the Netherlands, whereas German 
debt is spread out over the different government levels. For all three systems, government 
liability obligations, such as those due to interventions in the financial sector, are excluded 
from the debt statistics. Unless otherwise stated, the data is taken from the fiscal year 
2012. 
Using the government gross consolidated debt definition used in the Eurozone, 
table 1.1 shows that the UK total public sector debt reached 1,664.9 billion € in 2012, 
equal to 86.5% of UK GDP. Most of this debt is held by the UK central government 
(1,644.9 billion €, or 85.4% of UK GDP). According to ONS/Treasury statistics, the UK 
local government sector has an accumulated debt of 103.2 billion €, over 92% of which  
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Table 1.1 Intergovernmental structure of German, UK and Dutch public debt, 2012 
  Debt, billion € Debt € p/c Debt % GDP 
All levels     



















 Netherlands 426.2 25,000 66.5 
Central level    
 German federal 
government 









 Dutch central 
government 
385.2 22,900 60.1 
Regional level    
 Cumulative 16 
German states 
649.1 8,100 24.5  
NRW state 188.9 (2011) 10,595  
(2011) 
32.5 (NRW GDP) 
 Cumulative 12 
Dutch  
provinces 
5.6 333.30 0.9 
Local level    
 Cumulative German 
local government  
133.6 1,700  5.1 
NRW local 
government only 

















 Dutch local 
government 
49.8 2,964 8.6 
 
Source: 2012 national statistics (CBS, Destatis, IT.NRW, DCLG, ONS) & own calculations. 
 
is held by English local government. The difference of 83.2 billion € between the UK’s 
total public sector debt (1,664.9 billion €) versus the debt of UK central and local 
government combined (1,644.9 + 103.2 = 1,748.1 billion €) is explained by 
intergovernmental crossholdings of debt (ONS, 2013).  
Table 1.1 shows that most German debt is held by the federal government – equal 
to 48.7% of Germany’s GDP – the accumulated debt of the German Länder is substantial 
and is equal to roughly half the size of the federal government’s debt. However, there are 
large differences in the debt held by the German Länder, and per capita debt data show 
that NRW is one of the more heavily indebted Länder. Similar to the state level, financial 
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heterogeneity characterises the financial position of LG within the Länder. The total 
accumulated debt of German LG stands at 133.6 billion €, or 5.1% of German GDP. In 
NRW, however, LG debt is equal to 10% of the state’s GDP, resulting in nearly double 
the amount of LG debt held per NRW citizen compared to the average among the Länder 
citizens (Destatis). Reflecting 8.6% of GDP, the debt amount held by the Dutch LG sector 
falls roughly in between the debt volume of the UK and NRW, but is substantially larger 
than the cumulative average of German LG.  
Figure 1.3 shows that all three systems experienced a growth in LG debt since 
1995. However, there have been significantly different trends among the systems. LG 
debt has its most consistent growth in NRW, whereas in the English system it has grown 
dramatically since 2005. The Dutch system shows the most minimal growth in LG debt, 
although after a period of reductions, debt has increased rapidly since 2007.  
The aggregate statistics conceal substantial financial heterogeneity in the debt 
held by different LG types. Table 1.2 shows the local debt position in England and NRW 
in 2012 according to LG type. In England and NRW, the average debt per capita is highest 
in the single-tier LGs. Of these authorities, the NRW county-free cities are stronger 
indebted compared to the English city areas. Among the English city areas, the Unitary  
 
Figure 1.3    Index LG debt evolution, 1995-2012 (1995 = 100) 
 














Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics detailing the institutional spread of LG debt, 2012 
 
Source: 2012 national statistics (Destatis, IT.NRW, DCLG, ONS) & own calculations. 
 
Authorities have the lowest debt (1,333 € p/c), and the metropolitan districts are most 
heavily indebted (1,954 € p/c). The London boroughs occupy a middle position. The 
minimum and maximum debt values confirm the observations: the highest maximum debt 
position (8,400 € p/c) is occupied by a county-free city in NRW (Oberhausen), while the 
only debt free single-tier authority in England is a Unitary Authority (Bracknell Forest). 
In the county areas, the county administrations in NRW hold less debt compared 
to their English counterparts. The situation is different when the cumulative debt position 
of the counties is observed, including the lower tier. In that case, the debt of the English 
counties is less than one fourth of the NRW counties. This is reflected by the mean debt 
p/c of the NRW county-dependent LGs, which is roughly three times the debt size held 
by English non-metropolitan districts. The comparatively limited debt position of English 
districts is also indicated by around 20% of them being debt free. 
 Mean debt 
per LG, 
million €  
Mean debt 
p/c, €   
Standard 
deviation 
debt p/c, € 
Min. debt 
p/c, €  
Max. debt 
p/c, €  
% LGs debt 
free (n= 
absolute) 
City areas       
NRW county-free 
cities 






































County areas       
NRW counties 62.01 173.06 179.53 0 877.74 6.7 (2) 
English counties 578.61 
(469.42 £) 
747.30 








NRW cumulative LGs 
within counties 
814.25 2,225.85 954.24 877.24 4,548.14 0 
English cumulative 
LGs within counties  
430.99 
(£ 349.66 £)  
508.56 
(£ 412.59 £) 
295.38 
(£ 239.64 £) 
16.29 
(£ 13.22 £) 
1,190.68 
(£ 965.99 £) 
0 
County-dependent areas      
NRW county-
dependent cities 
81.75 2,059.23 1,271.91 0 6,566.64 1.6 (4) 
NRW county-
dependent LGs 
19.26 1,414.16 1,165.08 0 5,091.25 6.3 (8) 











Miscellaneous areas       





 (1,039.33 £) 
- - - - 
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Most of the local debt in NRW is concentrated in the county-free cities, whereas both the 
counties, and county-dependent areas score below NRW’s average debt level (3,256 € 
p/c). In England, only metropolitan districts outnumber the average LG debt level in 
England (1,716 € p/c). For the large part, the high total of English LG debt reflects debt 
held by the GLA. The GLA’s debt of around 10.5 billion € makes the London area the 
most heavily indebted area of England (2,810 € p/c for the London boroughs and GLA 
combined), and significantly increases the average debt level of the English LG sector.  
The descriptive statistics in this section illustrate that institutional differences 
affect the financial position of LGs. Due to this, it can be expected that the increase of 
LG debt, as a likely reflection of increased LG financial stress, is affected by institutional 
variables. To a large extent, the institutional differences are linked to differences in LG 
population size.  
Figure 1.4 shows that in all three constitutional systems debt increases with an 
increase in population size, with the highest debt positions taken by LGs with more than 
350,000 inhabitants. The concentration of debt in large LGs is confirmed in table 1.3, 
which shows that the largest absolute debt volumes are concentrated within the biggest 
cities. Different LGs are listed when using the indicators debt p/c, and debt as percentage 
of income. The top five maximum cases demonstrate relatively similar debt volumes in 
the Dutch and NRW systems. The top five indebted LGs in p/c terms in the English 
 
Figure 1.4     Mean LG debt p/c, by population size, 2012 € (excluding NRW counties)   
 
 
= England                 = NRW                 = The Netherlands 
 













0 – 10,000 10 – 25,000 25 -50,000 50 – 100,000 100 – 200,000 200 – 350,000350,001 – above all
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Table 1.3   LGs with highest debt volumes, 2012 
 
England  The Netherlands  NRW   
Top 5 – debt total bil. € Top 5 – debt total bil. € Top 5 – debt total bil. € 
Birmingham 3.4 Amsterdam 4.3 Cologne 4.5 
Leeds 1.6 Rotterdam 2.4 Duisburg 3.3 
Kent County 1.2 Groningen 1.2 Essen 3.2 
Nottingham 0.9 The Hague 1.1 Dortmund 2.4 
Dudley 0.9 Utrecht 0.9 Wuppertal 1.9 
      
Top 5 – debt p/c € Top 5 – debt p/c € Top 5 – debt p/c € 
Woking 4,100 Hengelo    8,700 Oberhausen  8,400 
South Tyneside 4,000 Spijkenisse 6,600 Hagen  7,400 
Gateshead 3,400 Schiermonnikoog 6,300 Remscheid  7,100 
Welwyn Hatfield 3,200 Groningen 6,100 Mülheim an der Ruhr  6,800 
Harlow 2,600 Gemert-Bakel 5,900 Siegburg  6,500 
      
Top 5 – debt % income Top 5 – debt % income Top 5 – debt % income 
Woking 720 Hengelo 295 Windeck  257 
Dacorum 422 Barneveld 293 Siegburg  247 
Welwyn Hatfield 408 Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 261 Oberhausen  246 
Stevenage 363 Gemert-Bakel 258 Lindlar  245 
North East Derbyshire 362 Ten Boer 255 Werl  238 
 
Source: own illustration; based upon national statistics (CBS, IT.NRW, DCLG & ONS) & own 
calculations. 
 
system demonstrate debt figures around half the size of their Dutch and NRW 
counterparts.4 
The descriptive statistics demonstrate a strong rise in LG debt across the three 
systems in the period since 1995, but with significant differences between the systems, 
and among LGs within the systems. This thesis investigates the institutional dimension 
of the increase in LG debt in three core empirical chapters.  
 
1.6 Chapter outline 
Following this introduction, chapter two provides a literature review. The review 
develops a conceptual framework to analyse the impact of intergovernmental institutions 
on local finances in a country comparative research design. The literature review 
identifies three core intergovernmental financial institutions, which each affect LG 
finances across the three systems: intergovernmental regulations, grant funding systems, 
and local tax space.  
                                                          
4 The high debt levels, measured as percentage of income, of the five LGs in the English system have 
different backgrounds, and are partly related to the introduction of Housing Revenue Account (HRA) 
self-financing in 2012, as well as historical territorial restructurings. 
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Chapter three discusses the methodological aspects of the research, concentrating 
on conducting combined qualitative and quantitative methods. The chapter also provides 
a comparative historical overview of intergovernmental trends in the three selected 
European systems over the past decades. 
Chapter four analyses the impact of regulatory structures on local debt. The 
regulatory intergovernmental mechanism is especially analysed through investigating the 
relationship between local borrowing costs and local debt accumulation.  
Chapter five investigates the impact of grant funding systems on LG debt 
development. The chapter shows that grant allocation patterns in practice differ from what 
would be expected based upon the technical design of the grant funding systems in place. 
Grant deviations are explained by political and institutional factors, and these factors 
change the relationship between grants and debt.     
Chapter six investigates local tax space as the third and final intergovernmental 
financial institution. The chapter concentrates on how the nature of local tax space 
impacts the fiscal response of LGs to financial stress. The analysis demonstrates to what 
extent local tax space contributes to the error correction capacity of different IGR 
financial systems.  
The thesis concludes by summarising the research findings and contributions to 
the literature, a discussion of the research limitations, its policy implications, and an 






















Studying financial relationships among government levels has a long tradition in the 
social sciences. Following the strong institutionalization of public finances within 
economics, especially from the 1950s onwards, most of this research has been strongly 
based on economic assumptions. The approach of economists towards public finances is 
most noticeable in the study of fiscal federalism (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). The 
increasingly sophisticated theories produced within fiscal federalism contain valuable 
insights into the most efficient organisation of the vertical structures of government 
systems. However, due to limited theory testing, the relevance of fiscal federalism for 
understanding the logic and mechanisms through which real world intergovernmental 
financial systems operate has remained uncertain.  
The limited number of empirical studies that are available often show weak results 
supporting fiscal federalism’s economically driven propositions (e.g. Dowding, John, & 
Biggs, 1994; Inman, 1988). In addition, the highly specialised nature of much economics 
research into intergovernmental relationships has resulted in a methodologically 
advanced but also highly fragmented research field. The effects of individual 
intergovernmental financial institutions are widely researched, such as grants or taxes. 
However, the relevant question as to the combined impact of the different 
intergovernmental institutions on local finances is virtually ignored.   
Another explanation for the weak operationalisation of institutional factors in 
fiscal federalism results from the methodological preference to conduct single country 
studies. Studies by organisations such as the OECD and World Bank include country 
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comparisons of intergovernmental finances, but mainly of a descriptive nature (e.g. 
OECD, 2012; Ter-Minassian, 1997). The preference for single country studies is strongly 
driven by scholarly pragmatism: as most theories have evolved on the basis of single 
country studies, building upon these theories is easiest by studying a single system, or 
selecting multiple ones that are very similar in institutional design. Consequently, the 
institutional dimension of local financial stress has been seriously neglected in the 
literature, which is evident in any attempt to export theories across institutional contexts. 
Oates clearly acknowledges the explanatory shortcomings of fiscal federalism in 
a 2005 article titled ‘Towards a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’. 
Whereas classic fiscal federalism theory naively assumes that governments act 
benevolently to maximise social welfare, more recent research on intergovernmental 
finances demonstrates that voters and officials are not always driven by ‘common good 
considerations’. These theories, to which Oates refers as second-generation fiscal 
federalism (SGFF), demonstrate that voters and officials have their own objectives and 
respond to institutional incentives. In contrast to classic fiscal federalism, SGFF theories 
draw on literature beyond the field of public economics, such as organisation theory and 
public choice theory (Oates, 2005; Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981).  
A major contributor to SGFF is Rodden, whose work investigates the relationship 
between vertical fiscal imbalances and subnational budget institutions. In a 2006 
comparative study, Rodden deploys a multi-method approach to investigate how 
subnational borrowing capabilities affect the fiscal position of the regional level, 
especially in Germany and Brazil. The study demonstrates that it is not institutional forms 
themselves that determine fiscal outcomes, but the way in which political actors operate 
within a given institutional framework. According to Rodden (2006), the greater the 
political disconnection between the centre and subnational governments, the more likely 
subnational government rent-seeking behaviour will occur. 
 The direct relevance for the study of local financial stress of SGFF has hitherto 
remained uncertain – this is especially because of the dominant focus in this literature on 
interactions between the regional and national level, which are likely to occur in a much 
more politicised context than local-national level interactions. This is due to the generally 
much smaller number of regional compared to local level entities, which provides many 
more opportunities for direct political interaction processes between regional level 
entities and the national government, as compared to local level entities and the national 
level. In addition, many SGFF studies that include the local level solely draw upon 
aggregate statistics, or refer to a small number of cases (Inman, 2003; Rodden, 2002). 
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Due to the large fiscal diversity between local entities that has been observed within 
several political systems, theorizing about actor’s behaviour on the basis of aggregate 
data solely, or based on a small number of case studies, may contain large risks.  
As another major contributor to SGFF, Von Hagen (2008) acknowledges the need 
for political economy investigations covering all government levels, including the local, 
and research that is more cognizant of constitutional aspects. Although political economy 
has generated relevant insights for the conduct of fiscal policy, such as the fiscal effects 
of the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians (Persson, Roland, & 
Tabellini, 1997), and the common-pool problem in budgetary politics (Hallerberg, 
Strauch, & Von Hagen, 2009; Poterba & Hagen, 1999) (see also later in this chapter), 
Von Hagen emphasises that the impact of constitutional aspects, such as levels of 
decentralisation, has remained underexplored. This is particularly problematic, according 
to Von Hagen, since constitutional aspects ‘seem to be more fundamental [for fiscal 
performance] than budgetary processes’ (Von Hagen, 2008, p. 474).  
 More so than SGFF, the field of intergovernmentalism has widely explored 
‘lower-level institutions’ (Von Hagen, 2008, p. 474) – or the political and administrative 
factors influencing vertical government systems. Besides minimal attention for public 
finances, theoretical rigor has unfortunately remained restricted in intergovernmentalism, 
due to the lack of genuinely comparative investigations, which stand in sharp contrast to 
the number of frequently published and inevitably under-conceptualized edited 
intergovernmental studies (e.g. Denters & Rose, 2005; Loughlin, 2001b). In addition, the 
growing importance of the EU government level, resulting in the thriving scholarly field 
of multi-level governance, has been at the expense of the study of vertical government 
relationships within a domestic context (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Ongaro, Massey, 
Holzer, & Wayenberg, 2010).  
Hence, in order to conduct a country comparative analysis of intergovernmental 
dynamics affecting LG financial stress, a conceptual framework is required that exceeds 
individual country descriptions but does not result in a narrow and formalised set of 
assumptions. Although the latter is methodologically tempting, as it would allow for the 
development of sophisticated methodological models, it is likely to result in theories that 
will only marginally contribute to our understanding of government systems, or would 
have an opposite effect. In this thesis, pioneering theories from policy sciences are found 
to provide a relevant framework to analyse cross-country institutional dynamics in 
intergovernmental financial systems.  
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, theory development in 
policy sciences is discussed, contrasting some of its insights to models of rational 
maximisation. Second, core intergovernmental institutions that affect local finances are 
introduced in the third section. The chapter identifies three core institutions: 
intergovernmental financial regulations; grant systems; and local tax space. Based upon 
an extensive literature review, which particularly draws upon recent insights from SGFF 
and budget theory, hypotheses are formulated as to how each of the institutions will affect 
the financial position of local authorities. The final section concludes the literature 
review.  
 
2.2 A policy dynamics approach towards intergovernmental financial systems 
The question do institutions matter has been central in social science research in the past 
decades. The topic has given rise to a vast scholarly field known as neoinstitutionalism 
(see for an overview: Hall & Taylor, 1996). Despite the extensive literature, theory 
development on the working of institutions has been modest. An important factor that has 
constrained progress in institutional theory has been the lasting schism in government 
studies between analyses that rely upon models of rational maximisation and those that 
do not. The schism has tended to polarize scholars and has resulted in explanatory models 
that are either based upon formal models using narrow assumptions, or studies taking a 
non-formalistic but often rather eclectic explanatory approach. The schism has 
undermined theory development, with institutional theories having shown particular 
weaknesses at explaining institutional change, and institutional interactions (cf. Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; Jones, 2001; Peters, 2005). Although still undermining research on 
institutions, there are welcoming signs that the schism is having less impact on more 
recent scholarly work. In particular, SGFF theory demonstrates that by applying a multi-
theoretical and multi-methodological approach, strong contributions can be made to the 
institutional literature. 
Another relevant explanation for the lack of progress in institutional theories is 
that the ground-breaking theoretical work conducted from a behavioural perspective in 
the 1950s received a limited following in mainstream government studies. Herbert Simon 
is particularly noteworthy here, as his work combined theoretical strengths with realistic 
assumptions of human behaviour. Simon’s core contribution is his concept of bounded 
rationality. A basic formulation of the concept first appeared in Administrative Behavior 
(1947) and the concept can be characterised by four principles (Jones & Thomas, 2012; 
Simon, 1947). First, the principle of intended rationality emphasises that people are goal-
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oriented but often fail to accomplish goals because of interactions between their cognitive 
architectures and the complexities of their environment. Secondly, human behaviour is 
characterised by adaptation, which puts emphasis on the fact that human problem-solving 
behaviour is learned and as such is subject to improvement. The fundamentally adaptive 
nature of human behaviour leads to the inference that the more time decision-makers 
spend on a problem, the more likely it is that the limitations of their cognitive architecture 
evaporate (Newell, 1994). Uncertainty is the third principle and emphasises that human 
psychology plays a crucial role in how we perceive and respond to risk. Finally, Simon’s 
model underlines the cognitive difficulties people can experience with trade-offs. Due to 
limited attention spans, people generally work on goals sequentially. As a result, trade-
offs among goals are difficult to implement (Jones, 2003, p. 399). 
Jones (2003) convincingly argues that a study of political behaviour that relies on 
behavioural assumptions will be drawn toward the study of information processing and 
problem solving, both argued to be critical determinants of government performance. A 
behavioural approach will be less focused on questions of equilibrium and control, topics 
that have occupied large parts of the political science community in the past decades, 
illustrated by widely tested theories such as principal-agent models (cf. Bendor, Taylor, 
& Gaalen, 1987; Miller, 2005). Taking a behavioural approach demonstrates that the 
nature of information streams diverges, depending upon the political infrastructure in 
place. In his work The Nerves of Government (1963), Deutsch provides the first major 
study investigating information streams in government systems. Based upon insights 
from modern biology, Deutsch developed a theory of information processing, using 
concepts such as feedback loops, decision points, and evolutionary dynamics. Despite its 
impact at the time, the study did not trigger further work toward a general theory of 
information processing in government systems (Workman, Jones, & Jochim, 2009, p. 77). 
Recent research in policy sciences has reconnected to information processing 
theory, particularly in relation to punctuated equilibrium theory. The latter theory 
emphasises that although political processes are generally marked by stability and 
incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959; Wildavsky, 1964), they occasionally produce large-
scale departures from the past (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Baumgartner, Jones, & 
Mortensen, 2014, p. 59). The intellectual roots of punctuated equilibrium theory are 
generally traced to the study of complex systems (Érdi, 2007), which investigates 
complex interactions among components of a system that can generate considerable 
37 
 
unpredictability.5 Complexity in political systems can lead to destabilizing events that 
change the status quo, leading to short processes of radical changes that establish a new 
policy equilibrium (Baumgartner et al., 2014, p. 61). While complexity theory itself 
suffers from the lack of a coherent and agreed-upon theoretical body of knowledge (cf. 
Gerrits & Marks, 2015), punctuated equilibrium theory is a flourishing research field. The 
cognitive framework that underpins punctuated equilibrium theory is bounded rationality, 
since the mechanisms associated with human cognitive architecture are also characteristic 
of organisations, including governments (Jones, 2001).  
Workman, Jones and Jochim (2009) apply bounded rationality to develop an 
information processing theory. Their theory emphasises that attention is crucial to 
understanding processes of policy change. According to information processing theory, 
organisations, like policymakers, are confronted with an oversupply of information. This 
contrasts with mainstream theories of politics, which generally view the decision problem 
as one of an undersupply of information that is held privately (e.g. Niskanen, 1975). Due 
to information oversupply, policymakers must rank information by its relevance 
(Workman et al., 2009, p. 78).  
Parallel processing and serial processing are different mechanisms through which 
policy actors are able to prioritise attention. Parallel processing refers to the ability of 
people in organisations to address multiple issues simultaneously. In practice, most 
organisations show a low capacity for parallel processing and instead process information 
in a serial, one-at-a-time mode (Workman et al., 2009, p. 79). This is due to two main 
institutional frictions. First, the short attention span of policymakers means that 
institutions generally change slowly. Second, high institutional decision costs incentivise 
policymakers to concentrate on one issue at a time. Due to the concentration on single 
issues, organisations will overrespond to some issues and underrespond to others. These 
institutional frictions translate into long periods of stability, which are punctuated by short 
bursts of large-scale policy change. The relationship between policymakers’ cognitive 
limitations versus institutional decision costs is not a linear one, and the exact relationship 
between them is likely to differ depending upon policy area or institutional context. 
Institutional frictions caused by policymakers’ cognitive limitations might be lower in 
one policy area compared to another, resulting in different dynamics of policy change 
depending upon the nature of the issue (Lowi, 1964). Many policy issues are inherently 
                                                          
5 However, punctuated equilibrium theory also shows strong similarities with what Wildavsky (1964), 
and Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966) already referred to as ‘shift points’.     
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complex and multi-dimensional, which explains why, overtime, issues can be redefined 
by actors along different dimensions. 
The impact of institutional frictions result in disproportionate information 
processing, to which Workman et al. (2009) refer as ‘errors’. An error is defined as a 
‘nonresponse of the governing system to new signals or information in the policy 
environment’ (Workman et al., 2009, p. 81). According to Workman et al. (2009), 
institutional features give rise to two error related phenomena: error accumulation 
processes and error correction mechanisms. Error accumulation refers to the fact that due 
to serial information processing and high decision costs, actors ignore policy errors over 
long periods of time, leading to a build-up of errors. Processes of error accumulation 
eventually forces actors to respond but the capacity to do so differs between systems 
(Workman et al., 2009, p. 82). Error correction mechanisms refer to the system’s capacity 
to correct errors that have been developed in the policy system. Workman et al. (2009) 
do hardly elaborate on the policy features that might characterise error accumulation 
processes and error correction mechanisms. Differences in institutional structures will 
affect how information processing dynamics contribute to error accumulation and error 
correction capacity. The next section offers a further discussion of the two error terms, 
focusing on different institutional contexts. 
 
2.2.1     Error accumulation processes 
Workman et al. (2009, p. 85) emphasise that multi-layered intergovernmental structures 
enhance the risk of ‘inefficient’ channels of information, which will increase risks of 
information oversupply. In contrast, hierarchical and unitary intergovernmental channels 
of information are likely to result in information undersupply. In this view, jurisdictional 
overlap increases the supply of information to policymakers, whereas a centralised system 
will have difficulties generating counter-knowledge, making the system ‘maladaptive’ 
(Workman et al., 2009, p. 85).  
 A larger number of influential actors, such as subnational authorities or a 
constitutional court, will increase the supply of information to policymakers. In addition, 
a wider range of actors will be able to influence the policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995). These 
information processing dynamics point towards the importance of what Workman et al. 
(2009) label ‘interinstitutional signalling’, which emphasises that in order to understand 
the supply of information in the policy process it is critical to understand the manner at 
which information processes flow between government actors.  
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 Error accumulation processes can be observed as a form of policy feedback into 
the system. While policy feedback is mostly related with self-reinforcement, hence 
stimulating path dependent processes, feedback mechanisms can also carry policies that 
become self-undermining over time. These feedback processes contribute to error 
accumulation and increase the likelihood of a major change in policy direction (Jacobs & 
Weaver, 2014).   
 
2.2.2 Error correction mechanisms 
Similar to error accumulation processes, error correction mechanisms are likely to differ 
depending upon the constitutional structures in place. For the analysis of 
intergovernmental financial systems, this thesis distinguishes between three error 
correction mechanisms: political correction mechanisms, legal-institutional correction 
mechanisms, and economic-financial correction mechanisms. While the three error 
correction modes can operate simultaneously, it is most likely that the constitutional 
features will result in some correction mechanisms being more frequently employed than 
others. Some examples illustrate this. 
 Political correction mechanisms operate through actors carrying an explicit party 
political profile, such as a popularly elected government minister who resolves a policy 
issue by aligning with a subnational politician holding a similar party political 
background. When applying political correction mechanisms to different constitutional 
structures, it can be expected that in centralised systems correction mechanisms will be 
of a strong political nature as central level executives hold a dominant position and limited 
veto players are present (Tsebelis, 2000; Ward & John, 1999). Error correction will take 
place through legal-institutional mechanisms when non-political institutions amend 
errors. Examples are mediation by judicial or administrative institutions, such as 
administrative procedures that require right of approval by third parties affected by 
proposed policies. Finally, policy errors can be corrected without direct intervention by 
policy actors as a consequence of changes in the external policy environment. Financial 
stress among government actors might be eliminated by the occurrence of an economic 
recovery, which will reduce the pressure to implement a policy based solution to financial 
tensions.  
 The system’s success at identifying errors is a crucial determinant of the 
effectiveness of error correction mechanisms. Effective processes of information 
acquisition are critical in order to identify errors. Success in information acquisition is 
determined by three key dimensions: intensity, speed and the source of information 
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(Zahra & George, 2002, p. 189). In IGR systems, intensity and speed refer, for example, 
to the effort and reaction speed of monitoring by regulatory agencies. The source of 
information refers to the direction of knowledge accumulation within IGR systems, which 
may be top-down, bottom-up, or a combination of both.  
 
2.3    Intergovernmental relations (IGR): core financial institutions 
Given a fragmentation in research topics and the dominance of single country studies, the 
impact of intergovernmental institutions on local finances is poorly understood. In order 
to identify how local finances are affected by intergovernmental structures a framework 
is needed that allows the integration and identification of multiple institutions. The 
literature indicates that three intergovernmental institutions fundamentally impact local 
finances across constitutional contexts: (1) the regulatory framework in which LGs 
operate; (2) grant mechanisms; (3) and local tax space (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972).
 In line with Easton’s (1965) approach to the analysis of political systems, it is 
assumed in this research that although each of the financial institutions can be studied in 
isolation, to understand and compare their local financial impact the institutions have to 
be studied alongside each other. This is even more relevant when considering the effect 
of individual institutions in a comparative constitutional framework. The institutions all 
produce separate input and output into their respective intergovernmental system, but 
input and output of every institution is fundamentally shaped by interaction with other 
institutions. Core local output indicators are local treasury variables, which constitute 
feedback input into the intergovernmental structure. Feedback can take many other forms: 
it ranges from purely formal feedback, for example aimed at fulfilling some regulatory 
obligations connected to grant funding, to highly politicised feedback, such as a local led 
campaign to increase grant funding.    
The different intergovernmental institutions are perceived as policy subsystems. 
It can be expected that different policy dynamics operate within each of the subsystems. 
Below, four hypotheses are formulated on the relationship between LG financial stress 
and each of the three financial institutions. As explained before, debt is used as the main 
local financial stress indicator.  
 
2.3.1 The financial regulatory framework and LG financial stress 
Research about the impact of regulatory systems on local debt accumulation demonstrates 
a large diversity in topical approaches. Scholars have investigated the impact of 
accounting frameworks (Rivenbark & Roenigk, 2011), budgetary procedures (Cabasés, 
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Pascual, & Vallés, 2007; Lewis, 1994; Tovmo, 2007), and vertical supervision exercised 
within intergovernmental systems (Berman, 1995; Capalbo et al., 2012; Kloha, Weissert, 
& Kleine, 2005). The regulatory space in which LGs operate is likely to constitute one of 
the core error correction mechanisms to prevent financial imbalances occurring at the 
local level. However, cognitive limitations among regulators are likely to reduce the 
effectiveness of IGR financial regulations, giving rise to error accumulation processes.  
 The impact of regulatory structures on local finances will differ between systems. 
On a constitutional scale, it can be expected that the regulatory framework in a more 
centralised system leaves marginal space for error accumulation, as error correction 
capacity is likely to be extensive and the system is able to respond promptly. Research on 
the dynamics between state taxes and spending in US states during the late 1980s 
demonstrates that more restrictive state institutions, such as ‘no-deficit-carryover’ rules, 
are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustments to fiscal shocks (Alt & Lowry, 1994; 
Poterba, 1994). However, more restrictive, and hence more centralised systems might 
suffer from information undersupply, which will negatively affect regulatory 
performance. In a more decentralised and pluriform IGR system, information processing 
between regulators will be more fragmented, enhancing the risk of inefficient channels of 
information.  
 Previous findings demonstrate a negative relationship between a government’s 
regulatory structure versus the borrowing costs it faces (Bayoumi, Goldstein, & Woglom, 
1995; Johnson & Kriz, 2005). Given its claim to government budgets, borrowing costs 
can be expected to operate as an indirect regulatory error correction mechanism. LG 
borrowing costs also offer one of the few available statistical indicators that can be linked 
to the regulatory framework, as the framework is likely to be a major determinant of LG 
borrowing costs. Through borrowing costs, regulatory systems will be a major 
determinant of LG debt development. Hence, borrowing costs are used as the main 
statistical indicator to determine the (indirect) effect of the regulatory framework on LG 
debt evolution.  
 The effect of borrowing costs on LG debt evolution constitutes a scarcely 
researched topic. Most of the literature investigating local borrowing costs has focused 
on municipal bonds, largely in the US. Although bond market funding among European 
LGs selected in this study is small compared to bank loans, behaviour that is identified 
by US municipal bond buyers might be comparable to behaviour shown by providers of 
loans to European LGs. The US literature mostly concentrates on the effects of local debt 
on local borrowing costs, rather than the other way around. The literature on the debt-
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borrowing costs relationship reveals mixed findings. A study by Capeci (1991) finds no 
effect of outstanding debt per capita on LG borrowing costs, in contrast to the significant 
effect the author identifies of bond ratings, with higher ratings producing lower interest 
rates. Similar results are shown by Poterba and Rueben (2001), and by Robbins and 
Simonsen (2012). Opposite findings occur in Benson, Marks and Raman (1984), and by 
Marks and Raman (1985), who show that larger amounts of city debt are associated with 
higher net borrowing costs. Despite these ambiguous results, most American studies 
demonstrate a significant effect of bond ratings, as given by credit rating agencies, on 
borrowing costs. However, as local level credit ratings for individual LGs are only used 
by a very small number of LGs in the country selection of this study, it can be expected 
that investors mainly rely upon the regulatory regimes in place as determinants for LG 
borrowing costs. Given the importance of the macro level regulatory regimes for the 
perception of local level risk presence (Peng, Kriz, & Wang, 2014), it can be expected 
that limited risk assessment is being conducted at the local level by credit providers to 
Dutch, English and German LGs. 
Hence the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: LG debt has no significant effect on LG borrowing costs. 
 
Although less frequently studied in this causal direction, the decision about whether or 
not to take on debt will be affected by the costs that are attached to debt making. Studies 
on national governments illustrate that politicians are more willing to increase borrowing 
in a situation of low borrowing costs (e.g. Drazen, 1997; Faini, 2006). Borrowing costs 
will occupy a larger share of the available budget if interest rates are high, which reduces 
political willingness for entering into debt.  
Hence: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: borrowing costs are negatively related to LG debt. 
 
The business literature illustrates a negative relationship between firm size and borrowing 
costs (Piot & Missonier-Piera, 2007; Reeb, Mansi, & Allee, 2001). This relationship 
might also apply to public sector entities, for several reasons. First, larger LGs tend to 
employ more professional financial management compared to smaller LGs (Simonsen, 
Robbins, & Helgerson, 2001). This is likely to be perceived by lenders as a form of risk 
reduction. A more professional treasury will also improve the chances for a locality in 
finding the most advantageous borrowing deals. Second, the size of a LG will affect the 
responses of higher government levels during situations of financial distress. The history 
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of LG financial distress demonstrates that higher government levels are more eager to 
provide financial support to larger as opposed to smaller LGs. The literature provides 
multiple reasons for this difference in support. The electoral importance of bigger LGs 
makes politicians more wary to allow interruptions of service provision in large LGs, as 
dislocated voters place some of the blame on the centre (Anagnoson, 1982). International 
visibility and potential ‘reputational effects’ of a bankruptcy of a large LG are also 
significant (Oates, 2005, p. 362). The eventual federal bailout received by a nearly 
defaulting New York City in the 1970s was primarily driven by concerns among the US 
federal administration of the city’s bankruptcy triggering a global dollar crisis 
(Morgenson, 2008; Shefter, 1992). The higher the quality of local treasury management 
and a reduced risk of financial default of large LGs are likely to be rewarded by credit 
markets with the levying of lower interest costs. 
 Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3: borrowing costs are negatively related to the local population size.  
  
The regulatory framework might apply to all local financial categories through the 
guidelines it sets out regarding LGs’ income, expenditure and debt making possibilities. 
Differences in income structures may have different effects upon local debt accumulation. 
It can be expected that LGs with a larger total income will have a larger capacity for 
taking on debt. A positive relationship between a jurisdiction’s income and the scale of 
its debt has been identified in several previous studies. In a study of 298 Flemish LGs 
over the period 1977-2000, Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels (2005) illustrate a positive 
relationship between local income and debt, and a similar relationship is identified by 
Benito and Bastida (2004) using a random sample of 130 Spanish cities over a five-year 
period. The positive relationship between local income and local debt is likely to be 
affected by the level of borrowing costs LGs face. Low borrowing costs will increase the 
positive relationship between LG income and LG debt.  
  Hence, the hypothesis is formulated: 
 
 Hypothesis 4: low LG borrowing costs enhance the positive relationship between 
LG income and LG debt. 
 
Research on the regulation of public sector organisations demonstrates that regulatory 
agencies that have a larger degree of autonomy from both their political superiors and the 
organisations they are supposed to regulate, have a higher quality of regulatory output 
(Gilardi, 2008). Differences in local regulatory compliance are likely to be reflected in 
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differences in local debt accumulation. It can be expected that the more autonomous 
regulators are, the better they will be at enforcing regulatory compliance at the local level, 
and hence restraining debt growth, assuming such regulations are in place. Some 
regulatory behaviour can be expected to occur across regulatory structures. An illustration 
is the cognitive limitations of regulators, resulting in the scenario where regulators will 
ignore financial error accumulation for long periods of time, until local financial problems 
become very visible.  
All the outlined hypotheses can be tested using quantitative techniques. The 
econometric relationship to investigate the effect of LG borrowing costs on LG debt 
evolution is illustrated in figure 2.1. It illustrates that the positive relationship between 
LG income and LG debt is enhanced by low borrowing costs. 
 
Figure 2.1 Econometric relationship to investigate the (indirect) impact of the 







2.3.2 Grant funding systems and LG financial stress 
The grant funding system constitutes the second intergovernmental institution affecting 
LG financial stress. Despite the large volumes of public funding involved, grant funding 
systems to local government have received limited scholarly attention. As a supposedly 
economic topic but with strong institutional dimensions, the study of grant systems has 
fallen victim to largely still mono-disciplinary functioning social sciences. A large 
literature on redistribution systems can be found in the public finance literature, 
traditionally characterised by a highly theoretical approach (e.g. Breton, 1965; Buchanan, 
1952; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Oates, 1972). Although empirical studies of grant 
systems have increased in recent decades, empirical work is focused on grant mechanisms 
between central and regional government. To a large extent, this research choice can be 
explained by scholarly pragmatism as the data requirements for meso government entities 
are easier to fulfil than for the much larger number of government entities at the local 








countries that lack an institutionalised meso level are underrepresented, while studies on 
federal systems dominate the literature (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006; Larcinese, Rizzo, 
& Testa, 2013; Musgrave, 1997).  
As well as the dominance of central-state level studies, research on grant systems 
reflect a general weakness of both public finance and intergovernmental studies: a strong 
bias towards single country studies. While a number of studies on central-state level grant 
systems do take a country comparative approach (e.g. Boadway & Shah, 2007; Melitz & 
Zumer, 2002), Buettner (2009) stands alone as an empirical scholarly comparison of 
redistribution systems between the local and central level across countries (Germany and 
the US). Due to this, the institutional dimension of grant systems has been seriously 
neglected in the literature.  
A further limitation of empirical work on grant systems is their narrow financial 
focus. Studies that include grant variables mostly analyse their effect on total expenditure 
or income (e.g. Mehiriz & Marceau, 2014; Veiga & Veiga, 2007), which say little about 
the consequences of grant funding on the wider financial position of involved government 
entities. This narrow scholarly orientation is surprising given that non-academic debates 
across intergovernmental systems focus on the adequacy of grant funding in meeting 
LGs’ expenditure obligations and its impact on the wider financial position of LGs, such 
as reflected in the local budget balance, debt and reserve levels (cf. Jacob & Hendrick, 
2013a). In order to analyse the contribution of grant funding to error accumulation and 
error correction capacity within different European systems, this section develops four 
hypotheses.  
 
In most systems, grants act as mechanisms to compensate for inter-local variation in 
revenue raising capacity. It can be assumed that the financial base position of LGs with 
high grant dependence and weak local tax capacity is weaker than LGs with low grant 
dependence and a strong local tax capacity. This difference in financial position arises 
because few intergovernmental systems completely equalise inter-jurisdictional 
differences in local tax capacity so as not to de-incentivise local tax effort (Boadway & 
Shah, 2007). However, empirical studies that analyse how grant funding affects the 
financial position of governments are limited. The few available studies that analyse the 
impact of intergovernmental grants on debt levels almost exclusively relate to the US. 
Clingermayer and Wood (1995) study 48 US states over a nearly four decade period and 
demonstrate that states with higher intergovernmental revenues borrow more money 
annually than those with lower intergovernmental revenues. Using panel data related to 
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all 50 US states over the period 1984 to 1999, a similar positive relationship between 
grants and borrowing is found by Martell and Smith (2004). Explanations as to why grants 
and debt issuance may be positively related follow from both the design of grant systems 
and their impact on local spending behaviour. 
In most systems, grants act as mechanisms to compensate for variations in local 
tax capacity. Without a redistribution system, large numbers of LGs would struggle to 
provide a minimum level of public services. Redistribution of fiscal capacity among LGs, 
however, is only partial following three reasons. First, partial redistribution is a deliberate 
policy preference, based upon the reasoning that full equalisation would deter LGs from 
optimising their local tax capacity (Boadway & Shah, 2007). Second, technical 
limitations result in imperfect grant mechanisms that reduce equalisation objectives 
(Bramley, 1990). A third factor relates to the fact that grant systems are not only aimed 
at equalising inter-local fiscal differences, but also used to fund specific tasks mandated 
to LGs by higher government levels. Several, mostly qualitative based studies emphasise 
the financial risks that mandates may exert to grant receiving authorities due to lacking 
or insufficient financial compensation (Gormley, 2006; Posner, 1998). Following from 
the partial and imperfect nature of grant funding systems, it can be assumed that the 
financial position of LGs with high grants dependence is weaker than LGs with low grant 
dependence. 
In addition to debt-enhancing effects caused by the intrinsic design of grant 
systems, the theory of the ‘flypaper effect’ suggests that grants may also have an 
independent effect on local spending behaviour. With the observation ‘money sticks 
where it hits’, the flypaper effect states that an increase in grant funding to LGs raises 
local spending by a higher amount than an equivalent increase in local tax income 
(Gramlich, 1977). In addition, the ‘flypaper effect’ argues that authorities respond 
differently to an increase in grants compared to a reduction. Authorities facing grant 
reductions manage to keep their spending levels relatively unaffected as they compensate 
grant losses with rises in other income sources. These asymmetries in local spending 
responses are supported by empirical evidence across a variety of constitutional contexts 
(Deller & Maher, 2006; Lalvani, 2002). Although local debt has generally been excluded 
from empirical investigations into the flypaper effect, it can be assumed that increased 
borrowing is one of the ways via which LGs compensate for grant losses. Income from 
credit liquidity will be particularly relevant in a context where other income streams, such 
as local taxes, face restrictions.  
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Following from the partial and imperfect nature of grant systems, combined with 
the independent impact of grant funding on local spending behaviour, it can be assumed 
that LGs with high grant dependence will borrow more compared to LGs with low grant 
dependence.  
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 5: grants are positively related to LG debt. 
 
The extent to which technical considerations affect grant allocation differs across 
systems. Studies on the Indian grant system (Khemani, 2007) and the Australian grant 
system (Worthington & Dollery, 1998) show that having an independent grant committee 
in place increases the likelihood of a technically motivated grant allocation. These 
committees are also likely to be relevant in signalling the negative financial effects that 
might build-up in intergovernmental financial systems due to the grant mechanisms in 
place. As such, the committees will increase a system’s error correction capacity. Error 
correction capacity is also likely to increase in case of a rise in the institutional capacity 
to consult LGs, or groups of LGs, who might be financially affected by grant mechanisms. 
In line with the behavioural assumption that actors do not deliberately want to extort each 
other, financial errors resulting from the grant architecture in place need to be explained 
primarily from cognitive limitations among policymakers and the decision costs attached 
to institutional change.  
The literature on grant redistribution has identified two main factors explaining 
why grant allocations might deviate from what would be expected based upon the 
technical characteristics of the grant system in place. The first type of explanations applies 
a partisan approach and traces how party political linkages among intergovernmental 
actors affect grant allocation. A second group of explanations identifies how interest 
representation different from party political interests affects grant mechanisms. Both 
literatures are discussed below.  
 
2.3.2.1  Partisan explanations: international literature 
The incentives to use grant systems for political purposes differ across systems. Partisan 
explanations are likely to be most relevant in majoritarian states as parties must win a 
majority of seats in the legislature to retain executive office. This incentivises them to 
advantage certain electoral districts over others. Moreover, once in government the party 
in power at the national level ‘has relatively unfettered control over the central 
government machine and faces relatively weak units of local government’ (John & Ward, 
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2001, p. 309). Hence, central governments in majoritarian systems are strongly motivated, 
and face limited obstacles, to use grants for political purposes.  
Most studies applying a partisan explanation concentrate on the geographical 
distribution of grants. Two main opposing effects are identified in the literature and 
referred to as the swing voter versus core voter hypothesis. According to the swing voter 
hypothesis, governments allocate more grants to subnational authorities with a higher 
proportion of voters who are not specifically linked to any of the national parties. 
Examples of studies that find support for the swing voter hypothesis are Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002) on Sweden, Magaloni (2006) on Mexico, and Weitz-Shapiro (2006) on 
Argentina.  
In the core voter hypothesis, governments allocate more funding to states where 
voters are clearly attached to the incumbent party. The core voter hypothesis has been 
confirmed in several US studies, resulting in a substantial literature on pork barrel politics.  
Most of these studies investigate the grant mechanisms in place between the federal level 
and state governments and typically explain pork barrel politics using a common-pool 
resource logic: as individual legislators are elected in specific districts they are 
incentivised to demand more money for projects in their electoral district than is socially 
optimal  (Grossman, 1994; Levitt & Snyder, 1995; Weingast et al., 1981; Wright, 1974). 
Support for the core voter hypothesis at the sub-state level is found by Ansolabehere and 
Snyder (2006) in a study on the funding of US counties.  
Outside the US, several studies find support for the core voter hypothesis. Calvo 
and Murillo (2004) demonstrate that in Argentina the provincial vote share of the 
incumbent Peronist party is positively associated with federally financed expenditures. 
Horiuchi and Lee (2008) report that in South Korea the incumbent president’s strongholds 
have received disproportionately larger amounts of grants. Similar partisan dynamics in 
the Indian system leading to higher grants to states that are politically aligned with the 
national government are identified by Khemani (2007). Although national politicians in 
centralised political systems have less direct electoral interest in allocating grant funding 
to specific districts, scholars have also identified the presence of pork barrel dynamics in 
non-federal systems. The reason for this is that voters’ assessment of the party’s 
performance at one level spills over and positively affects the assessment of the party’s 
national performance (Fouirnaies & Mutlu-Eren, 2015; John & Ward, 2001; Rodden, 
2006). 
Some studies find support for both hypotheses. In a study on India, Arulampalam 
et al. (2009) show that states that are both aligned and swing with central government 
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receive on average 16% higher federal transfers compared to states that are unaligned and 
non-swing. With the international literature providing inconclusive evidence, a closer 
look at the empirical literature on the selected European systems in this study might 
provide more direction as to what political motivations affect grant allocation.  
 
2.3.2.2  Partisan explanations: studies on selected systems 
In line with the international literature, empirical research on grant systems to the Dutch, 
English and German local level is limited. Most UK research has concentrated on the 
redistribution mechanisms that are in place between the national level and the devolved 
regions – especially through the Barnett formula (Christie & Swales, 2009; Mitchell, 
2003). Studies on grant funding to English local government mostly date back from the 
period before 2000. Many of these studies have an introductory character and limit 
themselves to aggregate statistics (e.g. Travers, 1986) or are highly theoretical (e.g. 
Bramley, 1990).  
Studies on England using micro-level LG treasury data are (largely) limited to 
Bennett (e.g. 1982), Ward and John (1999), Boyne, Powelll and Ashworth (2001), Hilber, 
Lyytikäinen and Vermeulen (2011), and Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015). In a 1982 
study, Bennett provides an elaborate analysis of the spatial distribution of English central 
government grants. Since the study is largely concerned with the outcomes and the 
technical aspects that are part of the distribution, Bennett does not provide much insight 
into the causal mechanisms that determine grant allocations. A 2001 study by Boyne et 
al. concentrates on the relationship between local tax effort and grant funding, and does 
not account for political variables.  
Ward and John (1999) clarify some of the mechanisms at work in the English 
system by identifying how political dynamics affect grant allocation. Based upon factor 
analysis and OLS regression techniques, using a dataset of 108 English LGs (in FY 
1994/95), the authors find support for both the core and swing voter hypothesis. Their 
empirical results demonstrate that central government allocated around 500 million £ 
more to LGs containing marginal constituencies and around 155 million £ more to core 
constituencies than they could have been expected to receive on the basis of the needs 
criteria used in the system. The presence of partisan elements in grant allocation is 
confirmed by John and Ward (2001). Hilber et al. (2011) also identify partisan elements 
and show that the Labour central government in the early 2000s targeted grants to LGs 
where it gained marginal dominance after local elections. However, as the focus of Hilber 
et al. (2011) is on the effects of central grants on local house prices, the study does not 
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shed light on why and how grants are allocated in a different way compared to what would 
be expected based upon the technical design of the English system. Support for the core 
voter hypothesis is found by Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015), who demonstrate that 
English LGs showing party political symmetry with the national government receive up 
to 17% more grant funding.  
Studies on grant allocation in the German system have concentrated on 
relationships between the federal level and the Länder. Investigating the evolution of 
federal intergovernmental transfers over the period 1970-2002, Pitlik, Schneider and 
Strotman (2006) demonstrate that the impact of overrepresentation of Länder in the upper 
house of the German legislature has led to disproportionate state shares of per capita 
transfers. In addition, the impact has increased over time, indicating that the German 
intergovernmental transfer system has become more ‘politicised’. Similar to many other 
federations, the design of intergovernmental mechanisms towards the local level is a state 
level responsibility, and hence differs across the German Länder. Empirical studies 
investigating the Länder’s intergovernmental transfer systems are limited. Most studies 
analyse the effects of transfers on the cost efficiency of LGs (e.g. Kalb, 2010) or their tax 
policies (e.g. Buettner, 2006), without considering institutional factors impacting grant 
allocation. Most analyses that do explicitly study the design of transfer systems are 
(German language) evaluation studies, regularly assigned to investigation committees by 
the Länder (e.g. Buettner, Holm-Hadulla, Parsche, & Starbatty, 2008). As such, these 
studies are not typical scholarly representations of the intergovernmental systems, despite 
the frequent participation of academics. Due to their evaluative character and tendency to 
make policy recommendations, the reports themselves need to be part of an analysis of 
what determines the working of grant systems. 
Scholarly empirical studies about what determines grant allocation in the Dutch 
system are virtually absent, as most studies are of a historical nature (e.g. Van Zaalen, 
2002). Available evaluations have mainly been conducted by the Dutch Financial 
Relations Councils (Rfv) (e.g. Rfv, 2007). Although this advisory body to the Dutch 
central government and parliament has an independent status, it is one of the actors in the 
Dutch intergovernmental financial landscape and its publications need to be evaluated as 
such.     
In sum, the identification of political and institutional drivers behind grant 
allocation receives limited attention. The small number of empirical studies available 
suggests the presence of political influence, however the results refer to redistribution 
systems that have since been replaced (e.g. John and Ward studied the SSA system which 
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ceased to exist in 2003), or are based on a selection of LGs. Notwithstanding the restricted 
empirical studies on the selected systems and the mixed international findings, the 
majority of research seems to indicate that party political congruence between the grant-
provider and the subnational grant-receiver tends to positively affect grant levels. To 
investigate the relevance of partisan explanations it is expected that the positive 
relationship between grants and debt reduces in case of intergovernmental party political 
symmetry, either due to the allocation of more grants, or grants pertaining less risks to 
the financial position of the grant-receiving LG. The following hypothesis has been 
formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 6: the positive relationship between grants and LG debt diminishes in 
case of party political symmetry between the grant-providing government and the 
grant-receiving LG. 
 
The extent to which grant allocation is politicised might be affected by the type of grant 
allocated to LGs. The traditional distinction is between general, or block grants, versus 
specific grants (cf. Ter-Minassian, 1997). Whereas general grants allow a high degree of 
local spending discretion, specific grants must be allocated to spending aims prescribed 
by the grant-provider. Although empirical studies mostly use aggregate grant figures, 
Kim (2013) and Sacchi and Salotti (2014) distinguish between types of grants and find 
significantly different results, with specific grants more affected by political dynamics. 
Khemani (2007) shows similar results for the distribution of central level grants to Indian 
states, with discretionary grants being more susceptible to partisan impact compared to 
constitutional grants. As the funding allocation of general grants tends to be determined 
through formula based mechanisms while this tends to be more diverse for specific grants, 
it can be expected that specific grants leave particular large space for partisan motivated 
grant allocation.  
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 7: party political symmetry between the grant-providing government 
and grant-receiving LG will have a larger effect on specific compared to general 
grants. 
 
Although politics affects grant allocation, empirical results regarding the political 
dynamics behind grant allocations are mixed. An explanation for these mixed empirical 
findings is due to the weak operationalisation of institutional contexts and a general bias 
towards majoritarian systems. Hypotheses testable across institutional systems need to 
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account for institutional differences. In contrast to majoritarian systems, multiparty 
executives constitute the ordinary government situation at the local and higher 
government levels in the Dutch and NRW systems. Consequently, the relevance of 
specific political variables in grant allocation processes is likely to differ between the 
systems.  
In contrast to England, mayors (or district heads in NRW’s counties) are present 
in all Dutch and NRW LGs. Although empirical research is limited, available studies 
indicate that mayors carry considerable political and policy responsibilities, and are 
crucial in representing the authority towards other government actors (Schaap, Daemen, 
& Ringeling, 2009; Wollmann, 2005, 2014). Research on US LGs indicates that mayors 
who are directly elected enjoy more influence at the state and national levels than their 
indirectly elected colleagues. Directly elected mayors would be more effective at bringing 
in state and federal money (Basehart, Kane, Wagenhals, & Hedger, 2000). Based upon 
this, it can be expected that mayors provide an additional test to trace a moderating effect 
of party political symmetry on the grant-debt relationship 
 
2.3.2.3  Interest representation explanations 
In majoritarian political systems, grant-providing governments have strong incentives for 
the political use of grants as they are elected in geographically defined areas. It can be 
expected that in non-majoritarian systems, central governments will have limited political 
motivation to influence electoral results in specific areas since election results will be 
based upon national aggregate results with every vote carrying a similar weight. In 
addition, central governments in non-majoritarian systems will face more institutional 
obstacles when attempting to use grants for political purposes (John & Ward, 2001; 
Tsebelis, 2000). Following from the differences in institutional structures, factors other 
than intergovernmental party political symmetry might explain grant patterns.  
Empirical studies suggest that local interest representation is crucial to the 
operation of grant systems in practice. In a study of 49 US states during four different 
years, Grossman (1994) finds that the importance of intergovernmental party political 
affiliation has become weaker over time and instead, interest representation of the grant-
receiver at the level of the grant-provider has become more relevant to explain grant 
allocations. Proxies for interest representation used by Grossman (1994) are the size of 
the state bureaucracy and union membership. The importance of interest representation 
by the administrative apparatus of the grant receiver is also identified by Lowry and 
Potoski (2004) in a study on the distribution of US federal discretionary grants to US 
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states (period of investigation: 1991 to 1998) and by Borck and Owings (2003) in the 
distribution of LG grants by the Californian state government. It can be expected that 
enhanced local interest representation leads to the acquisition of grants that pose less risks 
to the local financial position. Hence, the local administration will reduce the positive 
relationship between grants and LG debt.  
The subsequent hypothesis has been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 8: the positive relationship between grants and LG debt diminishes 
with an increase of the size of the local administration. 
 
The hypotheses formulated in this section are summarised in figure 2.2, which illustrates 
the institutional relationships to investigate in the analysis of grant systems.  
 








LGs that are aligned in partisan terms with the grant provider are able to reduce the risks 
posed by grants on local finances. It can be expected that due to strong electoral incentives 
and institutional capacity at the central level, error correction mechanisms within grant 
funding arrangements are particularly strong along partisan lines in centralised systems, 
whereas such mechanisms will be less developed in decentralised systems. Local 
administrative capacity is another error correction mechanism related to grant funding. 
Well-staffed and professional local administrations are likely to be better able to represent 
local financial interests at the level of the grant provider, and so reduce the risks posed by 
grants on LG finances. 
 
2.3.3 Local tax space and LG financial stress  
Local tax space constitutes the third and final core intergovernmental institution affecting 













space to financial error accumulation, and error correction capacity, is likely to differ 
across systems. Local tax space will be reflected in the extent to which LGs can 
autonomously introduce new taxes, and decide on tax rates. Hence, the main variable to 
be used to identify the relationship of local tax space with LG financial stress are local 
tax rates. Empirical research on the determinants of local tax space can be separated into 
one strand that concentrates on local level explanations, which are focused on structural 
and political features, and another strand that looks for explanations in the financial 
relationships among government levels, mainly the literature on Tax and Expenditure 
Limitations (TELs). While the local level approach has received attention in both Europe 
and the US, the TEL literature is almost exclusively US based. Both literatures are 
reviewed in this section. 
 
2.3.3.1  Local level explanations 
Empirical literature that studies local tax trends from a local level perspective can be 
distinguished into four strands: (1) the political colour of the local council, (2) local 
political business cycles, (3) characteristics of the local executive, and (4) inter-local 
spatial tax competition.  
Empirical research, which takes a partisan approach generally assume left-wing 
councils set higher tax rates compared to right-wing councils. Empirical evidence for this 
hypothesis is mixed. Using data for FY 1996 only, Allers, De Haan and Sterks (2001) 
find evidence for partisan influence on the tax rate set by Dutch LGs, with councils 
dominated by left-wing parties having a higher tax burden. However, Bosch and Suarez-
Pandiello (1995) find no partisan effect, using data on Spanish LGs for FY 1988 only. 
Other scholars highlight that due to the type of spending that occurs at the local level, 
local expenditure leaves little space for ideologically driven spending decisions (i.e. 
because LGs play a minor role in income redistributive spending) (e.g. Ashworth et al., 
2005). Inconclusiveness of the empirical literature on the impact of local partisan 
characteristics on LG finances is enhanced by the fact that several studies exclude local 
tax variables (Hagen & Vabo, 2005; e.g. Ibrahim, 1994; for an extensive overview of the 
emperical literature, see Imbeau, Pétry, & Lamari, 2001).   
The second research strand concentrates on the effect of local political business 
cycles. It argues that in order to increase their chances of being re-elected, politicians 
reduce tax pressure in the years prior to elections and increase tax pressure in the post-
election period. Effects of a local political business cycle are found in several studies, 
however, mostly using other dependent variables than taxes. Ashworth, Geys and 
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Heyndels (2005) show that due to rising local expenditure, debt levels increase prior to 
local elections. In a study of French councils, Binet and Pentecôte (2004) explicitly 
investigate the effect of political business cycles on local tax rates. They find that local 
tax pressures reduce in the two year prior to local elections and increase in the post-
election period. Similar political business cycle effects are identified by Lago-Peñas and 
Lago-Peñas (2008), and by Veiga and Veiga (2007).  
A third main approach to explain local tax rates looks at the characteristics of the 
local executive. Based upon research originally conducted by Roubini and Sachs (1989), 
the assumption is that an increase in the number of parties that compose the political 
executive complicates decision-making and so reduces governments’ fiscal performance, 
as indicated by, amongst others, higher levels of taxation. Although several empirical 
studies conducted on national and regional level governments find support for the weak 
government explanation (e.g. Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006; Jochimsen & Nuscheler, 2010), 
results at the local level are mixed. A study by Allers and Elhorst (2005) on Dutch LGs 
does not find support for the weak government hypothesis. Allers and Elhorst (2005) 
instead suggest that multiparty local executives benefit local fiscal performance as the 
higher the likelihood that coalition executive parties will be part of the post-election 
executive, the higher the sense of fiscal responsibility among executive parties. A study 
conducted by Rattsø and Tovmo (2002) of all Danish LGs from 1985-1996 also fails to 
provide support for the weak government hypothesis. Notice the close links of this 
literature on the composition of the political executive and government’s fiscal 
performance with the lively empirical debates about the relationship between the 
composition of the political executive and the size of government (Pettersson-Lidbom, 
2012; Schaltegger & Feld, 2009; Weingast et al., 1981). 
A fourth research strand concentrates on the effects of inter-local tax interactions. 
A substantial and growing literature demonstrates that tax decisions made in one LG can 
be significantly influenced by tax trends in other LGs (Bordignon, Cerniglia, & Revelli, 
2003; Wu & Hendrick, 2009). These effects are more substantial when a large local tax 
space exists, and when locally generated taxes do not negatively affect the amount of 
grant funding received. Several empirical studies indicate that tax rate setting by smaller 
LGs is more likely to be affected by inter-local tax competition due to the larger elasticity 
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of their fiscal base.6 Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) are examples of studies that 
identify asymmetries in spatial tax competition.  
 
Empirical evidence supporting the above mentioned four research strands is mixed. The 
factors identified above are therefore relevant to the analysis, and most of them can be 
used to operationalize control variables, but additional institutional and financial factors 
should be considered to adequately explain local tax trends.  
Few studies investigate the effect of the financial position of LGs on fiscal 
decision-making at the local level. In a study of German LGs, Buettner (2001) shows that 
LGs paying more on their debt service set higher rates on capital income tax. A study by 
Leprince, Madiès and Paty (2007) demonstrates that French LGs with a higher income 
per capita set lower business taxes. This supports the hypothesis that financial stress, as 
indicated by higher debt service or a reduction in LG income per capita, increases local 
tax rates. Hence, the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 9: LG debt is positively related to LG tax rates. 
 
The literature provides several indications that local tax effort might also be affected by 
the types of spending in which LGs are involved. Wolman (1983) laid out a theoretical 
model for responses to financial stress at the local level and tested it through a series of 
case studies in the US and the UK. Wolman’s study indicates that local fiscal strategies 
are aimed at minimising the decline of spending on public service delivery and local 
administrative staff. In a study of 264 Chicago suburban LGs, Hendrick (2011) shows 
that expenditure on capital investment, instead, is used by many LGs to alleviate fiscal 
stress, especially in the short run. Based upon these findings, it can be expected that the 
relationship between local tax rates and LG expenditure is influenced by the type of LG 
spending. Hence, the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 10: LG tax rates are positively related to LG staff expenditure, 
whereas LG tax rates are negatively related to local capital expenditure. 
 
Next to local level explanations, intergovernmental structures have been identified as a 
main determinant of local fiscal developments (Amiel, Deller, Stallmann, & Maher, 2014; 
Blom-Hansen, Bækgaard, & Serritzlew, 2014). Mostly dominated by US literature, it 
focuses on so-called Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs). TELs have been 
                                                          
6 E.g. the amount of local tax revenues generated by a small number of enterprises might be significantly 
affected when one enterprise relocates to another LG, something that will much less affect tax revenue 
streams of larger LGs. 
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introduced across the US at both the state and local level since the 1970s in what has 
become known as the Tax Revolt.  
 
2.3.3.2  Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) 
The application of TELs in the US is most visible in limitations on property taxation, the 
most important tax at the American local level. In 2006, only five out of the 48 continental 
American states did not impose a rate limit on some aspects of property taxation. 
Expenditure limitations have been less widespread, with only six American states having 
expenditure limitations imposed upon their local level in 2006 (Anderson, 2006, p. 688). 
The literature published in the 1980s found little evidence that TELs do effectively limit 
government tax and spending growth. However, with the availability of longer time 
series, more recent studies conclude that TELs have effectively reduced the growth of 
revenues and expenditures (Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Shadbegian, 1998; Skidmore, 1999; 
Staley, 2015).   
The US literature indicates that TELs incentivise revenue shifting strategies. 
While TELs lead to less tax income, several studies show that governments might shift 
their revenue levying from taxation to other sources, such as grants, service charges and 
user fees (Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Shadbegian, 1999). At the state level, the effect of 
TELs has been further undermined by states avoiding their constraining effect on state 
budgeting by shifting expenditures from the state level to local jurisdictions to which the 
TELs do not apply. These local jurisdictions can be existing ones (Skidmore, 1999) or 
exclusively created to avoid the effects of TELs (Bowler & Donovan, 2004). As this thesis 
concentrates on the local level, to which explicit expenditure limitations do not apply in 
any of the three selected European systems, unintended consequences of TELs are likely 
to be expressed in the form of local revenue shifting strategies rather than through an 
institutional shift of local expenditure obligations. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 11: stringent intergovernmental tax limitations are positively related 
with a replacement effect of LG tax revenues by nontax revenues. 
 
 
Although it can be expected that TELs do not effectively limit local expenditure, the exact 
form of the tax replacement effect will be affected by the demographic, financial, and 
political features of the intergovernmental structure in place. The TEL literature 
demonstrates that the effects of tax limitations are not uniform across localities, as they 
depend on local characteristics.  In a study of LGs in Colorado, Brown (2000) finds that 
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the impact of TELs depends on jurisdiction size, with TELs having a more constraining 
effect on small LGs. In the absence of TELs and in case of increasing local financial 
stress, small LGs have the strongest incentive to increase taxes, which is in line with the 
larger elasticity of their fiscal base as identified in spatial studies.  
In a study including all Danish LGs between 2007 to 2011, Blom-Hansen, 
Bækgaard and Serritzlew (2014) illustrate that the implementation of tax limitations upon 
the Danish local level incentivised revenue-shifting strategies from local taxation to 
central government grants. The authors relate the revenue shift to the specific working of 
the Danish intergovernmental system. As Danish LGs are responsible for the 
implementation of core welfare functions, the Danish LG sector blames the Danish central 
government for cutbacks to spending triggered by the TELs. The authors hypothesise that 
the Danish intergovernmental system makes it subsequently difficult for central 
government to commit credibly to the enforcement of TELs because task and expenditure 
responsibilities are so closely intertwined (Blom-Hansen et al., 2014, p. 65). Due to 
central government’s enforcement problem and in anticipation of the cutbacks resulting 
from TELs, Blom-Hansen et al. (2014) anticipate that the Danish local government 
association has been able to strengthen its negotiation position vis-à-vis the Danish central 
government, which should explain increases in the collective grant result for the Danish 
LG sector.  
As their study is limited to statistical research, Blom-Hansen et al. (2014) do not 
explicitly explore their institutional effect hypothesis. It can be expected that the country-
specific features of intergovernmental systems will significantly affect the type of 
revenue shifting strategies that occur. Following Blom-Hansen et al. (2014), it can be 
assumed that the credibility of higher government commitment to the enforcement of 
local tax limitations is more problematic in IGR systems that are more vertically 
integrated, as local tax pressures will easily backfire on central government. Tax 
limitations in more centralised intergovernmental systems are more likely to be replaced 
by increased grant funding. Based upon the assumption that intergovernmental structures 
critically affect the expression of the tax replacement effect, the following hypothesis has 
been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 12: an increase of the level of centralisation is positively related to a 
 replacement effect of LG taxes by grant funding.    
 
Within the selected constitutional systems, a tax replacement effect by grant funding is 
most likely to occur in the centralised English intergovernmental structure. In contrast to 
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England, it can be expected that in the more decentralised Dutch and NRW systems, taxes 
are more frequently used to offset budgetary imbalances, as compared to local strategies 
aimed at increasing funding from higher level grant providers.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
This review illustrates the fragmented character of the literature about intergovernmental 
finance, and the resulting lack of integrated frameworks for conducting comparative 
investigations into LG financial stress. In order to understand how intergovernmental 
structures affect local finances, it is insufficient to study one institution. This thesis 
observes the three different intergovernmental financial institutions as components within 
a system and studies their impact. The literature indicates that IGR dynamics can work 
significantly differently depending upon the institutions in place. Within a single system, 
IGR institutions work in opposing directions; with some institutions causing LG financial 
stress, while others alleviate financial tensions at the local level. 
The concept of bounded rationality, deriving from the behavioural literature, can 
be operationalised towards IGR financial institutions in multiple ways. First, the concept 
of intended rationality implies that policy actors design IGR financial institutions in such 
a way they do not deliberately exert negative financial consequences on government 
entities. Based upon this, it can be assumed that negative local financial consequences 
deriving from IGR financial institutions are not intended consequences and hence need 
to be explained by other reasons than motivations of policy actors. The intension to design 
IGR financial institutions that do not pose risks to local finances is translated as followed 
in practice. First, the regulatory framework will be aimed at reducing financial risk-taking 
at the local level – even when the regulatory design of the system has different 
consequences in practice. Second, grant funding will be aimed at reducing inter-local 
financial divergence. Hence, it can be expected that the design of grant systems is 
intended to reduce local financial stress levels. Third, intended rationality in the use of 
local tax space will be translated as tax rates being used to reduce local financial 
imbalances that are difficult, or impossible, to prevent within the wider design of the IGR 
financial system. 
A second feature of bounded rationality is that human behaviour is characterised 
by adaptation and that more time being spent on a problem results in better insight in the 
problem, and hence better decision-making. Following this, it can be expected that more 
decentralised political systems, which are characterised by more prolonged decision-
making processes compared to centralised systems, will design intergovernmental 
60 
 
structures that result in more sustainable financial arrangements at the local level. This 
leads to the expectation that IGR financial institutions are more rationally designed in 
Germany/NRW than in England. Due to these design differences, institutional 
arrangements lead to limited local financial risks in Germany/NRW and more substantial 
risk in England. The Dutch system will occupy a mid-position.  
Another assumption following from bounded rationality is that uncertainty plays 
a crucial role in human psychology. This means that situations will often occur in which 
policy actors are aware of their own knowledge deficiencies regarding the financial output 
of IGR financial systems. Knowledge deficiencies will be most explicit in case of large 
scale reforms, because its consequences will be most difficult to predict. Uncertainty is 
closely related to the fourth characteristic of bounded rationality: the difficulty people 
have with trade-offs. This leads to the expectation that policy actors have difficulties in 
identifying and implementing trade-offs between different IGR financial arrangements.  
The policy approach to focus on one institution at a time strongly resembles serial 
processing, which is the common mode at which institutions process information. Serial 
processing does not only occur due to limited attention spans and uncertainty among 
policy actors, but also because of high institutional decision costs. High institutional 
decision costs are due to the complexity and the number of actors that are affected in case 
of reforms in IGR financial arrangements. While institutional decision costs will be 
substantial in every IGR system, the specific sum of decision costs will be determined by 
the constitutional structure in place. Given the dominant position of the centre in 
centralised systems versus a higher power dispersion in decentralised systems, 
institutional decision costs can be expected to be lower in centralised compared to 
decentralised constitutional systems. Hence, the dominant mode of information 
processing is serial in decentralised systems, while centralised systems demonstrate larger 
capacity for parallel processing.  
 Bounded rationality characterises policy processes across constitutional systems. 
However, constitutional systems score differently regarding the degree to which 
rationality in policymaking is ‘bounded’. The duration of error accumulation processes 
until the system responds will differ between systems and policy areas. A larger number 
of actors involved in policymaking increases the response threshold (Workman et al., 
2009, p. 82), as more coordination is required to mediate between a larger number of 
interests and stakeholders. Hence, the threshold for a policy response towards local 
financial stress increases with the level of decentralisation. Different response thresholds 
are particularly due to information supply in different constitutional structures. Following 
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information processing theory, it can be expected that the centralised English system is 
characterised by information undersupply, whereas German policy actors face 
information oversupply. It can be expected that information undersupply and oversupply 
prolong the threshold of response. In a mixed constitutional system, such as the Dutch 
system, information supply will be most proportionate as information channels are neither 
pluralistic and ‘inefficient’, nor hierarchical and ‘efficient’. Hence, it can be expected that 
the threshold of response will be most adequate in a mixed constitutional structure such 
as the Dutch system.   
Once the threshold is passed, mechanisms to correct errors take effect. Similar to 
the dynamics of error accumulation, error correction mechanisms are framed by 
constitutional structures. Different error correction mechanisms can be identified in case 
of the three IGR financial institutions. Regarding IGR regulatory frameworks, the 
regulations themselves constitute a potential mechanism to correct local financial errors. 
Key to the effectiveness of regulatory structures is tractability of rule violation and the 
subsequent response implemented by regulators. A second error correction mechanism 
identified, which is indirectly related to the regulatory framework, are interest rates set 
by credit providers to LGs. More integrated IGR systems are likely to generate less 
correction capacity through the mode of interest rates, since the regulatory framework is 
likely to be more effective at eliminating risks of local financial defaults. 
The literature hints at significant political-institutional effects influencing grant 
funding, most importantly party political alignment and interest representation. Local tax 
space offers the third and final IGR financial institution that might contribute to error 
accumulation and error correction capacity. Local tax space will mainly operate as a 
correction mechanism of local financial stress through the extent at which LGs are 
autonomous to introduce new taxes, and determine their rates. The literature review in 
this chapter indicates that error accumulation processes and error correction mechanisms 
are likely to differ between country systems and IGR financial institutions.  
Table 2.1 provides an overview of four scenarios of LG financial stress depending 
upon the scoring of the two error terms. The biggest risk of a policy failure (Howlett, 
2012) occurring in IGR finances is when error accumulation processes are high, and the 
system demonstrates low capacity to correct those errors. In this scenario, the IGR 
financial context leaves the local level in a financially fragile position. The opposite 
situation occurs when the system transfers limited financial stress to the local level, while 
it generates limited error correction capacity, resulting in a financially robust position of 
LG. The remaining scenarios are mixed, where LG either possesses high error correction 
62 
 
capacity, but is also confronted with high error accumulation (financially volatile); or has 
low capacity to correct errors, but the IGR structure also prevents the accumulation of 
any significant local financial errors (financially stable). 
 
Table 2.1 Conceptualisation of LG financial stress within different IGR contexts  
 
  IGR error correction capacity 




low Financially stable Financially robust 
high Financially fragile Financially volatile 
 
At its core, the different working of the two error terms comes down to the level 
of discretion versus certainty at the level of the grant provider and local grant receiver. 
Larger discretion results in larger institutional flexibility in the regulatory framework, 
grant funding and local tax systems. Increased flexibility might positively affect error 
correction capacity. However, more discretion might also result in less well considered 
institutional structures that increase risks of error accumulation. Greater certainty, in 
contrast, corresponds with lower error accumulation processes and hence reduces the 
need for error correction capacity. Next to a discussion of the methodological aspects of 
this thesis, the next chapter offers an overview of the institutional evolution of the 
German, English and Dutch IGR structures. This discussion demonstrates that the 
dichotomy discretion versus certainty is a key dimension distinguishing the selected 
European systems. However, it also shows – in line with this literature review – that the 
consequences of these institutional differences on local financial conditions have 











CHAPTER  3  
 




This chapter consists of two parts. The first provides a discussion of the macro level 
choices underlying the methodological design of this thesis. The second provides a 





The study applies a mixed method strategy to investigate local financial stress. The study 
uses a classic research methodology: the comparative method. This section offers a 
discussion of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of a mixed method approach, 
explains the selection of cases, and elaborates on the main methodological strategies of 
the qualitative stage of the research. The reader is referred to the empirical chapters for 
information about the methodological choices made as part of the quantitative research. 
 
3.1.1 Mixed method strategies 
The intention of this research is to test the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2. There are 
strong reasons for applying qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate these 
hypotheses. Most importantly, triangulation of research methods can enable a researcher 
to address a broader range of issues, and to increase the reliability of research findings 
(cf. Lieberman, 2005; Yin, 2003). However, using mixed method strategies also contains 
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risks, which the researcher has to take into account carefully in order to achieve the full 
benefits of a mixed method research design. Examples of barriers in conducting mixed 
method research are the potential intensity of the research given the methodological skills 
and research capacity it necessitates, difficulties in integrating the quantitative and 
qualitative findings, and the lack of exemplar studies, which especially complicates the 
question how mixed method research has to be written up (Bryman, 2007).  
The qualitative side of this thesis uses the comparative method. While linked to 
classic publications in political science (e.g. Skocpol, 1979), the comparative method has 
several shortcomings, of which the most serious one is the problem of ‘many variables, 
small number of cases’ (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). Due to the small number of cases, the 
comparative method complicates the identification of variables which are critical in 
causal processes. While increasing the number of cases potentially reduces this problem, 
the research resources that are required for conducting in-depth comparative research on 
a range of cases goes beyond the investigation capacity of the individual researcher.  
Given the smaller number of variables, quantitative research provides a realistic 
research strategy to investigate a large number of cases and test the statistical significance 
of hypothesised relationships. The large-N in quantitative research enables the aversion 
of problems related to small-N research, most importantly difficulties in generalizability 
(Gerring, 2007). A solely quantitative research approach faces its own problems, 
especially in the scenario where it is not guided by strong, empirically grounded theory. 
The validity of quantitative research findings is jeopardized when the researcher misses 
out on important phenomena due to a focus on hypothesis testing, which causes risks of 
reductionism and confirmation bias. Other potential weaknesses in quantitative research 
are measurement issues with the underlying data, and errors in the selection of procedures 
for determining statistical significance (Burnham, Grant, Lutz, & Layton-Henry, 2008).  
Due to the relative strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative 
research, several scholars have called for greater integration of the methodologies 
(Lieberman, 2005; Tarrow, 1995). Resembling this pragmatic approach, this thesis 
combines the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to improve the 
quality of conceptualization and measurement, analysis of rival explanations, and overall 
confidence in the central findings (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009; Lieberman, 2005, p. 
436).  
To identify the impact of intergovernmental institutional factors on the occurrence 
of local financial stress, a research design is needed that includes multiple 
intergovernmental structures. A country comparative research design is most appropriate 
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to this aim, given the fact that intergovernmental systems are managed at the macro level. 
Prior to the selection of cases, the comparative method requires the researcher to choose 
between either a research design that uses the most similar or most different cases 
(Gerring, 2007, p. 138; Mill, 1843/1872).  
In a most similar systems research design (MSSD), cases show large similarity 
with respect to their explanatory variables, but differ regarding their dependent variable. 
A most different systems design (MDSD), instead consists of highly heterogeneous cases, 
all of which have the same dependent variable in common. The MDSD can be either 
exploratory or aimed to test a hypothesis. What is specific for the MDSD is the focus on 
variables below the system level. By conducting tests in a variety of sub-systems, the 
problem caused by too many variables and too few cases can be prevented when using 
the MDSD (Anckar, 2008).  
The initial assumption of the MDSD is that systemic factors do not play any role 
in explaining the observed behaviour. Further research consists of testing, step by step, if 
this assumption is still held in cross-systemic research. The analysis remains at the 
intrasystemic level, unless the assumption is rejected. In case of the latter, systemic 
factors must be considered to explain the dependent variable (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, 
p. 35). The most serious limitation of the MDSD is that it can only be applied in situations 
where the dependent variable resides at a sub-systemic level. In other words, independent 
variables can be measured at all levels, but the dependent variable should reside at the 
sub-system level (Anckar, 2008, p. 392). 
A major difference between the MSSD and MDSD is that whereas the former is 
concerned with the independent variable, the latter focuses on the dependent variable. 
Although some methodological scholars argue that a MDSD requires a constant 
dependent variable (Landman, 2008), this is a controversial issue in the literature as a 
constant variable only allows the researcher to identify the necessary conditions of a 
phenomenon (Anckar, 2008; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 129). A further relevant 
feature of the MDSD is the specific research design, which can be more deductively or 
inductively orientated. In case a deductive strategy is pursued, the aim of the MDSD is to 
study if the independent variable is present in all cases, whereas a more inductive strategy 
is aimed at identifying the determinant of the dependent variable with an open mind, 
without an a priori notion of the relevant explanatory variable (Anckar, 2008, p. 396).  
Given the aim of this study to identify the impact of intergovernmental 
institutional structures on the occurrence of local financial stress, a research design is 
needed that maximises the variation on the institutional dimension – the independent 
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variable in this research. Hence, the MDSD is most suitable in this study, and the analysis 
is initially concentrated at the intrasystemic level, which is reflected in the use of similar 
demographic and economic variables at the subnational level across the three selected 
European systems. In addition, LG debt indicators are used as comparable dependent 
variables for measuring LG financial stress across the systems. Although the absolute size 
of LG debt differs across the systems, the dependent variable contains a strong similarity 
since LG debt demonstrates an increase across the three systems. The MDSD approach 
will enable an explanation as to what extent increases in LG financial stress across 
varying contexts must be attributed to either intrasystemic independent variables at the 
local level or systemic independent variables at the country-constitutional level. 
 
3.1.2 Case selection 
Several typologies exist for selecting most-different intergovernmental systems. A 
popular method for the selection of country cases in Europe is the classification according 
to administrative traditions, or country groups. In Europe, five country groups can be 
distinguished: a Continental Napoleonic group, a Continental federal group, a 
Scandinavian group, an Anglo-Saxon group, and a Central Eastern and South Eastern 
European group (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014, p. 10; Painter & Peters, 2010). Other 
classifications focus on the dichotomy among European legal systems between the classic 
Continental European rule-of-law (Rechtsstaat) culture and the Anglo-Saxon public 
interest culture (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004). Inspired by this legal dichotomy, four groups of countries are 
differentiated: Common Law, Roman-French, Roman-German, and Roman-
Scandinavian. A third typology focuses on the intergovernmental constitutional structures 
of states, and distinguishes between three variants: federal, unitary-centralised, and 
unitary-decentralised (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014, p. 11; Loughlin, 2001b). The 
typologies are helpful instruments for classifying different European state systems, but 
their biggest weakness is that they conceal the large diversity existing within the groups. 
On some dimensions, diversity is larger within than between the groupings (Stewart, 
2011).   
Following the weak empirical support, all three typologies are used to select the 
cases in this study. Given the focus of this research, most relevant is the 
intergovernmental constitutional typology. Hence, this study selects one federal, one 
unitary-centralised, and one unitary-decentralised system. Germany is selected as 
representative of a federal system. In line with its federal structure, the organisation of 
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local government in Germany is mainly determined at the Länder level, which has led to 
significant inter-state differences across LGs, in spite of some converging institutional 
processes that have occurred recently (Blume, Döring, & Voigt, 2011). Inter-state 
intergovernmental differences, including differences in tasks fulfilled by ostensibly 
similar types of LGs, have led to the selection of one state, North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW).  
With around 17 million inhabitants, NRW constitutes the most populous, and 
most densely populated German state. Once Germany’s industrial heartland, substantial 
parts of NRW, most notably the Ruhr area, underwent significant economic 
transformation, leaving several weak economic structures. At the same time, economic 
strength is considerable in many parts of NRW, reflected by an above average GDP per 
capita compared to the German national average (Destatis, 2011). The state is highly 
urbanized and contains 30 out of the 80 biggest German cities. At the same time, around 
60% of NRW’s population lives in rural areas. NRW’s spatial economic heterogeneity is 
likely to increase the relevance of the intergovernmental system for the financial position 
of LGs. The state’s prominent place among the German states and its spatial economic 
heterogeneity provide the main reason for its selection.  
The UK is selected as the unitary-centralised case. The analysis is limited to 
England, because although Scotland and Wales (leaving aside the special case of Northern 
Ireland) have become less centralised in the last decades, England’s structure still reflects 
the UK’s typically highly centralised and functional government structure. The 
Netherlands is selected as representative of a unitary-decentralised system. The 
classification unitary-decentralised adequately highlights the flexibility of Dutch 
intergovernmental structures. The decentralised dimension of the Dutch system is 
observable in the principle of municipal autonomy, which determines that Dutch LGs are 
free to define their tasks and use their power, as long as it does not conflict with national 
or provincial statutes. The unitary element is reflected in the principle of co-governance 
(‘medebewind’) which determines that LGs have to cooperate in the implementation of 
national legislation (Hendriks, 2001, p. 143). 
Next to the constitutional typology, the case selection reflects the different legal 
systems – with the UK as a Common Law system, and Germany as a Roman-German 
system, as well as different administrative groups, with the UK representing the Anglo-
Saxon group, and Germany the Continental federal group. Although classifying the Dutch 
system is less straightforward, the government structure of the Netherlands most strongly 
resembles features of a Roman-French legal system, and the Continental Napoleonic 
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administrative group. As such, the Dutch system adds a third unique case to the country 
selection. The country selection guarantees a broad variety of intergovernmental 
structures, but it also has important practical benefits. Most important is that the 
researcher is not thwarted by linguistic obstacles, which is highly relevant as access to 
policymakers, and understanding of contextual factors, is greatly enhanced when the 
researcher possesses the linguistic skills that match with the case selection. The linguistic 
benefits increase the quality of the field research, and as such contribute to making valid 
comparisons across the cases (Lieberman, 2005, p. 447). Another strength of the case 
selection is that the quality of the statistical data in the three selected systems is of 
comparably high standards. These practical considerations provide strong rationale for 
the deliberate rather than random case selection in this study.  
 
3.1.3 Implementation of mixed method strategies 
Various methods are distinguished in the literature to implement mixed method research. 
Lieberman (2005) systematizes a specific mixed method approach, which he labels 
‘nested analysis’. In a nested design, the researcher combines a large sample of cases in 
the statistical research phase, with an in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases 
contained within the large sample. Translated to this study, this would mean that from 
within the dataset of LGs, a small number of LGs are selected from each of the three 
systems for in-depth study. Although a nested research design has been considered in this 
research, the decision was made to concentrate on LG interest groups, rather than 
individual LGs from within the dataset. Several reasons motivate this decision.  
First, given the large variety among LGs in terms of their financial position, 
institutional structure, intergovernmental political contacts, and demographic features, 
there is a high risk that the selected LGs are unrepresentative for the larger LG population. 
This would result in misfit between the specified model and the empirical data. There are 
also strong arguments to select LGs from different geographical regions (cf. the North-
South divide in England). Due to this variety, it is necessary, for example in the case of 
England, to select LGs from several LG categories (e.g. Unitary Authorities, counties, 
shire districts, metropolitan districts and London boroughs). This would have resulted in 
at least ten LGs to be selected for in-depth analysis in the English case alone. Although it 
is possible to reduce the qualitative caseload by only concentrating on one type of LG, 
for example counties in the English system, this decision significantly complicates the 
cross-country analysis given the methodological difficulties of comparing country 
specific LG entities across borders.  
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Second, the decision was made to include all LG entities in the selected systems 
in the dataset, in order to grasp intergovernmental financial dynamics within and across 
the entire LG sector of the selected systems. Hence, concentrating on particular 
institutional categories of LGs in the qualitative research phase would reduce the value 
of the qualitative findings for triangulation with the quantitative findings. Third, a positive 
motivation for focusing on LG interest groups instead of individual LGs is that the groups 
both reflect the institutional variety of LG within their respective system, and represent 
the views held by a majority of their members. These factors enhance the 
representativeness of qualitative research findings deriving from LG groups compared to 
investigating individual LGs.  
A fourth reason for focusing on LG groups is that interviewees in the LG 
(treasury) associations mostly held their society position besides their main source of 
employment, in most cases in a local authority. For example, the President of the English 
Society of County Council Treasurers, who was interviewed for this research, held the 
society’s presidency in addition to being CFO of Oxfordshire County Council, which 
constituted the interviewee’s main source of employment. The first-hand experience of 
interviewees prevented the risk of interviewing officials who would be detached from the 
practice of local finances. In addition, the approach allowed interviews to be conducted 
with officials who were not only highly aware of the finances of their own authority but 
also of the broader category of LGs their authority belonged to. At the same time, the 
associations at which interviews were conducted for this research represented LGs from 
a wider subcategory within the public sector. Hence, this interview approach positively 
contributes to the aim of case study research; namely to shed light on a question pertaining 
relevance to a broader class of units (Gerring, 2004, p. 344).  
Finally, the intergovernmental approach of this study leads to a focus on 
intergovernmental policy interactions in the qualitative research. Due to this, it is most 
appropriate to conduct interviews with members of LG and treasury associations, as it is 
these policy makers, rather than random LG officials, who are most often involved in 
intergovernmental interactions, enabling them to provide unique information. The focus 
on LG interest groups rather than individual LGs in the case study research phase carries 
some trade-offs, particularly as it reduces the possibility to illuminate, at the level of 
individual LGs, underlying mechanisms not captured by the theoretical model. However, 
the selected qualitative research focus also improves the aim of small-N analyses to assess 
and triangulate the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables 
(Lieberman, 2005). By approaching both officials within LG interest groups and officials 
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based at the level of the grant provider and regulator of LG, the chosen research design 
enables to incorporate different levels of analysis which are vital to understand the 
mechanisms through which intergovernmental institutions affect local finances. As 
interviewees representing the local level were both strongly involved in 
intergovernmental interactions and rooted in individual LGs, the qualitative 
investigations generated contextually based evidence both related to the systemic level of 
intergovernmental interactions and the subsystem level of local financial trends.  Hence, 
the chosen small-N research strategy proved most complementary to the focus on 
intergovernmental interactions and the large-N analysis pursued in this thesis. 
 
3.1.4 Implementation of qualitative research strategies 
To optimise a balanced view, interviewees have been selected from all relevant levels of 
government across the three systems. Interviewees were further selected based upon their 
assumed direct contribution to, and knowledge of intergovernmental financial 
interactions. Following this approach, nearly all interviewees occupied an advanced 
senior or executive level position (e.g. director-general of a government department, or 
chairing position in a LG representative association). As such, the qualitative 
methodology can be classified as elite interviewing.  
According to Dexter (1969/2006), a crucial difference of standardised versus elite 
interviewing is that in elite interviewing the investigator must be willing to let the 
interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, or the situation is. Following this 
approach, a semi-structured interview method is considered most appropriate, as this 
methodology allows new ideas to be brought up during the interview as a result of what 
the interviewee says. This exploratory approach enables the investigator to benefit more 
fully from the knowledge, expertise, and viewpoints of the elite interviewees, compared 
to what is achievable when sticking to a rigorous set of questions (Burnham et al., 2008, 
p. 231).  
 Notwithstanding its flexible and open approach, a semi-structured interview 
requires from the investigator to carefully consider in advance the topics he or she wants 
to explore. In this research, similar topics across the three systems were discussed in the 
semi-structured interviews. The main aim of the interviews was to identify to what extent 
LG financial stress can be related to the intergovernmental setup of the system, focused 
upon the working of the regulatory framework (chapter 4), grant funding systems (chapter 
5), and local tax space (chapter 6). In total, 48 interviews have been conducted, of which 
16 in England, 12 in Germany, and 20 in the Netherlands. The average duration of the 
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interviews was 1.5 hours and interviews mostly took place in the interviewee’s formal 
working environment, mostly his or her private office (see appendix I for an overview of 
interviewees). The interviews were transcribed to improve reflection upon the data and 
the conclusions drawn from the transcripts (cf. Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). For 
confidentiality reasons, interviewees have been anonymised, and references are made to 
organisations rather than individuals.  
Another primary source used in the qualitative research phase are archival 
sources. Some of these documents are in the public domain, but others have been provided 
by interviewees. Combining the interviews with archival sources enables a rich and 
triangulated understanding of the study phenomenon  (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 187). The 
collection of archival data continued until saturation was reached and a rich account of 
insights allowing triangulation with the interview data was available.  
 
3.1.5 Concluding comments 
The quantitative methods are used in this study to test hypotheses deriving from a variety 
of literature. The qualitative methods are used to cross verify the statistical findings and 
generate a richer understanding of the causal relationships affecting LG financial stress 
in different constitutional contexts. While the nature of case study research explains the 
selection of three constitutional systems, the focus on the subnational level strongly 
increases the number of observations, and allows the additional implementation of a 
quantitative analysis. The number of LGs in each of the selected systems is around 400, 
amounting to around 1,200 LGs in the panel dataset constructed for the statistical 
research. The statistical analyses do not only help in mitigating the weaknesses of small-
N research, but a focus on a large number of subnational government entities also 
‘strengthens the capacity of comparatists to accurately code cases and thus make valid 
causal inferences’ (Snyder, 2001, p. 93).  
The methodological approach of this thesis has several implications for the 
inferences that can be formulated based upon its observations. Chapter 2 presents several 
theories to explain local financial stress and formulates hypotheses to investigate for 
dissimilar constitutional systems. The selected constitutional systems differ on many 
aspects that potentially affect local financial stress, such as central-local relationships 
between political actors, and administrative monitoring structures in place. At the same 
time, the three systems show a strong similarity with respect to their dependent variable: 
an increase in LG financial stress as indicated by LG debt levels (e.g. see table 1.1 on 
page 26, and figure 1.3 on page 26). The most-different system approach in this study 
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enables to identify why and how different institutional contexts generate largely similar 
local fiscal effects.  
In terms of inference, formulating the research design reflects limitations which 
are more generally identified with the method of agreement and the method of difference 
as proposed by Mill. Both methods imply that causality can be determined based upon a 
small number of cases and can be traced back to a single cause (Lieberson, 1991). Due to 
this, the constitutional comparison in this thesis is more likely to identify causal 
propositions that are probabilistic rather than deterministic. The insights gathered through 
the constitutional comparison will reflect knowledge that can best be referred to as 
‘middle range theory’ (Merton, 1968), as the study’s findings will only be applicable to a 
confined set of comparable intergovernmental contexts where cause-effect links recur as 
they are identified in the selected cases.  
 
 
3.2 Cross-country institutional comparison 
In this section, the selected intergovernmental systems are investigated by mapping out 
their constitutional features. The term ‘design’ should not give the impression that the 
systems have been established according to a concrete and consistent plan. Within each 
system institutional developments can be traced that reinforce but also contradict one 
another. Nevertheless, the systems show certain continuums that demonstrate long-term 
intergovernmental trends in each system. Institutions that exist longer are more difficult 
to change and will exert a more durable effect on decision-making processes (Pierson, 
2000; Thelen, 1999). Regarding the intergovernmental financial position of local 
government, institutional resilience is observable in both formal and informal institutions. 
Formal institutions, such as constitutional arrangements, or informal ones, such as 
cultural norms, may have large effects on the financial position of local government. 
Below, a discussion is provided of the most relevant institutions. The description of each 
country system is divided in a historical intergovernmental overview and an analysis of 
relevant political institutions. 
 
3.2.1 England: historical overview 
Traditionally, almost any description of the constitutional system of the United Kingdom 
starts by emphasizing the supremacy of the centre. Devolution implemented by the 
Labour governments from the 1990s onwards moderated the UK’s centralised state 
structure. According to some observers, classifications such as quasi-federalism 
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(Bogdanor, 2001), or federacy (Watts, 2008) have become more appropriate to refer to 
the current British government system.7 However, others have disputed the previous 
degree of centralization in the UK (Mitchell, 2003, p. 18), as has been the extent to which 
devolution has genuinely affected the powers of the UK government (Gamble, 2006, p. 
33). 
Characteristic of the devolution implemented during the Labour governments is 
its asymmetric nature, with England, in contrast to the other parts of the UK, having 
remained largely unaffected by devolution. Hence, England still constitutes one of the 
most centralised government systems in the Western world. From a legal-historical 
perspective, England’s unitary state structure was especially recognizable in the ‘ultra-
vires’ principle, which emphasised that only parliament could determine the powers of 
subnational government, i.e. the powers ‘beyond which’ local government was not 
allowed to act. The Localism Act 2011 replaced the ‘ultra-vires’ principle with a ‘general 
principle of competence’, that has given local government a full-scale power of general 
competence (Wilson & Game, 2011, p. 32). However, as a constitutional framework has 
remained absent in the English system, the enhanced local powers can be reversed easily 
in practice.  
Due to the absence of a constitutional framework, the position of English LG has 
been determined by individual laws passed by the Westminster Parliament and case law 
made by judges, developed over long periods of time. The absence of a constitutional 
framework exerted a dubious effect on the position of English local government: on the 
one hand it left local government unprotected without any allocated inherent rights, but 
on the other hand it also meant that the dominance of the central government was never 
formulated in an unambiguous manner (Loughlin, 1996). Largely due to the latter, British 
parliamentary legislation never acquired the character of administrative law, in contrast 
to what occurred in many European continental systems. The English common-law 
tradition led to the dominance of a pragmatic approach in the country’s IGR system 
(Bulpitt, 1983; Jowell, 2003, p. 375). It also reinforced a governing culture that has 
created large degrees of political and administrative discretion in individual policy 
decisions, and a relatively fluid institutional tradition of what has been referred to as 
‘ungrounded statism’ (Dunleavy, 1989).  
Historically, English local government had substantial autonomy and 
responsibilities. The rapid industrialization in the 19th century led to a rising demand for 
                                                          
7 The term federacy is used to denote a large political unity to which smaller units are federated even 
though the larger unit is not itself a federation (Watts, 2008). 
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public services, resulting in important legislation such as the 1835 Municipal 
Corporations Act and the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894. During the Victorian 
period central government pursued a laissez-faire politics of minimal central interference 
and taxation in which local government was able to cope admirably with the social 
changes it faced (Lambert, 1962; Travers & Esposito, 2003, p. 10). During the interwar 
period, local autonomy was reduced, especially in fiscal affairs.8 Centralization continued 
with the development of the welfare state after the Second World War. Public services in 
health care and infrastructure provision became transferred from local government to 
newly established national government organisations. Most significant, however, for the 
current position of English local government is the acceleration of centralization that 
occurred after the electoral victory of the Conservatives in 1979.  
Reforms, such as agentification and the implementation of compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT), strengthened a centralization of services that were 
previously organised at the local level, either towards the national level or the private 
sector. In fiscal matters as well, the position of English LG weakened in the 1980s. With 
its embracement of monetarism, the Thatcher governments strongly emphasised the need 
to control public expenditure for macro-economic policy purposes (Thain & Wright, 
1995, p. 20). Since LG spending was argued to increase faster than other kinds of 
government spending, the cabinet implemented various measures that tightened LG 
finances. A major instrument to increase central fiscal control was the possibility 
implemented in 1984 to cap the council tax rates of LGs whose expenditure the 
government judged ‘excessive’ (Loughlin, 2001a, p. 41). Since nearly all of these 
councils were Labour controlled, intergovernmental frictions acquired a profound 
political nature, with cabinet members referring to the overspending LGs as irresponsible 
and profligate ‘socialist republics’(Fry, 2008, p. 162) . 
The Thatcher government’s claim that LG expenditure was on the rise was 
partially true. Ironically, increased spending was largely made possible by the 
Conservative government’s own policy, which had forced councils to sell their socially 
rented houses, resulting in an expansion of local capital revenues. When interest rates 
rose during the UK’s economic recovery of the second half of the 1980s, many LGs 
decided to place their assets in the UK money market instead of repaying their debts 
(Potter, 1997, p. 353). To strengthen control over subnational capital revenues, the 
                                                          
8 E.g. the Rating and Valuation Act of 1925 pulled all the differing strands of local rates across England 
and Wales into one single rate, while the scope of rates as a local tax was decreased in 1929 (Travers & 
Esposito, 2003, p. 11). 
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government imposed limitations on the additional revenues from the mid-1980s 
onwards.9  
The most prominent element in the Conservative policies towards LG finances 
was the introduction of the community charge in 1990, better known as the poll tax. 
Following its dramatic implementation, the poll tax was replaced in 1993 by the council 
tax, which itself is a mix of the rates and the community charge. The failed introduction 
of the poll tax resulted in the unintended policy consequence of making the local level 
more instead of less dependent on central government funding (Butler, Adonis, & 
Travers, 1994). Overlooking the Conservative government period, English central-local 
relations became increasingly dominated by the centre. The application of a more 
centralised approach was not applied for the sake of increasing central government power, 
but was instrumental to increase central government’s fiscal control. This illustrates that 
the intergovernmental approach taken by the centre during the Thatcher period has to be 
explained by the context of the crisis of the British welfare state following the economic 
downturn of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Laffin, 2009).  
In its rhetoric, the New Labour government that entered office in 1997 applied a 
different approach in central-local relations and declared partnership the guiding 
principle. However, in practice most of the Conservative policies that aggravated the local 
level continued, or were extended. Agentification further expanded, while the basic 
neoliberal assumptions underlining CCT persisted (Fry, 2008). Local dependence on 
central government financing further continued from 61% in 1997 to 65% in Labour’s 
final year in power, in 2010 (excluding non-domestic rates) (CIPFA statistics, 1997-1998, 
and 2010-2011). New Labour also continued the capping instrument on council taxes. 
The failed attempt by New Labour to institutionalize an English regional level also 
contributed to a continuation of centralised decision-making, even though differences in 
decision-making approaches have been observed among Whitehall departments 
(Mitchell, 2002, p. 762).  
Under the slogan ‘Localism’, the decentralisation of powers from London has 
been a policy aim for the Conservative-led coalition that entered office in 2010. The 
decision of where to move decentralised powers has been less clear, and the evolution of 
English LG under the coalition shows a mixed record. Important tasks have been removed 
                                                          
9 The 1989 Local Government and Housing Act restricted local discretionary space by determining that 
only 25% of capital receipts from housing and 50% of other capital receipts were allowed to be used for 
capital expenditure. In addition, the 1989 Act introduced credit approvals and limitations on LGs net 
indebtedness (Potter, 1997, p. 351). 
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from English LGs, in particular education, while others have been added to their tasks 
(especially public health functions). With respect to local finances, substantial changes 
have been implemented, most importantly the removal of local auditing from the Audit 
Commission to private sector auditors, the partial localization of the business tax rates, 
and the introduction of council tax referendums. These reforms are further discussed in 
the separate empirical chapters. Due to its recent implementation, the eventual impact of 
the reforms is difficult to determine at this stage, but its consequences on the power 
balance in the English intergovernmental system seem unlikely to be revolutionary (cf. 
John, 2014; John & Copus, 2012). 
 
3.2.2 England: political institutions 
With power centralised in London, the position of the English local level is heavily 
influenced by power constellations within the Westminster Parliament, the cabinet and 
the Whitehall bureaucratic apparatus. As long as it enjoys a majority in parliament, the 
UK central government faces few veto players that might block its funding decisions. The 
political science literature on the British system suggests that the Treasury, and its 
Chancellor, play a predominant role in interdepartmental interactions and cabinet 
decision-making, even though the Treasury is locked into a system of mutually 
constrained power-relationships with other Whitehall departments (Heald, 1998; Thain 
& Wright, 1995).10 The suggestion of a dominant Treasury in the UK system is supported 
by political economy findings which indicate that Treasury Ministers tend to have a 
dominant position within single party cabinet systems (Hallerberg, Strauch, & Von 
Hagen, 2009). 
The limitation in veto players in the English system is partly explained by the fact 
that English LG lacks an (authoritative) judicial institution at which it can appeal against 
central government decisions.11 Whilst the possibility of judicial review exists, the few 
court cases heard in recent years have largely proven unsuccessful (Wilson & Game, 
2011, p. 174). There have been several attempts over the decades to introduce more 
institutional guarantees for the English local level but these failed to receive central 
government support (e.g. Lyons Inquiry, 2007, for a recent illustration). The weak access 
                                                          
10 Due to their largely historically orientated methodological approach, available Treasury studies 
strongly rely upon anecdotal information and lack a long-term systematic (financial) analysis of the 
trajectories and outcome of UK central level policy-making. Hence, the real impact of the Treasury on 
cabinet decision making and Whitehall policy-making is still largely unclear (cf. Heald, 1998 in a review 
of Thain and Wright, 1995). 
11 The Supreme Court of the UK that was established in 2005 only resolves disputes relating to devolution 
in the UK. 
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of English local politicians to the centre, combined with a strong silo structure among 
Whitehall departments, leads to the strongest intergovernmental connections traditionally 
existing between local and central level bureaucrats working within the same policy silo 
(Laffin, 2009).  
The English local level is hugely dependent upon the central level for its funding, 
but, and despite reductions in its tasks, central government still strongly relies upon the 
implementation capacity of the local level for the delivery of public services (John, 2014, 
p. 687). It was estimated in a 2011 inventory that the English local level has to fulfil 
around 1,294 statutory tasks prescribed by central government (DCLG, 2011). Its 
significant role as service provider does not translate into a strong role for English LG at 
the political centre. Several reasons can be identified for this (John & Copus, 2012). First, 
the British political centre shows limited interest in LG (Bulpitt, 1983). Second, the 
comparatively large population size of English LGs – on average 140,000 residents – , 
and the frequent reorganisations they have been subjected to, undermines community 
identity, and contributes to a weak local electoral base for local politicians – all being 
detrimental to an authoritative and powerful representation of local interests at the centre. 
Third, councils often have limited discretion over the services they provide, mostly on 
behalf of central government.  
The concentration of power at the central level leads to the expectation that 
English LG interest groups have limited influence on funding decisions made by central 
government. However, empirical research on the financial dimension of English 
intergovernmental negotiations is limited, and existing work outdated (e.g. Rhodes, 
1986). Since 1997, the Local Government Association (LGA) has been responsible for 
the representation of all English LGs at the central level. Although this concluded a period 
in which different associations represented the interests of different types of LGs, the 
previous associations continue to exist within the LGA (i.e. the County Council 
Network/CCN, the District Councils’ Network/DCN, and the Special Interest Group of 
Municipal Authorities/SIGOMA). The effectiveness of the LGA at the centre in 
representing local interests has received mixed evaluations (Entwistle & Laffin, 2003). 
The Core Cities Group and London Councils are the only LG interest groups that exist 
outside the LGA, but their members have retained their membership of the LGA. 
 
3.2.3 Germany/NRW: historical overview 
Fragmentation of power has been a returning feature in Germany’s intergovernmental 
history. The Holy Roman Empire can be seen as the first modern cooperation among 
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German states. State cooperation within the Holy Roman Empire became intensified with 
the creation of the German Empire in 1871. The institutional and fiscal capacity of the 
German Empire remained weak due to the constitutionally assured autonomy of the 
individual states (Hefeker, 2001). It is difficult to trace a pattern in Germany’s 
intergovernmental system during the twentieth century. After the collapse of the Empire 
in 1918, centralization increased under the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), and the 
Länder were entirely dissolved during the Nazi period. After 1945, the Cold War context 
resulted in a clear split in Germany’s intergovernmental development, with a highly 
centralised system in East Germany and federal structures in West Germany (Schneider, 
1999).  
 Despite an initially highly decentralised take off, federalism in West Germany 
gradually evolved into a strongly dual or cooperative system (Adelberger, 2001). Inspired 
by Keynesian economic theories, the West German federal government of the second half 
of the 1960s strived to increase its macroeconomic steering capacity. By paying off the 
rich against the poor Länder, the federal government was able to increase its 
macroeconomic role through the big tax alliance (Großer Steuerverbund) of 1969. The 
tax alliance nearly equaled the tax share of the federal government to the proportion held 
by the Länder (Senger, 2008, p. 39). Besides the Keynesian inspired emphasis on its 
macroeconomic role, the federal government enhanced its intergovernmental position by 
somewhat selectively applying the German constitution. Crucial has been article 106 of 
the Basic Law, which demands equal living conditions to be achieved throughout the 
German federation. Based on this notion, the federal government has justified federal 
interference in policy fields in which the Länder used to be autonomous. Although 
growing federal government activity has frequently been challenged by the Länder in the 
Federal Constitutional Court, the Court has mostly backed the federal government 
(Abromeit, 1992).  
In constitutional terms, policy responsibilities are apparently clearly divided in the 
German system with the federal government holding the main policy making 
competences and the Länder performing executive tasks on behalf of the federal 
government. In practice, most policy is implemented by local government at the sub-state 
level. Regarding the position of LGs, the constitutional notion of subsidiarity constitutes 
a guiding principle, determining that in case state and federal authorities are not explicitly 
entitled to deal with a particular policy field, LGs have the autonomy to take on that 
responsibility (Henneke, 2012b, p. 76). The intergovernmental practice, however, has 
been far more complex than what is suggested by its constitutional outline. 
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The German governing complexity has been a particular result of the growing role 
of the federal government in the 1960s and 1970s, especially via so-called ‘joint tasks’ 
(Gemeinschaftsaufgaben). This system of what Scharpf (1976) has called 
‘Politikverflechtung’ cemented doubts about the genuine nature of Germany’s federal 
system, and has led to classifications such as the ‘unitary federation’ (Spahn & Föttinger, 
1997, p. 226), or the ‘crypto-unitarist state’ (Abromeit, 1992). With the German system 
increasingly suffering from ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf, 1988), efforts were undertaken 
in the 1980s to simplify the intergovernmental system. This was initiated by the Länder 
who aimed to roll-back and rein-in the federal government. Led by the strongest Länder 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westphalia, the Länder aimed to 
strengthen the Federal Council as their main representative institution, in both legal and 
procedural sense (Adelberger, 2001, p. 51; Schneider, 1999, p. 71).  
The result of the Länder resurgence at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s has 
been mixed; while proposals to strengthen the collective legislative rights of the Länder 
vis-à-vis the federal government have been successful, proposals to return responsibilities 
to the individual Länder largely failed (Adelberger, 2001, p. 51). The failure to 
(re-)decentralize policy responsibilities to the Länder is explained by continuing conflicts 
of interest among the prosperous and less well-off Länder. While the prosperous Länder 
have been generally inclined to underline Länder autonomy, the less well-off Länder have 
mostly favored a growing role for federal institutions, and subsequent financial 
equalization mechanisms (Adelberger, 2001, p. 45). Following the German unification, 
and five poor Länder being added to the federation, conflicting Länder interests have only 
increased.  
Germany’s difficulties in reaching intergovernmental agreements are reflected in 
the distribution of the massive costs linked to the German reunification, which led to a 
rise in gross public sector debt from 41.8% in 1989 to 60.3% in 1996 (Spahn & Föttinger, 
1997, p. 238). Since an intergovernmental agreement on the unification costs was hard to 
reach, the federal government took up the far majority of the debt that was made in the 
process; 18.5% compared to 2% for the Länder (Spahn & Föttinger, 1997, p. 238). 
Though this protected Länder finances, the federal government could fortify its 
intergovernmental position due to its increased financial responsibilities, and the 
subsequent strong dependence of the new East German Länder on federal government 
spending. It needs to be emphasised, however, that federal government spending has been 
additional spending above the much more substantial horizontal equalization mechanisms 
that exist among the Länder themselves. The latter is particularly of relevance to West 
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German local finances, because the Länder have largely retracted the costs caused by 
horizontal equalization directly from local government.  
 
Germany/NRW: clarifying intergovernmental responsibilities in a context of fiscal stress 
The growing complexity of the German system meant that from the 1980s onwards 
ongoing pleas were made to reform the country’s intergovernmental structure. Due to 
political sensitivity it took until the early 2000s before a large scale reform was seriously 
considered. In two commissions, jointly organised by the Federal Parliament and Federal 
Council, options were discussed to simplify the intergovernmental system. Commission 
I concentrated on non-fiscal subjects and delivered some results such as the complete 
decentralisation of higher education to the Länder and the federalization of civil servant 
employment conditions. Overall, however, many government tasks have remained highly 
intermingled across government levels (cf. Burkhart, 2009).  
The results of the even more sensitive fiscal topics that were discussed in 
Commission II have been even more modest. Commission II focused on three 
intergovernmental financial issues: the vertical and horizontal equalization systems, the 
intergovernmental division of tax resources, and the introduction of public debt limits. 
The Commission largely failed to introduce reforms in case of the first two topics. More 
significant was its work leading to the implementation of a debt brake in the German 
constitution. The amendment determines that from 2016 onwards the federal government 
is forbidden to run a deficit of more than 0.35% of GDP, while the Länder are not 
permitted to run any deficit from 2020 onwards. The effectiveness of the debt brake in 
the long run is uncertain, especially given the exception clauses included in the balanced 
budget law (i.e. in 2009, this resulted in the debt break being overdrawn when both the 
federal and state governments implemented fiscal stimulus packages to address the 
financial and economic crisis). In budgeting processes at various government levels, the 
debt brake nevertheless plays an increasingly prominent role (Ciaglia & Heinemann, 
2012; Feld & Baskaran, 2010).  
 
3.2.4 Germany/NRW: political institutions 
In the German system, intergovernmental relations are strongly affected by constitutional 
institutions. The federal Basic Law, and NRW’s state constitution, contain two articles 
affecting LG, which can be judicially reviewed by either the Federal or NRW’s 
Constitutional Court. First, there is the constitutional article that guarantees equal living 
conditions across the German federation, which is seen as an implicit instruction for both 
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the federal government and Länder to organise a financial redistribution. For the federal 
government among the Länder, and for the Länder among LGs. Secondly, the 
constitution provides the guarantee of local self-government, which in common 
understanding is perceived as LGs being able to determine a share of the local budget 
according to local preferences (Buettner et al., 2008). Despite these (indirect) protections, 
the constitution does not ‘provide’ German LGs with constitutional autonomy, but 
observes them as part of the state administration (Henneke, 2012b). Hence it is the Länder 
organised in the Federal Council who carry the main responsibility for looking after the 
interests of LG at the federal level.  
In the German system, the interests of different types of LGs are represented by 
different associations. At the NRW state level, three main associations can be 
distinguished, largely organised along NRW’s three categories of LG: cities, counties, 
and county-dependent LGs. Despite the institutional segregation of the LG landscape, the 
organisations regularly operate in joint cooperation when dealing with the NRW state 
government.12 As federal legislation has substantial financial consequences for the local 
level, federal counterparts of the associations are active at the federal level in Berlin. The 
Federal Association of Counties and the Federal Association of County-dependent Cities 
and Municipalities only offer federal membership at an associational level to their 
counterparts active in the Länder. The Federal Association of Cities provides both 
associational and direct membership to individual cities (Henneke, 2012a, p. 74). The 
influence of the associations is stronger at the state level compared to the federal level, 
although their role in Berlin has increased in recent years, as is illustrated in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis.  
 
3.2.5 The Netherlands: historical overview 
Less extreme than the German case, the Dutch IGR system has also endured major 
changes in its historical evolution. When the Dutch Republic of the Seven United 
Provinces was founded in 1581, it was a loosely organised state system, and the first 
federation in modern history. Strong power differences existed between the provinces, 
with Holland dominating the other provinces in both commercial and military weight. For 
the most part, the provinces were highly autonomous as central decision-making 
proceeded by mutual consensus and remained largely restricted to common defense and 
trade interests. While the decentralised structure was effective and contributed to the 
                                                          
12 Collectively organised in the ‘Working Community of the LG Associations NRW’ 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der kommunalen Spitzenverbände NRW).  
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Dutch Golden Age of the 17th century, the necessary reforms were thwarted when the 
Republic faced increasing economic and military competition from the more centralised 
European states in the 18th century (Deursen, 2003, p. 163).  
The implementation of French inspired institutional reforms in the Netherlands 
from 1795 onwards strengthened capacity for central level decision-making. The French 
inspired, centralised state structures continued to exist in the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands established in 1815. In its first decades, the Dutch Kingdom was 
characterised by autocratic monarchical rule, however this changed when the European 
revolutions of the 1840s convinced the Dutch king to take on a more liberal approach. 
The Dutch constitution of 1848 not only enhanced the powers of the Dutch parliament, 
but also outlined and formalised the Dutch intergovernmental structure. The 1848 
constitution, in combination with the Provinces Act of 1850 and the Municipal Law of 
1851, largely determined the Dutch IGR structure until today. All drafted by the liberal 
Prime Minister Thorbecke, the legislation outlined an intergovernmental structure 
containing elements from both the Dutch Republic and the post-1795 French inspired 
centralised system.13  
Dutch LGs are required to cooperate in co-governance arrangements, which 
illustrates the unitary character of the Dutch system. At the same time, the Dutch 
constitution regards LG as equal and autonomous in these arrangements, rather than a 
subordinate government partner. The constitutional provisions offer limited protection to 
Dutch LGs in practice, due to the Dutch prohibition on reviewing the constitutionality of 
Acts of Parliament.14 In a similar vein, the Dutch system has been characterised as an 
example of ‘grass roots constitutionalism’ in that the shape and legitimacy of the 
constitutional order is – in general – not derived from the popular will as expressed in 
constitutional texts, but instead rests on the stability, efficiency and outcomes of the 
government’s performance (Schyff, 2010).  
As Dutch LGs face ‘freedom in restraint’ (Hendriks, 2001, p. 144), and central 
government strongly depends on the local level for the implementation of its policies, the 
Dutch system is characterised by strong institutionalized interdependence. Vertical 
interdependence strongly increased with the rise of co-governance arrangements in the 
                                                          
13 Thorbecke was also influenced by the German philosophical and legal tradition which emphasised the 
organic development of state institutions, in close interaction with the societal context (Drentje, 2004). 
14 The original text in Section 120 of the Constitution of the Netherlands states that: ‘The constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts’ (in Dutch: ‘De rechter treedt niet in 
de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen’). Source: website Dutch Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (visited March 12, 2014). 
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twentieth century, which according to some observers reduced the autonomy of Dutch 
LG (Hendriks & Schaap, 2012, p. 113). Other scholars emphasise the role played by co-
governance to enable Dutch citizens to continue to exercise some degree of local control 
over an expanding public sector (Denters & Klok, 2005; Toonen, 1987). The relevance 
of each of the perspectives remains uncertain given a lack of empirical research that 
elucidates the genuine degree of local discretionary space in co-governance 
arrangements. Uncertainty about the degree of discretionary space in the implementation 
of local tasks poses a major barrier for determining LG financial flexibility, and hence for 
using local task execution as an indicator of LG financial stress (see also chapter 1). 
Similar to England and Germany, cultural features have reinforced path 
dependency in IGR arrangements and practices in the Netherlands. Consensus-orientation 
is particularly characteristic of Dutch society (Lijphart, 1969), where as many actors and 
perspectives are involved in the decision-making process of a matter as possible (also 
referred to as overlegeconomie - deliberative economy –, or poldermodel) (Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2009). The need for government policies to have widespread support from 
organised interests and citizens has contributed to the Dutch egalitarian culture. The 
tradition can also be traced in the performance of the Dutch intergovernmental system. 
First, there is a strong emphasis and official government policy to realise a high level of 
equality in public service provision throughout the country (Goedhart, 1989). Second, 
central government generally restrains from taking unilateral decisions affecting 
subnational interests. Duyvendak (1998) therefore typifies Dutch IGR interactions by the 
three C’s, denoting ‘consultation, consensus and compromise’. 
 
3.2.6 The Netherlands: political institutions 
Despite the limited role for the constitution, the Dutch system operates several norms 
affecting the (financial) position of LG. First, in 2004 the Dutch cabinet and LG 
representative associations agreed on a Code of Intergovernmental Relations (Code 
Interbestuurlijke Verhoudingen) as a procedural basis for intergovernmental interactions. 
The basic assumption of the Code is that government tasks should be allocated at the 
subnational level, unless central level allocation offers clear advantages. The Code 
includes nine guidelines, which, in essence, encourages central government to consult LG 
representative associations in early stages of national and EU level policy trajectories. 
In intergovernmental negotiations, the Dutch Association of Municipalities 
(Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten/VNG) plays a prominent role. Since 1987, 
government actors involved in intergovernmental negotiations are using so-called 
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convenants, which are agreements between the national government, and LG interest 
groups, generally drafted at the start of a national cabinet period. The convenants are not 
binding legally, but they have some relevance due to the moral obligations they create 
among the organisations involved. Further strengths of the convenants are their results 
oriented nature, and the increased access they provide to senior officials of subnational 
organisations vis-à-vis cabinet Ministers (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 73). Although all 
Dutch municipalities held a membership with the Association of Dutch Municipalities, 
subgroups of Dutch municipalities are present and operate as such, although to varying 
degrees of intensity, within and outside the Association of Dutch Municipalities. There 
are four main associations active besides the Association of Dutch Municipalities, which 
are mainly organised along their demographic or physical characteristics. Particularly 
relevant are the G4, which represents the four largest Dutch cities, and the G32, which 
lobbies central government on behalf of the 33 largest Dutch cities, excluding the G4-
cities.  
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
The first part of this chapter offers a discussion of the methodological aspects of the 
thesis. The discussion identifies several risks attached to conducting combined 
quantitative and qualitative research. It is noted that when these pitfalls are properly taken 
into account, a mixed method research design offers substantial benefits to enhance the 
reliability of research findings, compared to the results that can be achieved when 
applying one methodological approach. The research design of this thesis reflects 
awareness of the perils attached to mixed method research. It has selected a feasible 
number of cases – three country systems – to which the investigator has a level of access. 
To ensure integration of quantitative and qualitative findings, the thesis is not divided into 
chapters using separate methodologies. Instead each empirical chapter draws upon both 
quantitative and qualitative research findings.  
The second part of the chapter provides a descriptive overview of the evolution of 
the institutional structures selected in this study. The overview demonstrates that all 
systems are characterised by substantial IGR changes throughout their history, most 
dramatically in the German case. Despite these changes, the systems demonstrate long 
periods of path dependent processes. The comparison demonstrates several similarities 
between the systems. Most significant is the strong institutional interdependence between 
government levels in the provision of public services. IGR reforms with fiscal 
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distributional effects stand out as politically most sensitive. The observations also 
highlight several distinctive features of the systems.  
In England, LG has been torn between long periods of minimal government 
involvement and periods with intergovernmental restrictions unparalleled from a 
European comparative perspective. A dominant pragmatic, and often uninterested 
approach at the centre towards local affairs, means that changes in the intergovernmental 
position of English LG have not been an outcome of long running constitutional debates 
but are much more a reflection of immediate responses by the country’s governing elites 
to changing material circumstances. This is most noticeable during the Thatcher period, 
where significantly restrictive regulations were introduced to increase central fiscal 
control.  
The chapter shows that political and administrative discretion is a core feature of 
the English intergovernmental system, whose institutional origins can be retraced to the 
English common-law tradition. Although present at all levels of government, discretion 
is most visible in the approach of the centre towards LG, and explains the regular changes 
in England’s intergovernmental structure. The reform mode in the German/NRW system 
contrasts sharply with England. Besides the complete institutional makeovers during 
Germany’s periods of extraordinary political change, post-war intergovernmental 
structures demonstrate a high degree of institutional resilience. This is also observable in 
the frequency and intensity of territorial restructurings, which occurred almost 
continuously in the English system and are much rarer in the German system. The German 
tradition of administrative law has evolved into an IGR approach that is characterised by 
certainty and stability, rather than discretion and flexibility.    
With respect to decision-making legitimacy, the Dutch system more strongly 
resembles the English system. In contrast to Germany, it is not so much normative 
constraints on the political process that provide legitimacy to policy decisions, but, similar 
to England, very much the political process itself. The limited prominence of normative 
constraints can be explained by the Dutch prohibition on reviewing the constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament, which has resulted in marginal formal protection for the local level. 
In practice, however, the Dutch system applies informal, cultural norms that seems to 
restrict central government’s space for manoeuvre. 
The institutional differences are expected to result in differences in access by LG 
interest groups to higher government levels. Although systematic research on interest 
representation at the level of the German Länder is highly limited (cf. Benz & Zimmer, 
2012, p. 159), it is likely that the Länder provide more space for local interest 
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intermediation compared to England. Unlike England, state level politicians in Germany 
frequently have roots in local politics. In addition, institutional and political distance 
between the local level and the Länder governments is smaller compared to the distance 
between the UK government and the English local level, as the latter (still) lacks its own 
parliament or government. Due to relatively strong political links between local and 
national level politicians – although the size of the city matters –, access of interest groups 
in the Dutch system is likely to resemble the German system more closely than the 
English system.   
In conclusion, the comparisons in this chapter demonstrate that the existing 
political and administrative literature on the constitutional ‘identity’ of the three selected 
European systems leaves unanswered the question of what impact the differences in the 
degree of institutional discretion versus the degree of certainty have on error 
accumulation processes and error correction mechanisms in different IGR financial 
systems. Hence, the effect of these differences on the occurrence of LG financial stress 
remains unexplored in the existing literature.15 As shown in the chapter 2, the research 
gap can be explained by the near ignorance of the financial dimension in government 
studies, and the unrefined approach taken towards institutional structures in public 
economics and political economy.  
By investigating the three core IGR financial institutions that affect LG finances, 
the next three empirical chapters explore the impact of differences in institutional 
discretion and certainty on financial error accumulation and error correction mechanisms 
at the local level within heterogeneous IGR contexts. This investigation improves 
scholarly understanding of local and IGR finances but also has important implications for 






                                                          
15 This gap in government studies contrasts to other fields, such as planning, where cross-country 





CHAPTER 4   
 
The double role of regulatory 
regimes: how low borrowing costs 




The level of interest rates is a relevant consideration for consumers and businesses when 
making the decision to take on debt. Also for national governments that aim to prevent a 
rise of inflation and therefore limit the increase of the money supply, borrowing costs 
determined by credit markets will effectively demarcate debt policies. More ambiguous 
is the question of how interest rates affect debt accumulation at the subnational level. This 
ambiguity results from the country-specific organisation of local government (LG) 
borrowing markets, which is visible in two major ways. First, financial regulations on 
loan provisions to LG entities often differ from borrowing regulations applied to private 
sector organisations. Second, LG lenders are often partially or completely based within 
the public sector.  
Research about the effect of interest rates on subnational debt accumulation is 
highly limited. Most research has focused on US municipal bond markets with a common 
finding showing that financial indicators significantly affect local interest rates (e.g. 
Capeci, 1994; Kriz, 2003). In many European systems, however, bond markets are of 
minor importance, making it difficult to predict the effect of local financial indicators on 
local borrowing costs. This also applies to the impact of local borrowing costs on local 
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debt accumulation. In order to identify the impact of LG borrowing structures on local 
debt accumulation in Europe, this chapter compares the Dutch, English and German LG 
systems. 
The aims of this chapter are threefold. First, the chapter seeks to discover whether 
a relationship exists between local level financial indicators and the borrowing costs of 
LGs. Second, the relationship is investigated between local financial indicators and 
borrowing costs on the evolution of LG debt. Third, the chapter analyses the impact of 
country-specific regulatory structures on local debt accumulation and borrowing costs. 
This part of the analysis discusses the formal and informal institutional framing of LG 
borrowing in the selected systems. To realise the chapter’s aims, a mixed methodological 
approach is adopted. The relationship between borrowing costs and local debt 
accumulation is investigated using regression techniques, which are supplemented by 
qualitative sources to identify the impact of the regulatory framework on LG debt and 
borrowing costs.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 2 are shortly recapitulated. The chapter then describes the organisation of the 
markets for LG borrowing in the three systems. This information is essential in order to 
understand how macro-system characteristics affect local borrowing costs. A detailed 
description of the research design and methodology is provided in the fourth section, 
followed by a discussion of the empirical results. The sixth section provides a 
comparative institutional analysis that identifies the effect of the three regulatory regimes 
on local debt-making. The chapter concludes by summarising the findings.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
Section 2.3.1 in the literature review introduces four hypotheses to investigate the 
relationship between regulatory structures, LG borrowing costs, and LG debt 
development. This section shortly recapitulates those hypotheses.  
First, due to the fact that investors in the European context mainly rely upon 
regulatory regimes to determine LG borrowing costs, it is expected that limited local level 
risk assessment is being conducted by credit providers to Dutch, English and German 
LGs (Peng et al., 2014). Hence: 
 




Second, it is expected that political willingness to enter into debt, will reduce when 
borrowing costs occupy an increasing share of the budget (Drazen, 1997; Faini, 2006). 
Hence: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: borrowing costs are negatively related to LG debt. 
 
Third, the higher quality of local treasury management and a reduced risk of financial 
default of large LGs are likely to be rewarded by credit markets through the levying of 
lower borrowing costs to large LGs, as compared to small LGs. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3: borrowing costs are negatively related to the local population size.  
  
Fourth, the literature indicates at a positive relationship between a jurisdiction’s income 
and the scale of its debt (Ashworth et al., 2005; Benito & Bastida, 2004). It can be 
expected that low borrowing costs will enhance the positive relationship between local 
income and local debt-making. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 4: low LG borrowing costs enhance the positive relationship between 
LG income and LG debt. 
 
 
All the outlined hypotheses can be tested using quantitative techniques. The main 
econometric relationship to investigate the effect of borrowing costs is illustrated in figure 
4.1. Before progressing onto the empirical analysis, some background information is 
provided on the organisation of the borrowing markets for LGs in the three selected 
systems.  
 
Figure 4.1 Econometric relationship to investigate the (indirect) impact of the 







4.3 Organisation of LG borrowing markets 
In all the three systems the credit market for LG borrowing is characterised by a mix 









lenders to local government. In each system, a single player (strongly) dominates the 
market in LG credit provision. In the English system, around 74% of all LG debt in 2013 
was outstanding with the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), compared to around 60% 
of all Dutch LG debt with the Dutch Municipal Bank, the BNG.16 The market for credit 
provision is significantly more diverse in NRW - that said, the NRW.Bank, stands out 
with a market share of around 25% in the financing of NRW’s LG debt (2012). In all 
three systems, these credit providers are in public ownership. This is most noticeable in 
England, where the PWLB is part of the Treasury’s agency responsible for the UK’s debt 
management. The NRW.Bank is NRW’s main public investment bank and is solely 
owned by the state of NRW. Ownership of the Dutch BNG is equally shared between 
central and subnational government.   
 
Table 4.1 LG lending institutions 
Source: own illustration, based upon corporate reports respective financial institutions.  
 
                                                          
16 Total debt of English LG (including functional authorities) in 2013: 69.2 billion £, of which 51.2 billion 
£ outstanding with the PWLB (DCLG statistics 2012/13; PWLB 2013). Total debt of NRW LG in 2012: 
58.0 billion €, of which 14.3 billion € outstanding with the NRW.Bank (Landtag NRW, Drucksache 
16/4504, 27/11/2013); Handelsblatt, ‘Landeseigene NRW.Bank hält Kommunen über Wasser, 
01/12/2013). Source Dutch percentage: interview BNG, interviewee A, 28/01/2014. 
 England NRW – Germany The Netherlands 
Main LG credit 
provider  
Public Works Loan 
Board (PWLB) 
NRW.Bank Dutch Municipal Bank 
(BNG – Bank 
Nederlandse 
Gemeenten) 
Year of foundation 1793 2002 1914 
Estimated market 
share LG borrowing 
(2013) 
74% 25% 60% 
Ownership structure 100% central 
government; 
part of the UK Debt 
Management Office, 
an executive agency 
of HM Treasury 
100% owned by the 
state of NRW 
50% shares owned by 
central government, 





HM Treasury Markets  Markets 
Long-term credit 
ratings of the bank 
(2013) 









ratings (NRW for 
Germany) (2013)  














In England and NRW, other actors active on the market for LG borrowing are 
mainly private. Due to the PWLB’s dominance this percentage is relatively small in 
England, but private sector banks provide the majority of local credit in NRW. In the 
Dutch system, the main competitor of the BNG is the similarly publicly owned 
Netherlands Water Boards Bank, with a market share of around 12% in municipal loan 
funding in 2012 (NWB Bank, 2013, p. 26). Although most Dutch local treasury statutes 
contain the requirement to obtain at least three borrowing offers before deciding where to 
take a loan, acquiring a third offer often proves difficult. Some Dutch private sector banks, 
such as the Rabobank, are active on the LG borrowing market but their involvement is 
limited, mainly due to the small margins on municipal loan provision which reduces the 
market’s commercial attractiveness. Foreign banks appear to operate rarely on the Dutch 
LG borrowing market, which is partly due to unwillingness to channel resources into 
building a bank infrastructure in the Netherlands, and unfamiliarity with the Dutch 
intergovernmental system which complicates the offering of attractive loans to local 
treasurers.17  
 Familiarity and tailored size loans also motivate English and NRW LGs to mainly 
organise loans with domestic financial institutions. However, the main motivation to 
acquire loans domestically – and especially with the specialised lenders – are their 
competitive rates. Treasurers in all three systems indicate that they would not hesitate to 
change from the current dominant loan providers if cheaper loans could be acquired 
elsewhere. With larger treasury capacity available and bigger borrowing sums to finance, 
eagerness to find the most attractive loan pricing is most explicit among bigger LGs. In 
all three systems, bigger LGs tend to have the most diverse loan portfolios, but the 
specialised lenders still dominate.  
 The competitive loan pricing that the PWLB, NRW.Bank and the BNG are able 
to offer, can largely be explained by their ownership structure. In case of the NRW.Bank, 
the institutional and guarantor liability for the bank rests with the state of NRW. The bank 
also benefits from an explicit, unconditional, and irrevocable guarantee that has been 
granted by the state of NRW for an unlimited period of time.18 Unlike the NRW.Bank, 
                                                          
17 For example, one Dutch local treasurer recalls: ‘I remember a case where a foreign bank included in 
their draft borrowing contract that if our municipality had to apply to Section 12 support [= i.e. the 
financial safety net in place for LGs in the Dutch system, DW], they would be able to claim their loan 
with us. For us this was reason to cancel the loan, because Section 12 itself is the safety net, and you 
can’t then put a second guarantee in the contract that the loan would be claimable with the municipality’. 
Source: interview Dutch 100,000+ Municipal Treasurers Association, 20/02/2014. 
18 “Gesetz über die NRW.BANK” (Act on NRW.BANK) dated March 16, 2004; and NRW.Bank 
Corporate Profile, available on the bank’s website: http://www.nrwbank.de. See also Moody’s (2012). 
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the BNG does not have an explicit comfort letter from the Dutch central government or 
other contractual guarantees from its key stakeholders. However, given BNG’s 
importance to the Dutch public sector, the rating agencies generally assume that the Dutch 
central government would provide support if a financial stress situation would occur ((‘a 
very high likelihood’, according to Moody’s (2013)). Another factor contributing to 
BNG’s high rating is linked to the bank’s advantageous funding costs, which is largely 
due to the fact that most lending to Dutch public sector entities is classified as risk-free 
by the Dutch Central Bank (DNB). The solvency-free status of municipal loans 
significantly reduces the BNG’s banking costs because liquidity requirements do not 
apply to LG loans (Eekelen, 1987, p. 139). This cost advantage is passed on to LGs 
through the BNG’s low interest rates.19    
The special ownership structures result in credit ratings for the BNG and 
NRW.Bank that are, with some delay, in line with the ratings assigned to their sovereigns 
(see table 4.1).20 As an integral part of the central government, the credit rating of the UK 
directly affects interest rates set by the PWLB. Loans to LGs are provided by the PWLB 
at a slightly higher rate than the UK government is able to borrow, which in most cases 
is lower than the rates English LGs can achieve on the private sector market. The English 
borrowing market also differs from the Dutch and NRW system as the PWLB holds the 
official status as lender of last resort for LG loans (since 1955) (DCLG, 2012). As such, 
the PWLB does not only reduce LG borrowing costs through directly provided loans, but 
also indirectly by providing a guarantee to private banks who would otherwise not be 
willing to lend to English LGs. 
Since the BNG, NRW.Bank, and PWLB, solely operate to serve the public sector, 
and therefore lack private savings – traditionally the cheapest source of bank funding – 
the institutions strongly rely upon external investors to raise money. High credit ratings 
are crucial in this process.  
As one banker from the BNG recalls:  
 
When we are on our fundraising roadshows, say in Asia where we raise over 40% of our 
funding, the BNG, or Dutch municipalities generally, do not say much to investors, but 
when we start telling about our triple A-status, that works.21 
 
                                                          
19 Interview BNG, interviewee A, 28/01/2014. 
20 The high trust position of the BNG and NRW.Bank is also reflected in both banks having been 
continuously listed in the annual top ten of the world’s safest banks from the Global Finance Magazine 
(2nd and 8th position respectively in 2013). 
21 Interview BNG, interviewee B, 28/01/2014. 
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In addition to their assumed (BNG) or formalised special status (NRW.Bank), the 
high credit ratings of BNG and NRW.Bank are strongly related to the external perception 
of the intergovernmental systems in which their client’ LGs operate. Confidence in the 
regulatory frameworks and safety nets in place for financially distressed LGs provide a 
crucial reason for low local borrowing costs. These regulatory frameworks carry even 
more relevance for lending to LGs by private sector banks, who in the Dutch and NRW 
system lack an official lender of last resort as present in the English system.  
Confidence in the internal organisation of the intergovernmental systems is 
reflected in how borrowing provision by the specialised lenders occurs in practice. A 
simple phone call by a local authority and a check by the loan provider whether the caller 
is authorized, is sufficient to transfer the loan sum, almost immediately.  
According to an interviewee at the Dutch BNG: 
  
We do not conduct any risk analysis in case a municipality arranges a borrowing sum 
with us. This is also not our task, since the provinces [that is the official regulators on 
LGs in the Dutch system, DW], carry the main responsibility for supervising local 
finances. In addition, if the borrowing sum is provided for a project carrying high 
financial risks, local treasurers are generally very much aware of this, but if it’s a prestige 
project and local politicians want it, it will go ahead. It’s then not up to us to start asking 
critical questions.22    
 
Due to high confidence in the quality of the system’s regulatory regime, the (assumed) 
presence of safety nets, and the absence of both historical cases of municipal bankruptcies 
and official legislation regulating LG insolvencies, interest rates offered by the three 
specialised lenders are not only comparatively low priced but are also set at uniform levels 
across LGs. This means that the specific credit position of a LG does not affect its 
borrowing costs from the three specialised lenders.23  
The high degree of financial integration in the intergovernmental systems is 
strongly emphasised by the LG associations in the three systems. The associations 
generally discourage their members from acquiring an individual credit rating, arguing 
                                                          
22 Interview BNG, interviewee B, 28/01/2014. 
23 The PWLB stands somewhat out here as it offers an advantageous rate to LGs who are able to 
demonstrate in their long-term capital expenditure borrowing plans that they have prudential borrowing 
and debt policies in place. This concessionary so-called Certainty Rate is 20 basis points (0.2%) below 
PWLB’s standard rate and has been in use since 2012. The reduced rate seems primarily an effort by the 
UK Treasury to re-assure the attractiveness of PWLB interest rates, which came under pressure after 
rising PWLB rates between 2006-2012 resulted in increased private sector borrowing by English LGs. 
However, submitting the plans mentioned requires limited local effort, since according to the English 
audit regulations LGs already need to have these plans in place when considering any type of long-term 
borrowing, indiscriminate of the specific lender. 
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that individual credit ratings are unnecessary as the intergovernmental system is assumed 
to eliminate local default risks. Without facing any substantial difficulties in attracting 
loans in the recent past, combined with the costs attached to acquiring a credit rating, 
local treasurers in the three systems generally hold a negative perception of acquiring a 
credit rating. This position is reflected by all Dutch and NRW LGs foregoing an 
independent credit rating in 2013. In England, eight LGs did have a credit rating in 2013 
(see appendix II). The individual financial position of these eight English LGs has exerted 
only a minor effect on their rating, which has primarily reflected rating changes for the 
UK central government. Given the PWLB’s position as official lender of last resort and 
its generally low interest rates, it seems surprising that out of the three systems, only 
English LGs have sought a credit rating. However, acquiring a credit rating was strongly 
linked to a onetime change of the Housing Revenue Account (HRA) in 2010, which 
temporarily increased borrowing needs among English LGs, and triggered some of them 
to improve their credit status for private sector borrowing.24 
 
Due to the special intergovernmental structures, a weak link can be expected between the 
financial status of a LG and its interest rates. The relationship will be weakest in England, 
following the dominance of the PWLB and the virtual uniform interest rates it sets among 
LGs. The relationship is expected to be strongest in NRW, following a large borrowing 
share occupied by private sector borrowers, and an intermediate position taken by the 
Dutch system. The empirical analysis of the relationship between local interest rates and 
local financial variables confirms these expectations. Therefore, these results are briefly 
discussed in the empirical section, but the focus will be on the more interesting question 
of whether low borrowing costs have a separate effect on LG debt-making policies. 
 
4.4 Method and data sources 
The empirical analysis is based on a uniquely compiled dataset of LGs in England, NRW, 
and the Netherlands. The data on English and NRW LGs cover a four year period, from 
2009 to 2012. The interest rates for LGs in the three systems have been calculated as the 
interest expense for the year divided by the average debt during the year. This calculation 
controls for differences in the maturity period of local loans and macro level interest rate 
trends, which makes calculating interest rates based upon borrowing costs preferable over 
relying upon the actual interest rates. When using the term interest rates in this chapter, 
                                                          
24 Public Finance, 18 November, 2011; Public Finance, 19 September, 2011.   
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the reference is made towards these calculated effective interest rates. A similar method 
has been used by previous studies such as Pittman and Fortin (2004), Francis et al. (2005), 
and Bastida et al. (2014).  
In contrast to NRW and England, the Dutch national statistical office (CBS) does 
not publish local borrowing expense figures. According to the Dutch accounting 
regulations, Dutch LGs are required to include their long-term interest costs in their 
annual accounting report. By checking the annual accounting reports, which are mostly 
available on the municipality's website, it has been possible to obtain the long-term 
interest costs for 360 of the 415 Dutch municipalities in 2012. Missing cases are due to 
39 municipalities that demonstrate report omissions, and 16 that do not provide long-term 
interest costs figures because they are debt-free. As historical accounting reports prior to 
2012 are unavailable for many Dutch LGs, interest rate figures for Dutch municipalities 
are used for 2012 only. 
It has been possible to calculate the average interest costs over the period 2009-
2012 for 200 English LGs, and for 316 NRW LGs. Missing cases are due to missing data 
on interest cost expenditures, especially in case of English LGs, and LGs reporting a debt 
free status. Given the limitation of the Dutch data to a single year, the dataset is unsuitable 
to conduct panel data analysis. In order to be able to run the statistical analysis in a model 
including all three constitutional systems the four year English and NRW data have been 
averaged into single year observations, and combined with the Dutch data into one pooled 
dataset. To standardize the fiscal data, the currencies of all three countries have been 
converged in euros. For the currency conversion from pound sterling to euros in case of 
the English treasury data, the average annual currency exchange rates have been used, as 
calculated by the Bank of England. The historical exchange rates data are available 
through the online Statistical Interactive Database of the Bank of England. 
A dummy variable is used to indicate whether a LG is in a special financial 
emergency arrangement, which might affect its borrowing costs. For NRW, the official 
status of non-approved emergency budget has been used, and for Dutch LGs Section 12 
status. Since no special arrangements for financially distressed LGs exist in the English 
system, information has been used from the LG performance measurement system that 






Table 4.2 Variable names pooled dataset 
 
 
designate LGs which in turn received the label ‘poor’ or ‘excellent’. LGs included are 
those that were ranked poor in the most recently available ranking (2009).25 
The financial data for English LGs are derived from the Department for Local 
Government and Communities (DCLG); for NRW LGs, from NRW’s statistical office 
(Landesdatenbank NRW); and for Dutch LGs, from the office of Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS). Sources of other variables are provided in table 4.2. 
 
Dependent variable 
Two different dependent variables are used in the regressions. First, the regressions 
identify if a relationship exists between local variables and the borrowing costs of LGs. 
In this case, the calculated borrowing costs are used as dependent variable. In the second 
and main regression, the local debt size (natural log) is used as the dependent variable. 
                                                          
25 See also http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/dec/09/oneplace-website-council-services; 
providing additional information on the worst performing councils according to the Audit Commission’s 
One Place rating system. 
Variable Measurement Source 






debt Natural log of total debt DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
income Natural log of total income DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
taxes Natural log of tax income p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
totalgrants Natural log of total grants p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
interestrate Effective interest rate DCLG IT.NRW Municipal 
accounting 
reports  
expenditure Natural log of total expenditure p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
density Natural log of inhabitants per square km ONS IT.NRW CBS 
unemployed Unemployed inhabitants as % total local 
population   
ONS IT.NRW CBS 




icelandbanks English LGs with savings with Icelandic 
banks (Landsbanki and Kauphting) 
DCLG & Audit 
Commission 
- BZK 
propertybubble Dutch LGs affected by property bubble  - - CBS 
ideology Political colour; 0 right wing council 







nrw 1 if a NRW LG, 0 otherwise     
netherlands 1 if a Dutch LG, 0 otherwise     
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As local borrowing costs in England and NRW refer to all borrowing, total local debt 
figures are used in case of England and NRW. It is particularly relevant to include total 
local debt size for NRW, as more than half of NRW’s local debt consists of short-term 
liquidity (see also section 4.6.2.2). The available Dutch interest expense figures refer to 
long-term debt only, so the debt variable used in the Dutch case refers to long-term debt 
only. Dutch regulations effectively reduce the use of short-term liquidity by Dutch 
municipalities. For this reason, the vast majority of Dutch local borrowing costs are 
related to long-term borrowing, which legitimises a statistical limitation to long-term 
borrowing in the Dutch case.  
 
Model specification  
In line with the hypotheses generated from the literature, independent variables are related 
to the financial, institutional and demographic features of LGs. Country dummies have 
been created to control for unobserved effects at the country level, with England used as 
reference group. The following empirical model has been formulated to identify the effect 
of the regressors on the effective local interest rate: 
          
(4.1) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡) + 𝛽2 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)
 + 𝛽5 (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽6 (𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) + 𝛽7(𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦) 
 + 𝛽8 (𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)+𝛽9 (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽10(𝑛𝑟𝑤)+𝛽11 (𝑛𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖
  
Where 




debt is the log of total debt size. 
income is the log of total income. 
taxes is the log of tax income p/c. 
totalgrants is the log of total grants p/c. 
expenditure is the log of total expenditure p/c. 
emergency is equal to 1 for LGs in an institutional emergency arrangement, 0 otherwise. 
ideology is equal to 1 for left wing council majorities, 0 otherwise.  
density is the log of inhabitants per sq. km. 
unemployed is the number of unemployed inhabitants as percentage of the total local population. 
nrw is 1 if a NRW LG, 0 otherwise. 





Secondly, debt is used as a dependent variable, and effective interest rates are included 
as one of the explanatory variables. This model is formulated as follows:  
                        (4.2) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)         
+𝛽5(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽6(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) + 𝛽7(𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦) + 𝛽8(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)  
 +𝛽9(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽10(𝑛𝑟𝑤)+ 𝛽11(𝑛𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖 
      
To test the moderating effect of the effective interest rates on local debt accumulation, 
interaction terms are included in the final estimation model. This regression is expressed 
as: 
                        (4.3) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)     
              +  𝛽5(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽6(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) + 𝛽7(𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦) + 𝛽8(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
 + 𝛽9(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) +  𝛽10(𝑛𝑟𝑤)+ 𝛽11(𝑛𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠) +
                 𝛽12(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝜀𝑖  
 
In addition to model 4.3, which provides the main model for analysing the pooled data 
for the three systems combined, regressions are run for the three systems individually. 
Two additional variables are added to these models. For English LGs the variable 
icelandbanks is added, with a dummy coded 1 for English LGs that had savings with the 
Icelandic banks Landsbanki and Kaupthing, 0 otherwise. The variable is relevant to 
include – the effect of the Icelandic banks defaulting in 2008 (temporarily) increased the 
borrowing costs and debt levels of the 105 English LGs that had investments with 
Icelandic banks (to account for this, losses on saving accounts were added to borrowing 
costs). For the Dutch case, the variable propertybubble has been added, which controls 
for Dutch LGs that have been severely financially affected by investments in real estate 
projects (see also further in this chapter). The variable is operationalised as a dummy, 
with the fifty Dutch LGs most affected by the property crisis labelled 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.5 Empirical analysis – results 
Table 4.3 reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in the regression. 
Following large ranges of magnitude, natural log transformation has been applied to 
control for skewed and wide distribution among data. As part of the data transformation, 
values with absolute value less than one have been mapped to zero (e.g. debt free LGs).
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Table 4.4 Correlation coefficients
Variable n Mean s.d Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
debt 876 7.76 0.62 5.56 7.33 7.72 8.16 9.637 
income 876 7.93 0.56 6.72 7.53 7.80 8.28 9.73 
taxes 876 2.50 0.43 0.17 2.22 2.45 2.89 4.14 
totalgrants 876 2.85 0.43 0.99 2.58 2.97 3.14 4.77 
interestrate 876 3.75 1.23 0.15 2.85 3.80 4.42 9.76 
expenditure 876 3.28 0.20 2.51 3.23 3.31 3.40 4.88 
density 876 4.639 2.01 0.54 2.67 4.81 6.25 10.3 
unemployed 876 7.99 1.77 4.54 6.44 8.04 9.50 11.9 
emergency 876 0.18 0.39 0 0 0 0 1 
icelandbanks 876 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 
propertybubble 876 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 
ideology 876 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
nrw 876 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
netherlands 876 0.43 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
1 debt 1              
2 income 0.61 1             
3 taxes 0.671 0.660 1            
4 totalgrants 0.382 0.304 -0.016 1           
5 interestrate -0.001 0.146 -0.044 0.419 1          
6 expenditure 0.410 0.255 0.240 0.357 -0.028 1         
7 density 0.409 0.421 0.364 0.284 0.116 0.176 1        
8 unemployed 0.420 0.458 0.573 0.251 0.220 -0.095 0.424 1       
9 emergency 0.064 -0.073 0.197 -0.408 -0.373 0.0533 -0.069 -0.003 1      
10 icelandbanks 0.219 0.254 0.275 0.161 0.164 -0.054 0.108 0.007 -0.09 1     
11 propertybubble 0.278 0.064 0.025 0.199 0.003 0.219 0.057 0.004 -0.114 -0.104 1    
12 ideology -0.050 0.024 0.025 0.135 -0.262 -0.099 0.008 0.027 0.093 0.181 0.140 1   
13 nrw -0.142 -0.133 0.210 -0.650 -0.517 -0.001 -0.180 -0.200 -0.167 0.592 -0.181 0.372 1  
14 netherlands -0.069 -0.189 -0.581 0.524 0.203 0.304 -0.100 0.200 -0.534 -0.388 -0.201 0.288 -0.410 1 
100 
 
Table 4.5  Pooled OLS cross-sectional analysis, using interest rates as dependent    .    .  
.                variable 
 
 
The effective interest rates in the dataset range between a minimum of 0.15% to a 
maximum of 9.76%, with a mean of 3.75% and a standard deviation of 1.23. Table 4.4 
shows the correlation matrix of the key variables. All variables show coefficients below 
the critical level of 0.7. With coefficients around 0.65, only the variable taxes comes close 
to the critical value.  
Table 4.5 shows the results of the conducted pooled OLS cross-sectional analysis, 
using interest rates as dependent variable, and using England as the reference group. The 
results indicate that an increase in local debt does not lead to an interest cost penalty for 
LGs. However, in contrast to hypothesis 1, an increase in debt negatively affects local 







    
debt -0.772*** -0.148*** 
 (0.104) (0.032) 
income 3.947 0.759 
 (2.617) (0.795) 
taxes 0.077 -0.020 
 (0.162) (0.049) 
totalgrants 0.106 0.033 
 (0.180) (0.054) 
expenditure -2.840 -0.428 
 (2.634) (0.800) 
emergency -0.216* -0.086** 
 (0.111) (0.034) 
ideology 0.144* 0.042* 
 (0.078) (0.024) 
density -0.127** -0.034** 
 (0.043) (0.013) 
unemployed 0.045 0.007 
 (0.030) (0.009) 
nrw -1.335*** -0.361*** 
 (0.200) (0.061) 
netherlands -0.596** -0.179** 
 (0.264) (0.080) 
constant 4.872*** 1.173 
 (0.965) (0.310) 
   
Number of LGs 876 876 
R² .35 .30 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 4.6 The effect of total income on debt and the moderating effect of interest 
rates – England, Germany/NRW, and the Netherlands, OLS 
 
 
interest rates. The relationship is highly significant (P<0.05) and remains strong when 
using alternative measurements in addition to the natural log of total debt, the regressions 
were also run using debt p/c and the log of debt p/c). While the finding looks 
counterintuitive at first, interviews with local treasurers and finance experts in the three 
systems indicate that the negotiation space surrounding borrowing costs and conditions 
of borrowing increases with the size of the loan. In addition, and in line with Simonsen et 
al. (2001), larger LGs are able to realise better loan conditions due to their higher treasury 
capacity. These findings confirm that when deciding about the level of interest rates, loan 
providers in the three systems do not rely upon the financial conditions of an individual 
Independent 
variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
interestrate*income   0.064*** 
   (0.017) 
income  1.042*** 0.797*** 
  (0.035) (0.063) 
taxes  0.335*** 0.328*** 
  (0.065) (0.064) 
totalgrants  0.029 0.016 
  (0.050) (0.048) 
expenditure  -0.345** -0.387** 
  (0.155) (0.157) 
interestrate  -0.073*** -0.580*** 
  (0.012) (0.135) 
emergency  0.238*** 0.242*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
ideology  0.054** 0.038* 
  (0.0212) (0.021) 
density 0.280*** 0.030** 0.034** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) 
unemployed 0.085*** 0.024** 0.026** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) 
nrw 0.220** 0.058 0.118** 
 (0.093) (0.054) (0.057) 
netherlands 1.158*** 0.573*** 0.644*** 
 (0.126) (0.096) (0.101) 
constant 5.484*** -0.478* 1.492** 
 (0.173) (0.271) (0.617) 
    
Number of LGs 876 876 876 
R² .35 .78 .79 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Pooled data 2009-2012 for England and Germany/NRW; 2012 data for the Netherlands. 
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LG, but are guided by the institutional characteristics of the intergovernmental structures 
in place. 
Table 4.6 reports the empirical results that show the effect of financial, 
institutional and demographic variables on local debt. The first model provides the base 
model, which is extended in model 2 with financial and institutional variables. In both 
model 1 and 2, the variable unemployed and the country control variables are highly 
significant and show a positive relationship with local debt. Of the financial variables, 
income and taxes are highly significant (P<0.01) and positive, which confirms previous 
findings in the literature (Ashworth et al., 2005; Benito & Bastida, 2004). The amount of 
total grants shows a positive relationship with local debt, but does not demonstrate a 
significant effect. The variable interestrates, now used as a regressor, is significantly 
negatively related to local debt (coefficients β=-0.073, P<0.01). This indicates that an 
increase in interest rates reduces local debt making, which supports hypothesis 2. The 
variable emergency indicates that LGs in a financial emergency arrangement show 
significantly higher debt levels compared to LGs outside these arrangements. The 
financial, institutional and demographic variables included in model 2 result in a R-square 
of 0.78, which is in line with models explaining local debt used in the literature (Cropf & 
Wendel, 1998). 
 Model 3 in table 4.6 provides a direct test of the moderating relationship between 
local income and local debt. The results show a positive and highly significant effect of 
the interaction term interestrate*income on local debt (coefficients β=0.064, P<0.01), and 
an improvement in the explanatory power of the overall model. In model 3, the variables 
interestrate and income remain significant at the 0.01 level, and continue to demonstrate 
a similar direction as in model 2. These findings provide strong support for hypothesis 4, 
indicating that interest rates enhance the positive effect of local income on local debt 
accumulation by around 6.4%. Figure 4.2 provides a visual representation of the marginal 
effects. The graph indicates that beyond a certain income threshold, interest rates 
positively affect local debt accumulation.  
 To specify results, estimations organised by size of LG are provided in table 4.7 
and by country system in table 4.8. The results demonstrate that the moderating effect of 
effective interest rates is especially strong for LGs with more than 50,000 inhabitants, but 
is insignificant for LGs with less than 50,000 residents. These results are in line with 
interview findings, which indicate that large LGs are better able to strategically use
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* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. Pooled data 2009-2012 for England and Germany/NRW; 2012 data for the Netherland
Table 4.7       The effect of total income on debt evolution and 
the moderating effect of interest rates: OLS regressions, results 
by jurisdictional size 
 
 Table 4.8       The effect of total income on debt evolution and the      





Small LGs           
(< 50,000) 





England Germany/NRW Netherlands 
         
interestrate*income 0.050 0.095***  interestrate*income       0.060** 0.077* 0.114** 
 (0.054) (0.025)   (0.023) (0.043) (0.040) 
income 0.899*** 0.650***  income 0.831*** 0.864*** 0.493** 
 (0.205) (0.111)   (0.135) (0.140) (0.166) 
taxes 0.078 0.372***  taxes 0.772 0.545*** 0.126 
 (0.131) (0.104)   (0.492) (0.165) (0.107) 
totalgrants 0.064 0.195  totalgrants 3.581* 0.005* -0.030 
 (0.047) (0.247)   (1.860) (0.067) (0.171) 
expenditure 0.311* -0.440  expenditure -4.502* -1.053 -0.133 
 (0.182) (0.305)   (2.316) (0.700) (0.177) 
interestrate -0.474 -0.825***  interestrate -0.529*** -0.618* -0.935** 
 (0.406) (0.207)   (0.195) (0.325) (0.307) 
emergency 0.198*** 0.283***  emergency 0.085 0.121*** -0.168 
 (0.030) (0.056)   (0.113) (0.036) (0.094) 
ideology 0.039 0.041  ideology 0.067 0.011 0.036 
 (0.032) (0.031)   (0.046) (0.036) (0.031) 
density 0.030 0.039**  density 0.021 -0.029 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.018)   (0.022) (0.042) (0.035) 
unemployed 0.002 0.037**  unemployed 0.011 0.043 -0.005 
 (0.210) (0.013)   (0.013) (0.026) (0.024) 
nrw 0.196 0.109*  propertybubble - - 0.234* 
 (0.131) (0.128)     (0.039) 
netherlands 0.378*** 0.109  icelandbanks 0.124*** - - 
 (0.135) (0.128)   (0.042)   
constant -0.973 3.143  constant 2.261* 2.686 4.226 
 (1.461) (0.929)   (1.300) (1.881) (1.263) 
        
Number of LGs 527 349  Number of LGs 200 316 360 
R² .60 .79  R² .84 .81 .78 
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interest rate movements due to their larger and more constant borrowing demand.26 This 
contrasts to small LGs, who are far less able to apply total financing methods since their 
long-term borrowing needs are more likely to be directly linked to concrete investments, 
primarily determined by amortization periods of local capital goods.  
The country-specific estimations confirm the findings: the interaction term 
interestrate*income is again significant and in the expected direction, and the same 
applies to the individual variables interestrate and income. Taking into consideration the 
overall model in table 4.6, these observations also remain robust when other variables are 
excluded from the model. This also applies to the tax income variable, hence, it can be 
concluded that the high correlation of this variable with the dependent variable does not 
negatively affect the model. The coefficients differ among the three country systems, with 
the moderating effect of interestrates least significant in NRW. The difference is less a 
result of NRW’s borrowing market, as it primarily follows from the substantially smaller 
average size of NRW LGs compared to Dutch and English LGs. Taxes are only significant 
in NRW, with the direction of the variable indicating that LGs with higher tax income 
have higher debt levels. Hence, the country estimations confirm the relevance of a 
jurisdiction’s size for its borrowing behaviour. Finally, the country specific variable 
formulated for the English system – icelandsbanks – and the Dutch system – 
propertybubble – are significant and positively related to local debt, which is in line with 
expectations. 
 
Figure 4.2 Marginal effects graph: the graph shows the impact of interest rates on 









                                                          
26 E.g. interview Association of Cities in NRW, 23/04/2013; interview Dutch 100,000+ Municipal 
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4.6 Institutional analysis 
The statistical analysis demonstrates that higher debt levels have not positively affected 
LG interest rates during the period of 2009-2012, whereas interest rates have enhanced 
the positive relationship between local income and local debt accumulation. Section 4.3 
illustrated that investors’ confidence in both the quality of the regulatory frameworks and 
the vertical financial integration of the IGR systems provides an explanation for LG 
borrowing costs. This section analyses to what extent investors’ confidence in the 
institutional quality of the three regulatory regimes is supported by their regulatory 
performance. This question indirectly investigates whether the regulatory regimes 
enhance a scale of local debt accumulation that would not occur if, either different 
monitoring mechanisms were in place, or markets would be able to adequately evaluate 
the financial risks faced by LGs. To analyse the intergovernmental regulation of LG 
finances in the Dutch, English and NRW system, the focus is on three questions: who 
regulates LG finances; what is regulated; and how the monitoring systems operate once 
LGs face financial default.  
 
4.6.1  Regulatory actors on LG finances 
In all three systems, the ministry responsible for LG at the central level carries the main 
responsibility for the regulatory framework in which LG operates. Since the organisation 
of local government is a state level responsibility in the German system, the relevant 
ministry in the German context is based at the NRW state level. In the Dutch case the 
ministry responsible for LG is known as the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (BZK), in NRW as the Ministry for the Interior and Local Government (MIK), 
and in the English/UK case as the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). For convenience, the departments are referred to as the Interior Ministries.  
In all three systems, the Interior Ministries are not themselves responsible for 
ensuring regulatory compliance at the local level. The Interior Ministries fulfil a policy 
responsibility regarding the laws and regulations that provide the statutory basis of the 
regulatory framework, and they coordinate and facilitate the activities of the actual 
regulators. The Interior Ministries only act as active regulators in case a LG infringes the 
regulations in place or faces a financial emergency. These types of extraordinary central 
level regulation are discussed in section 4.6.3.   
As shown in figure 4.3, the actual regulators differ among the three systems. In 
England, during the period leading up to 2014, the Audit Commission constituted the 
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main regulator of LG finances. The Audit Commission was established as a statutory 
corporation in 1983, which meant that only its chair and the Commission’s board 
members were appointed by Ministers, whereas its members were not to be regarded as 
civil servants. The Audit Commission fundamentally changed British public sector 
auditing by making auditors only answerable to the public and the courts rather than to 
their public sector ‘clients’ in the field (Campbell-Smith, 2008, p. 2). The mediating 
function fulfilled by the Audit Commission between LGs and auditors gave English 
auditors a highly autonomous position towards their LG clientele. The independence of 
English auditors was also strengthened by the LG Act 1988, which gave auditors the 
power to issue a ‘prohibition order’. This order enables English auditors to pre-empt any 
local decision that they believe would lead to a breach of the law. Before 2012, the Audit 
Commission was responsible for appointing all LG auditors and allocated them to specific 
LGs. The auditors were a mix of around 70% direct employees of the Commission, and 
a segment of around 30% from the private sector.  
The Audit Commission fulfilled its oversight role by conducting analyses that 
stretched beyond ordinary financial compliance checks. The Commission obliged its 
auditors to not only check and conclude local accounts based upon traditional regularity 
criteria, but to also include a full professional opinion on the economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of local spending (the so-called Value for money conclusions). To identify 
aggregate trends in LG performance, the Commission also developed increasingly 
sophisticated, and time-consuming, benchmarking systems. These systems reduced 
support for the Commission’s work among the local sector, partly explaining why the 
Conservative-led coalition government faced limited opposition when it decided to 
abolish the Commission in 2010. As one prominent English LG treasurer put it: 
 
The Commission should have stayed within its core auditing business, in which it did an 
excellent job, but they went off track by developing benchmarking systems that 
demanded too much of theirs and our energy.27  
 
This view was widely echoed in interviews conducted among other English LG 
officials.28 Despite a lack of support within the public sector to keep the Audit 
                                                          
27 Interview Society of London Treasurers (SLT), 07/02/2014. 
28 An interview (30/12/2013) with a high level official at the Audit Commission, conducted a few months 
prior to the organisation’s closure, indicated that serious doubts also existed within the Commission as to 
whether the Commission had made the right decision in dedicating a growing share of its work to non-
audit related tasks. 
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Commission alive, the decision to close it was criticised by the rating agencies (e.g. 
Moody’s, 2010).  
As shown in figure 4.3, the responsibility for appointing local auditors is no longer 
based at the central level in the English post-2014 audit regime. In line with the localism 
vision of the Conservative-led coalition government, LGs themselves appoint their own 
auditors. To address concerns regarding the independence of auditors in the new 
framework, auditors are not directly appointed by the local council but through council-
appointed auditor panels. It is uncertain at this stage if the audit panels will be able to 
ensure the independence of local auditors.29 A second risk of the new structure is that 
with the absence of an independent body standing behind auditors, auditors may be less 
willing to expose local malpractices out of fear of being dismissed. Third, a localised 
auditing structure is likely to reduce central government’s oversight on English LG 
finances, despite the transfer of the corporate governance inspections from the Audit 
Commission to the Interior Ministry (DCLG).30 
 
External regulation of LG in the German state NRW is exercised in a horizontal way 
through traditional auditing, and vertically through inspections by higher government 
levels. The identity of the financial supervisor in the vertical chain depends on the type 
of LG. As shown in figure 4.3, upper-tier LGs in NRW – i.e. county-free cities and 
counties – are monitored by government districts. The government districts in NRW 
represent the state government and their head is directly appointed by NRWs’ prime-
minister. While being part of the state administration, the government districts have 
significant autonomy in the execution of their monitoring duties. Information from 
interviews conducted with local level representatives and at the NRW Interior Ministry 
indicates that the southern based government district of Cologne is a tougher regulator, 
compared to the northern based district of Münster.31 While the government districts are 
responsible for monitoring LGs that have the largest budgets, they only monitor a 
minority of LGs as most LGs in NRW are based within counties. 
                                                          
29 E.g. the British public sector accounting specialist Prof. David Heald critically commented on the new 
system by stating that ‘at a time when there are doubts about the private sector’s role in appointing its 
own auditors’ it did not seem sensible ‘that the public sector should move off in the opposite direction of 
its own choosing’ (Financial Times, 26 September 2010).  
30 The corporate governance inspections have been hitherto only commenced once there have been clear 
indications of regulatory non-compliance (between 2000 and 2010, the Commission only carried out 20 
corporate governance inspections). Source: http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/ 
inspection-assessment/corporate-governance/pages/default.aspx.html (visited 12 July, 2014). 




 Vertical financial supervision of the lower tier in the counties is conducted by the 
county administrations. In comparison to the government districts, the quality of 
supervision conducted by the county administrations has to be critically reviewed due to 
the existence of strong financial interdependencies between counties and county-
dependent LGs. Most problematic is that the counties raise around 60% of their income 
via a contribution fee levied among their county-dependent LGs, which they are supposed 
to regulate. These county contribution fees constitute one of the main explanations for 
debt-making among NRW’s county-dependent LGs. As such, one interviewee 
metaphorically compared the monitoring relationship in NRW county areas with ‘a 
butcher who’s allowed to inspect his own meat’.32  
The monitoring performance of NRW counties is also impeded by political 
aspects. In the counties, the final responsibility for financial supervision rests with the 
popularly elected county leader (Landrat). Since the similarly popularly elected mayors 
of the county-dependent LGs often share their party political background with the county 
leader, interviewees indicate that political considerations regularly undermine the 
firmness of county supervision.  
In addition to vertical monitoring, all LGs in NRW are audited by NRW’s 
Municipal Audit Institute (GPA NRW). Established by NRW’s state government in 2003, 
the Audit Institute is the compulsory auditor for every LG in NRW. Regulations about 
the composition of its board of directors show that NRW’s LG sector is strongly involved 
in the Institute; of the ten members in the board, nine are equally divided among NRW’s 
three main LG representative organisations, with the remaining board member 
representing the NRW Interior Ministry.33  
 
In the Dutch system, the provincial level carries the main responsibility for monitoring 
LG finances. The twelve Dutch provinces conduct local financial supervision on behalf 
of the Interior Ministry. However, as a separate government layer in the Dutch 
constitutional system, the provinces enjoy significant autonomy in their supervision. The 
responsibility of supervision at the provincial level rests within the College of Provincial 
Executives, which is elected by the popularly elected Provincial Council – except its 
Chair, is appointed by the national cabinet. Decision-making in the college is collegial, 
but one provincial executive carries the primary responsibility for intergovernmental 
                                                          
32 Interview Association of Cities and Municipalities in NRW, 22/04/2013. 
33 The Association of Cities in NRW, the Association of Cities and Municipalities in NRW, and the 
Association of Counties in NRW have each three members in the board.  
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financial supervision. In practice, substantial differences exist among provincial 
executives regarding their interests for – and dedication to – supervision. One provincial 
civil servant recalls: 
 
Attention for financial supervision ranges from provincial executives starting their term 
by stating that they don’t want any LG in their province put under preventive supervision, 
to others who show a high interest in improving the effectiveness and thoroughness of 
applied supervision methods.34 
 
Political aspects affect some of the monitoring decisions by provincial executives. 
According to Dutch regulations, LGs must be put under an intensified, so-called 
preventive form of supervision if they show a structurally unbalanced budget. However, 
as the label ‘preventive supervision’ attracts considerable media attention and negative 
publicity for the local politicians involved, the decision to install preventive supervision 
is not taken lightly by provincial authorities. According to those interviewed, the decision 
about whether or not to install preventive supervision is affected by the existence of party 
political similarities that often exist between provincial executives, who are popularly 
elected politicians, and municipal politicians. As indicated in the above given quote, in 
some cases, provincial executives continuously refuse to follow advice from their 
administrative staff to install preventive supervision.35  
 Institutional reforms implemented in Dutch LG in the early 2000s have also 
influenced monitoring relationships. These so-called dualism reforms have increased the 
council’s control over the local executive, and led to a reduction of intergovernmental 
financial supervision by the provinces. According to one provincial supervisor:  
 
The primary responsibility for the local finances has become more explicitly located with 
the local council. The council has to be primarily supported in its work by the external 
local auditor and the local court of audit, and provincial supervision should only be 
complementary to the local monitoring chain.36  
 
Interviews conducted within the Dutch Interior Ministry indicate that even a complete 
removal of provincial financial supervision was considered by central government.37 
More than ten years after the implementation of dualism, the expected benefits of the 
                                                          
34 Interview Dutch Expert group of provincial supervisors on municipal finances, 27/01/2014. 
35 One interviewee recalls a situation where a provincial executive continuously refused to install 
preventive supervision in municipality X which finances were clearly going off track. It appeared that the 
executive had been the responsible alderman for finances in municipality X, previous to his provincial 
career. Interview: Dutch Council for Intergovernmental Finances, 21/01/2014.  
36 Interview Dutch Expert group of provincial supervisors on municipal finances, 27/01/2014. 
37 Interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior, 23/01/2014. 
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reforms regarding the council’s control over local finances have not yet materialised. 
Instead, the program budgets that were introduced as part of the dualism reforms have 
reduced the financial steering possibilities of Dutch councils. Partly because of these 
disappointing results, the Dutch central government has decided to not allow a further 
weakening of provincial supervision.38 
In addition to political aspects, provincial monitoring is affected by policy 
relationships between the Dutch provincial and local level. Most relevant for the financial 
position of LGs are the spatial planning responsibilities held by the provinces. By 
translating central government’s spatial policies into area-specific plans, the provinces 
traditionally play a key role in Dutch spatial planning. With the economic opportunities 
for commercial and private property development strongly increasing in the Netherlands 
during the 1990s, provinces facilitated and incentivised municipalities to conduct a 
pioneering role in real-estate projects. By reselling former agricultural land to commercial 
developers, municipalities were able to generate huge profits. In 2006 alone, 900 million 
€ of LG income derived from property projects, while the average share of property 
profits to the total income of LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants amounted to 17.4% 
in 2008 (Ten Have, 2010, p. 29). Commercial interests in construction sites evaporated 
with the economic crisis in 2008 and municipal profits started to decrease strongly. Since 
many LGs had acquired substantial areas for real-estate developments, and made large 
infrastructure related investments to prepare areas for construction, the sites turned from 
being a very profitable activity into an expensive undertaking. The financial loss suffered 
by Dutch LGs between 2010 until 2012 amounts to 3.3 billion €, likely to increase to 6.0 
billion € according to independent expert analyses (Deloitte, 2013). Although the role of 
the provinces in the local real-estate debacle has not been subject to separate analyses, 
local and central government actors interviewed for this research criticised the provinces 
for their long-time reluctance to enforce better financial risk management of real-estate 
investment within the municipalities.39  
                                                          
38 An indication of this is offered by the experiments that two Dutch provinces – Limburg and North 
Brabant – were eager to conduct in the early 2000s. The provinces intended to redesign supervision 
drastically, e.g. Limburg wanted to subject LGs to intensive financial scrutiny only once every four years, 
which, in case the local finances were evaluated to be healthy, should have resulted in the complete 
absence of provincial supervision in the intermediate years. The experiments did not go ahead in the 
manner intended by the provincial executives since the Interior Ministry demanded at least a basic annual 
check of the local accounts. Source: interview Expert group of provincial supervisors on municipal 
finances, 27/01/2014.  
39 E.g. interview Dutch Financial Relations Council, 21/01/2014; interview Dutch National Court of 
Audit (interviewee B), 22/01/2014. 
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As illustrated by figure 4.3, local auditors in the Dutch system are directly 
appointed by their clientele LG. Auditing of Dutch LGs has been run by private sector 
auditors since 1997. In 2014, only two Dutch LGs had their own auditing service 
(Amsterdam and The Hague), while others are audited by external firms, mostly the Big-
4 (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PWC). The quality of audits conducted by the 
Big-4 has recently been strongly criticized by the Dutch independent government 
regulator for financial services (AFM, 2014). Problems are most notably related to the 
mix of auditing and consultancy that characterises the work of auditors from the Big-4, 
which alerted to the serious moral hazards in the Dutch accounting profession, and 
undermines the quality of local government auditing.  
 
Pros and cons of different monitoring regimes 
The organisation of LG monitoring is highly heterogeneous among the three 
constitutional systems, with significant effects on supervision performance. In the English 
system, monitoring of LG finances has been fundamentally driven by expert 
considerations of the Audit Commission, a highly independent regulator that combined 
auditing and inspection tasks. The statutory independence of the Audit Commission in 
the pre-2014 English system made English regulators more autonomous compared to 
Dutch and NRW regulators who are directly subordinate to elected politicians. The 
combined function of the Audit Commission, however, also made the Commission 
politically vulnerable as it could easily be seen as an ‘agent for central government’ (Jones 
& Stewart, 2012, p. 17). Observing the lifetime of the Audit Commission, it can be 
concluded that a combined inspectorate and auditing agency with special protected status 
from politicians enhances regulatory output, but also results in an existentially vulnerable 
regulator that lacks natural allies at both the local and central level, putting strong pressure 
on the diplomatic skills of the organisation’s leadership. 
The Dutch and NRW systems confirm the importance of the institutional location 
of regulators. The location of regulators at a government level that does not carry the 
largest intergovernmental responsibility for the allocation of funding and tasks to LGs, 
increases the independence of regulators. Following from this perspective, the 
subnational level in non-federalized systems, and the sub-state level in federations is the 
most suitable place for regulators. Locating regulators at the subnational/sub-state level 
also poses three major disadvantages.  
First, regulators at the subnational level are not able to receive direct back-up or 
support from government Ministers. Interviewees in the Netherlands and NRW indicate 
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that this coverage would help to strengthen the position of regulators, especially vis-à-vis 
large cities, on which the impact of regulators appears to be rather limited. Second, 
regulators based at the subnational level tend to have more general training and 
experience. This is a result of the smaller territories they cover and the subsequently 
smaller divisions in which regulators work, which reduces utilising economies of scale in 
monitoring management. As large cities have treasuries with many and often highly 
specialised staff, intergovernmental regulators face difficulties in acquiring the authority 
and expertise required to adequately monitor large LGs.40 Third, if LGs end up in a 
financial emergency, it is the national level in the Dutch case and the state level in NRW 
that would manage the financial safety net. The absence of any direct financial 
implications of defaulting LGs, especially in the Dutch case, helps to explain why 
financial monitoring has not been a policy priority for many of the Dutch provincial 
regulators. 
From this perspective, government districts regulating counties and county-free 
cities in NRW may well provide the best performing regulatory actors in an inherently 
political world of intergovernmental financial regulation. As the government districts are 
responsible for financial monitoring, while the actual auditing work is assigned to 
auditors appointed by local councils, the system encapsulates LGs as co-shapers of their 
own regulatory space. A second advantage of the NRW system is that it provides the state 
government with a fall-back option in case local auditing does not result in regulatory 
compliance (cf. Huntington, 1961).  
In a context where one government level regulates the finances of another 
government level, it seems unrealistic to insulate regulators completely from the 
politicians that are active on these government levels, and from which regulators finally 
derive their legitimacy. A far-fetched approach to establishing an independent regulator 
seems to be at the root of the conversion from an effective English regulatory framework 
to a system that in its post-2014 structure might become the most perilous regulatory 
regime of the three country selection.  
 
 
                                                          
40 E.g. an interviewee at the Dutch Financial Relations Council (21/01/2014) indicated that ‘in practice 
provincial authorities do not have any regulatory authority over the finances of the city of Amsterdam’. 
Comparable remarks were made by other Dutch interviewees, and by German interviewees regarding the 
limited influence of the government districts over the budgeting practices of large cities (e.g. interview 




4.6.2 Regulatory focus of intergovernmental monitoring 
Regulations affecting local debt can be distinguished at three different levels. First, macro 
level regulations structure the aggregated borrowing space between government levels. 
Next, meso level regulations apply to each individual LG. Finally, LGs might be affected 
by tailored sized micro level regulations. This section discusses the first two types of 
regulation, and, as they mostly apply to non-conforming LGs, micro level regulations are 
discussed in section 4.6.3. 
 
4.6.2.1        Aggregate level regulations 
Out of the three systems, England has the longest history of controlling expenditure and 
deficit at a level related to the entire public sector. Introduced as the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), the UK has strongly designed its borrowing policies, 
since the 1970s, around financial aggregates that apply to the country’s entire public 
sector (Thain & Wright, 1995). Aggregate figures on local finances have been an integral 
part of central government policies, resulting in aggregate local borrowing being strictly 
controlled by the Treasury. Central control of local borrowing has been a reason for 
intergovernmental tensions but also explains long periods of moderate borrowing among 
English LG. 
 National government budgeting based upon public sector financial aggregates is 
from a more recent date in the Dutch and German system. In both systems, the 
introduction of the fiscal responsibility conditions of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 
incentivised a discussion about how to share the newly established borrowing limits 
among government levels. As the intergovernmental negotiations proceeded slowly, the 
discussion about sharing the Maastricht borrowing limits was not resolved in Germany 
with any definitive result in the 1990s (Farber, 2002, p. 152). A reform of Germany’s 
fiscal federalism in 2009, however, resulted in the introduction of specified debt 
restrictions for the federal government and the Länder, but not the local level.41  
Discussions in the Netherlands about the intergovernmental sharing of borrowing 
limits were particularly incentivised after the signing of the European Fiscal Compact in 
2012. The Dutch Ministry of Finance initially aimed to set maximum deficit levels for 
                                                          
41 From 2016 onwards the federal government will be forbidden to run a structural deficit of more than 
0.35% of GDP, while the states will not be permitted to run any structural deficit from 2020 onwards. The 
debt brakes do not apply to the local level, which has given rise to fears among several local level 
interviewees about potential debt shifting strategies by Länder governments (e.g. interviews Association 
of Cities and Communities in NRW, 22/04/2014; Association of Cities in NRW, 23/04/2014). This risk, 
however, seems limited as EU deficit regulations apply to the entire German public sector, including the 
local level.  
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each individual municipality, including a sanction option in case the municipality violated 
its deficit limit.42 Severe opposition by Dutch LG organisations prevented this law from 
being implemented. From 2014 onwards, the EMU’s maximum public sector deficit level 
of 3% GDP is annually divided by central government between the Dutch government 
layers. This is done following a process of intergovernmental consultation. So far, the 
consequences of the regulations have been limited as they have not significantly reduced 
local borrowing space.43    
 In sum, mainly due to European developments cross-country differences in macro 
level regulations have converged in recent years, with the concept of aggregate public 
sector deficit now constituting the main indicator in budget policies in the three 
constitutional systems. However, country specific trends are still relevant and may 
counteract European developments. The implementation of state level debt brakes in 
several German states, combined with large inter-state financial heterogeneity, makes that 
large local deficits within some German states do not necessarily result in a negative 
aggregate EMU balance for the German public sector. In parallel, macro level regulations 
have also limited impact on the deficit levels of individual LGs in the Dutch and English 
context because their deficits can be compensated by LGs with budget surpluses. As a 
result, macro level regulations in the Dutch and English system prevent debt 
accumulation at the local level, but have little impact on preventing debt concentrations 
within individual LGs. It may be expected that regulations that uniformly apply to LGs, 
rather than the local or public sector at an aggregate level, are more effective in restraining 
budget deficits.   
 
4.6.2.2          LG meso level regulations 
In all three systems, meso level regulations applying to all LGs show a fundamental 
distinction between borrowing for current revenue purposes versus capital investment. In 
general, current revenue borrowing is restricted while LGs have more autonomy to 
borrow for capital investment. The main purpose of borrowing for current revenue in each 
system is to bridge over temporary funding gaps in the local budget. Regarding capital 
investment borrowing, the principle of the ‘golden rule’ can be recognised in each system 
as borrowing for investment purposes is allowed as long as it can be realised in 
combination with a balanced budget on the current revenue account. Despite these general 
similarities, the operationalisation of the principles differs strongly between the systems.  
                                                          
42 Interview Dutch Ministry of Finance, 24/01/2014. 
43 Interview Dutch Association of Municipalities, 30/01/2014. 
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Table 4.9 System comparison of regulations on local capital and current  
  expenditure borrowing 
 England The Netherlands Germany/NRW 
Main regulatory 
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Cash limit: liquidity 
credits (max. one 
year) not allowed to 
exceed 8.5% of total 
local exploitation 
costs. 
50% of liquidity 
credits may mature 
within max. ten 
years; 25% within 
max. five years. 
Source: own composition, based upon LG accounting regulations. 
 
Table 4.9 illustrates that only in the Dutch system regulators apply explicit norms 
regarding current and capital expenditure borrowing. The Wet Fido, or the Law on the 
financing of sub-central governments, provides the main Dutch regulatory framework for 
LG borrowing. Fido tightened the relatively liberal Dutch subnational treasury framework 
in 2000, as a response to the secret commercial banking activities by the province of South 
Holland, which led to a loss of more than 20 million €.47 With regard to current 
expenditure, Fido provides a cash limit (kasgeldlimiet), stating that short-term debt is not 
allowed to exceed 8.5% of the total municipal exploitation costs. Fido’s interest risk norm 
(renterisiconorm) provides the main regulation on capital expenditure borrowing and 
prohibits LGs from refinancing debt that exceeds 20% of their total budget, every year.48 
                                                          
44 Wet Fido is defined as Wet Financiering decentrale overheden, which translates as Law on the 
Financing of Subnational Governments.  
45 Ruddo is defined as Regeling uitzettingen en derivaten decentrale overheden, which translates as 
Regulation on Loans, Advances and Derivatives of Subnational Governments.  
46 ̒Runderlass über Kredite und kreditähnliche Rechtsgeschäfte der Gemeinden (GV) vom 9. Oktober 
2006’(SMBl. NRW. 652). 
47 The province of South Holland speculated with almost 0.8 billion € (1.7 billion gulden) of loans to 
realise interest profits. After some initial lucrative years, the secret banking activities brought the 
province near financial collapse when one of its debtors, the trading house Ceteco, went bankrupt 
(Koelewijn and Meeus, 1999).  
48 The norm’s operationalisation does not necessarily reflect real financial risks as refinancing an amount 
exceeding 20% of total long-term debt might result in financial advantage if the replacement interest level 
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 The balanced budget rule is operationalised in the Dutch system by focusing upon 
a materially balanced budget. Materially balanced is defined as the structural costs being 
covered by structural income, whereby structural refers to a period of three years. 
Difficulties to present materially balanced budgets among Dutch LGs that have been 
affected by the property bubble have led to an extension – only for this group of LGs – 
of the period in which the budget needs to be balanced for up to ten years. Other relevant 
regulation affecting borrowing behaviour by Dutch LGs is included in the BBV, which 
tightened the Dutch regulatory framework for the activation of current expenditure on the 
municipal balance.49   
In the English system, local borrowing autonomy for capital investments 
significantly increased with the introduction of the prudential borrowing framework 
(PBF) in the Local Government Act of 2003. Until 2003, a strict central government 
monitoring system on English local capital expenditure borrowing was in place, including 
a system of Credit Approvals via which central government annually set a credit limit for 
each local authority (outlined in detail in the Borrowing Act, part of the Local 
Government Housing Act 1989). LGs that exceeded their approved credit limit were 
confronted with intensive government sanctions, including the possibility of a personal 
surcharge imposed upon culpable LG officers and councillors (in place up to 2000). 
The introduction of PBF in 2003 removed the centrally set capital borrowing 
limitations. The Treasury possesses a reserved power to impose borrowing limits upon 
the entire English local level, or individual LGs, but the power has not been used hitherto 
(LG Act, Section 4, 1 & 2). According to the prudential borrowing regulations, an English 
LG has only the obligation to ‘determine and keep under review how much money it can 
afford to borrow’ (LG Act 2003, Section 3, 1). This duty has been operationalised in the 
Prudential Code, developed by the accountancy body CIPFA. The Code obliges all LGs 
to base their capital expenditure decisions on a set of ‘prudential indicators’, which should 
ensure that local capital investment plans are ‘affordable, prudent and sustainable’ 
(CIPFA, 2011). Although the Code has received legislative backing in 2004 its 
                                                          
is lower. This illustrates that in contrast to the norm’s title, it is not interest risk but the annual borrowing 
amount to be refinanced that is observed as the main risk in long-term local borrowing. Because of these 
criticisms, the main advantage of the Dutch interest risk norm is that it forces LGs to pay attention to a 
proper spread of the maturity of their debt portfolio in time (Zanten-Lagen-Daal and Wijnands, 2001). 
49   ‘BBV - Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording Provincies en Gemeenten’; or ‘Decision Budget and 
Reporting Provinces and Municipalities’. The BBV replaced CV’95 (Comptabiliteitsvoorschriften 1995), 




implementation is not policed in practice, and the operationalisation of the budget 
indicators leaves substantial interpretation space to LGs.  
Compared to the Dutch and NRW regulations, CIPFA’s Prudential Code is most 
explicit in its attention for local debt. English councils are required to set an authorised 
limit for external debt, which establishes the outer boundary of a LG’s borrowing based 
on a realistic risk assessment (Section 5 LG Act 2003). This debt indicator applies to the 
entire local debt volume, including short-term debt. Although the CIPFA Code pays 
attention to debt, the Code only provide guidelines regarding procedures on how to decide 
about the level of debt, while the actual debt levels are solely determined by the LG. 
English interviewees emphasise the strict enforcement of the balanced budget rule at the 
English local level, especially due to the authoritative role of the Officer 151. In practice, 
the enforcement of the balanced budget rule sets strict boundaries on short-term 
borrowing by English LGs, something that is reflected in the very small amount of short-
term liquidity held by English LGs ((around 5% of total English LG borrowing in 2012; 
(DCLG, 2013)).  
 
The NRW system has undergone some major changes in the 1990s regarding the 
regulation of short-term liquidity. Until 1994, NRW applied a proportional limit similar 
to the Dutch system, which restricted an authority’s amount of short-term borrowing to a 
maximum of 1/6 of a locality’s total annual income. In case a LG was planning to exceed 
the cash limit, it had to acquire pre-approval from its intergovernmental supervisors. The 
revision of NRW’s Local Government Order in 1994 removed the cash ceiling and 
essentially gave LGs total freedom in setting their maximum level of short-term 
liquidity.50 In theory the relaxation of the liquidity credits has not replaced NRW’s 
balanced budget rule, since liquidity credits are only allowed to balance annual budget 
fluctuations. As the liquidity credits are perceived as budgetary neutral transactions they 
are not an integral part of the municipal budget report. Since the removal of the credit 
ceiling, short-term liquidity in NRW LG has strongly increased, from an amount just 
                                                          
50 NRW’s 1994 and currently operational LG Act formulates this as follows: ‘For the timely performance 
of their payments, the municipality may take up liquidity credits up to the ceiling amount as ascertained 
in its budgetary bill insofar as it has no other means available. The authorization is valid for the budget 
year and until the adoption of a new budgetary billʼ. Original clause: ‘Zur rechtzeitigen Leistung ihrer 
Auszahlungen kann die Gemeinde Kredite zur Liquiditätssicherung bis zu dem in der Haushaltssatzung 
festgesetzten Höchstbetrag aufnehmen, soweit dafür keine anderen Mittel zur Verfügung stehen. Diese 
Ermächtigung gilt über das Haushaltsjahr hinaus bis zum Erlass der neuen Haushaltssatzungʼ (GO NRW 
§ 89 II). 
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above 1 billion € in 1992 to 23.7 billion € in 2012, exceeding long-term debt held by 
NRW LG (22.7 billion € in 2012) (IT.NRW, 2013).  
 The gradual implementation of an accrual based accounting system from 2006 
onwards also changed NRW’s borrowing regulations. Parallel to the obligation for LGs 
to draft an opening balance sheet, NRW’s Local Government Order was changed to allow 
the inclusion of a so-called ‘balancing reserve facility’.51 NRW LGs include this facility 
as a separate asset post on their balance. As long as the facility does not exceed 1/3 of the 
total municipal assets, and 1/3 of the total annual local income from taxes and grants, LGs 
are allowed to use the facility to balance annual deficits if faced with such a situation. 
Even though LGs that use the facility have a deficit in practice, the regulatory framework 
regards them as formally balanced if they are able to balance their budget by reducing 
their assets within the defined maximum of the balancing reserve facility (e.g. Gröpl, 
Heinemann, & Kalb, 2010).52  
The comparative analysis of the formal regulations which frame local budgeting 
shows that despite the emphasis put on prudential budgeting in every system, the local 
level has substantial scope in how it implements prudential budgeting. After the 
introduction of PBF in England, this observation applies to all three systems. The German 
system provides most space for local debt-making. Arguably, the unique financial 
circumstances of individual LGs and the need for local budget flexibility make it virtually 
impossible to prescribe detailed guidelines for local budgeting. With strong arguments 
against detailed budgeting rules, the formulation and manner of monitoring of the few 
rules that are present becomes even more relevant. The next section compares the practice 
of supervision in case LGs do not conform to the few budgetary regulations in place.  
 
4.6.3 Monitoring approach towards non-conforming LGs 
As self-government constitutes the leading principle for the constitutional position of 
German LGs, interviewees in the German system widely perceive levels of supervision 
as a ‘necessary evil’.53 The regulatory regime in NRW applies different intervention once 
a LG is unable to set a balanced budget. As illustrated in table 4.10, it starts with a 
situation in which a LG is unable to produce a balanced budget, in which case it faces an 
                                                          
51 See for this socalled ‘Ausgleichsrücklage’ NRW Gemeindeordnung (GO NRW), Section 75, par. 2, 
sentence 3. 
52 The system in NRW regulates capital borrowing through the municipal balance. Capital borrowing is 
allowed as long as a municipality does not become over indebted. Over indebtedness is defined as a 
municipality that has used all local assets on the municipal balance (Gemeindeordnung NRW § 75, 7).     
53 E.g. interview NRW Ministry of the Interior, 24/04/2013; interview Association of Cities and 
Municipalities in NRW, 22/04/2013. 
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Table 4.10 Intervention steps towards non-conforming LGs 
 
Source: own composition, based upon LG accounting regulations. 
 
intensification of intergovernmental supervision. The LG is now only allowed to borrow 
for investments that generate revenues, is no longer allowed to adopt any new voluntary 
tasks, and significant limitations are implemented upon its personnel management 
(Busch, 2005). In 2011 a major change was implemented in NRW’s local budget 
regulations. Up to that period, a rebalanced budget needed to be realised by the fourth 
year after the start of the budget balancing concept. Since 2011, the period has been 
extended to the tenth year after the start of the procedure (GO NRW § 76, 2).54 Figure 4.4 
illustrates that in the period leading up to 2011, 81% of NRW LGs had a non-approved 
budget status. The amendment of NRW’s LG budgetary law in 2011 reversed this 
situation and 83% of NRW LGs set an approved budget in 2012. The final stage of action 
in the German system is to send of a state commissioner. Given the strong interference 
                                                          
54 In addition, the budget concept needs to illustrate that in the most recent five years since the start of the 
four year budget balancing period, the remaining old debts will be phased out via budget surpluses – 
assuming that no extraordinary financial setbacks will occur.      
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with the constitutional principle of local self-autonomy, state commissioners are used 
very infrequently.55   
 
Figure 4.4 Graph approved and non-approved budgets NRW, 2004-2013 
 
Source: own graph, based upon data from NRW Interior Ministry (MIK). 
 
In the Dutch system, the provinces monitor LG budgets to identify those that do 
not balance their budget over a period up to three years. A LG is allowed to show a budget 
deficit in the current budgetary year but should be able to present a balanced budget in its 
three year estimates. This indicates that a municipality is able to have a continuously 
unbalanced budget without getting into trouble with the provincial regulator, as long as it 
can present a balanced budget in its three year estimates. Data on the number of Dutch 
LGs that are unable to set a balanced budget in the upcoming budgetary year are not 
systematically disclosed by the Dutch provinces. However, indications about the scale of 
unbalanced budgets can be obtained from data provided by the provinces of Utrecht and 
North Brabant. In correspondence from 2013 with the Dutch Interior Ministry (BZK, 
2013), Utrecht reports seven LGs that set an unbalanced budget (out of a total of 27), and 
North Brabant, 34 (out of a total of 67). A countrywide extrapolation of these figures 
indicates that 175 municipalities or more than 43% of Dutch LGs set an unbalanced 
budget in 2013. Although extrapolations have their obvious limitations, this extrapolation 
does not seem to be a very precarious one since the relevant statistics show average 
financial conditions for LGs in Utrecht and North Brabant.  
                                                          
55 The NRW Interior Ministry used the instrument in 2013 for the first time. However, the Commissioner 
was sent to a LG – Nideggen – who had committed itself to the implementation of a set of austerity 
measures in exchange for additional financial support from the state, which nuances the degree of state 
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If a LG is unable to present a structurally balanced budget, the Dutch provincial 
authorities are legally obliged to put the LG under ‘preventive supervision’. In this stage, 
a LG needs to send its budget and any budget changes it plans for approval to the 
provincial regulators. The number of Dutch LGs under preventive supervision has been 
small, and has more recently further decreased. Whereas 30 LGs – equal to 6.4% of the 
total number of Dutch LG – were under preventive supervision in 2005, the number was 
only 9, or 2.2%, in 2014 (see appendix III for details by province and year). Several Dutch 
interviewees made critical and sceptical comments regarding these figures, and showed 
surprise that at the same time as Dutch local finances were under increasing pressure, the 
number of LGs facing intensified financial supervision is reducing.56  
If the municipal finances do not improve under preventive supervision, a Dutch 
municipality can apply to central government for Section 12 status, which provides the 
municipality with a temporary annual funding amount in addition to the normal allocation 
it receives from the Dutch Municipal Fund. To prevent common pool problems (Ostrom, 
1990), entrance to Section 12 funding is decided after a tightly organised process lasting 
approximately one and a half years in which local expenditure, income, reserve and deficit 
structures are scrutinized by Section 12 inspectors from the Interior Ministry (BZK).57 
Once a municipality receives Section 12 funding, the municipality is put under intensive 
supervision, resulting in the virtual abolishment of local financial decision-making 
freedom. Four Dutch LGs were receiving Section 12 funding in 2013, with a similar 
annual average over the period since 2001. Historically, this is a relatively small number. 
For example, in 1955 more than 700 of the then 1,000 Dutch LGs were receiving 
additional funding. By improving municipal income via an introduction of a local 
property tax in the 1970s and through continuously sophisticating the distribution funding 
mechanisms, Section 12 funding has developed from a ‘popular opportunity to get 
something additional’ into a safety net of last resort.58   
Compared to the Dutch and NRW systems, procedures as to how 
intergovernmental regulators should operate in case councils are unable to set a balanced 
budget is least institutionalised in the English system. The English system puts strong 
                                                          
56 E.g. interview Dutch Association of Provinces, 21/01/2014; interview Dutch Financial Relations 
Council, 21/01/2014; interview Dutch National Court of Audit (interviewee B), 22/01/2014. 
57 Only in the case the deficit exceeds two per cent of the sum the municipality receives from the Dutch 
Municipal Fund and the capacity of its local property tax, the municipality can be considered for Section 
12 emergency support. In addition, an income threshold, or admission ticket, is in place that demands that 
the local property tax is at least 20% above the national average, and fees for savage and refuse collection 
need to cover all costs (BZK, 2011, p. 9). 
58 Interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior, 23/01/2014. 
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emphasis on the role of the local Chief Financial Officer (CFO) as key actor in 
safeguarding a balanced budget. The role of CFO, also known as Officer 151, has 
traditionally been defined in a broader sense, with responsibilities that exceed those 
owned to the local council.59  
The CFO has several duties, including the requirement to provide a report to the 
local Council if there is, or is likely to be unlawful expenditure or an unbalanced budget. 
This report must also be sent to the LG’s external auditor, and to the Secretary of State of 
the Interior Ministry (DCLG). Until the council has considered the report, Section 114 of 
the LG Finance Act 1988 determines that the local authority is not allowed to make any 
new agreements incurring expenditure (CIPFA, 2012). By functioning in practice as a 
prohibition on any local spending, Section 114 gives strong powers to the CFO. Section 
114 notices were frequently issued in the 1990s, but following improvements in local 
financial management have been relatively scarce in the period since 2000.60  
The English system provides no formalised follow-up scheme for 
intergovernmental supervision once a Section 114 notice has been issued by the CFO. In 
case the LG is unable to re-balance its finances, central government can issue a financial 
directive, directing the LG to take certain measures. Since the introduction of the LG Act 
of 1999 central government has the additional competence to intervene in a LG in order 
to re-establish the authority’s finances.61 This decision is up to the discretion of the 
Secretary of State of DCLG, and is normally taken after pre-agreement within cabinet. 
Directions and interventions have only seldom been used by central government, the first 
time being in the London borough of Hackney in 2001, after a critical report from the 
Audit Commission called for government intervention.62 Although financial matters often 
call for central government intervention, non-performing local services constituted the 
main reason for the interventions that occurred in England between 2000 and 2013 (e.g. 
Doncaster, Kingston upon Hull, and – threatened with intervention – Walsall).  
 
                                                          
59 Case law Attorney General -v- De Winton (1906) established that the local treasurer is not merely a 
servant of the Council but also holds a fiduciary relationship to the local taxpayers (CIPFA, 2012). 
60 Interview Audit Commission, 30/12/2013. 
61 LG Act 1999, Section 15, 5 states: ‘the Secretary of State may direct the authority to take any action 
which he considers necessary or expedient to secure its compliance with the requirements of this Part’, 
and LG Act 1999, Section 15, 6a states ‘the Secretary of State may direct that a specified function of the 
authority shall be exercised by the Secretary of State or a person nominated by him [-]’, and Section 15, 
6b: ‘the authority shall comply with any instructions of the Secretary of State or his nominee in relation to 
the exercise of that function and shall provide such assistance as the Secretary of State or his nominee 
may require for the purpose of exercising the function’. 
62 Local Government Chronicle, ‘Hackney LBC responds to Audit Commission’, 11 July 2001; Public 
Finance, ‘Hackney faces intervention’, 21 September 2001; and Audit Commission (2002).  
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has analysed the impact of borrowing costs on LG debt accumulation, and 
in the second part compared the regulatory regimes. The analysis demonstrates that the 
regulatory systems in which LGs operate contribute to high investor confidence in the 
financial creditworthiness of LGs. This confidence is expressed directly through low 
interest rates applied by private sector credit institutes when borrowing to LGs, and 
indirectly through the low financial compensation accepted by investors when borrowing 
to specialised LG lenders.  
The empirical analysis demonstrates that low effective interest rates significantly 
affect debt policies at the local level. Low borrowing costs enhance the positive 
relationship between a locality’s income and its debt accumulation. The moderating effect 
is significant in all three constitutional systems, and is particularly strong for large LGs. 
On average, interest rates enhance the positive effect of local income on local debt 
accumulation by around 6.4%. 
The regulatory regimes directly affect local budgeting practices, and as such help 
to explain local deficit and debt trends. Due to low interest rates, borrowing is an attractive 
local option, and, as indicated by interviewees across the three systems, politically often 
more appealing than reducing expenditure and/or increasing local tax rates. This even 
applies to the most heavily indebted LGs. Increased local borrowing has most strongly 
contributed to growing intergovernmental fiscal imbalances in NRW’s system.  
The institutional analysis presented in the second part of the chapter demonstrates 
that the performance of the regulatory regimes might be at risk of being overestimated. 
Growing LG financial stress has resulted in a relaxation of the borrowing regulations in 
place in the Dutch and NRW system, while pressure from the English local sector is 
growing to soften intergovernmental regulations on local debt repayments.63 Several 
features of the regulatory systems undermine their effectiveness and give space for error 
accumulation: political, financial, and task relationships between regulators and the 
regulated local level weaken independent monitoring. 
Inadequate performance by the regulatory regimes carries considerable risks for 
the stability of intergovernmental financial systems. The absence of LG bankruptcies in 
the recent history of the three selected systems should not lead to the conclusion that the 
question of how sovereigns will respond in case of defaulting LGs is only of theoretical 
interest. The EU financial crisis has led to discussions about defaulting European states 
                                                          
63 Local Government Chronicle, ‘Cities moot lower debt repayments to offset cuts’, 21 May 2014. 
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unimaginable in the European discourse before the crisis. In addition, uncertainty about 
the responses of the regulatory regimes in situations of defaulting LGs may well have an 
immediate effect as well. This is most visible in NRW, where heavily indebted LGs and 
unclearly defined government liability structures, should a local default occur, have 
recently caused private sector loan providers to apply (slightly) higher interest rates to 
more indebted NRW LGs.64 Although less pronounced, similar concerns about diverging 
local interest rates due to unclear liability structures are expressed by Dutch officials. 
With the PWLB providing an official lender of last resort, the discussion is largely absent 
in the English system, but liability questions can be observed in discussions surrounding 
current efforts by the English Local Government Association to establish a Municipal 
Bonds Agency.  
The financial relevance to enable LGs to profit from low interest rates, and at the 
same time promote sustainable local budgeting puts higher government levels in an 
ambiguous position. This is illustrated by figure 4.5. The loop demonstrates that the 
regulatory performance of the selected intergovernmental systems incites a vicious circle: 
incentivised by low interest rates LGs are able to accumulate substantial debt, which urges 
higher government levels to uphold the system’s external reputation. 
Debt accumulation further increases by the fact that, in order to accommodate LG 
financial stress, intergovernmental regulations are being relaxed. Due to the substantial 
debt accumulation, both local and higher government levels do profit from the following 
question remaining unanswered: how will the regime respond to potential LG financial 
defaults? Although questions of liability are relevant, the systems generate sufficient trust 
to enable LGs to continue to borrow against low interest rates, with a further accumulation 
of financial risks as a result.  
An increase of the borrowing costs for LGs with above average debt volumes may 
well lead to a financial risk reduction within each of the systems. However, to determine 
to what extent diverging interest rates should be welcomed for their disciplinary effect on 
‘irresponsible local budgeting’, or feared for the further pressure they put on already 
‘squeezed local finances’, it is essential to analyse the income streams of LGs in the three 
systems.   
 
                                                          
64 A survey conducted by the German treasurers’ magazine DNK (2013) illustrated that whereas 6% of 
German treasurers had noticed inter-local interest rate differences in 2011, 17% did so in 2013. In 
addition, a survey conducted among 300 treasurers of the 72 biggest German cities by Ernst & Young in 
2013 demonstrated that 71% of correspondents judged an increasing application of LG credit ratings 
‘more likely’ (Ernst & Young 2013). 
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Figure 4.5 The figure shows the vicious cycle incentivised by low effective interest .  .   
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CHAPTER 5  
 





Grant funding constitutes a major income source for Dutch, English and German LGs. 
Grant funding is the biggest income source for Dutch and English LGs at 65% on average. 
Own tax revenues are the largest income source for NRW LGs with an average of 32%, 
but grants still provide on average 29.8% of local income in NRW, equal to around 20 
billion € in 2012. Given the importance of grant funding in the three systems, it can be 
expected that changes in redistribution funding will affect a local authority’s financial 
position. The previous chapter has illustrated that despite the presence of regulations 
aimed at limiting LG borrowing to capital expenditure, the regulatory systems leave 
substantial scope to respond to reduced grant funding by increasing local borrowing. 
Redistribution funding can be analysed at a vertical and horizontal level. The 
vertical distribution refers to the funding amount that local government receives in total, 
relative to the other government levels. The vertical distribution is the outcome of a 
country’s constitutional structure. At one end of the spectrum, the aggregate local funding 
amount is solely decided upon by central government, whilst at the other end a 
constitutionally prescribed revenue division exists across government layers (e.g. shared 
taxes common in federal systems). The horizontal distribution refers to the allocation of 
grants among individual LGs. While the aggregate budget is relevant for the local sector 
in its entirety, the mechanisms in place to distribute the macro budget horizontally are 
most relevant to the funding position of individual LGs. 
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This chapter investigates the extent to which changes in grant funding 
mechanisms have affected the financial position of the selected LGs over the period 2005-
2012. As the period includes the economic effects of the Great Recession of the late 
2000s, the dataset can be deployed to identify the crisis dampening effect of grant systems 
on LG finances. The chapter starts by shortly recapitulating the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 2. The third section presents the institutional characteristics of the redistribution 
systems. After a presentation of the relevant descriptive statistics, section 5.4 presents a 
model to analyse the moderating effect of political-institutional features on grant 
allocations. Section 5.5 presents the quantitative empirical results, which are triangulated 
with qualitative research findings in section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Hypotheses  
The literature review in section 2.3.2 introduces four hypotheses to investigate the 
relationship between grant allocation processes and their local financial consequences. 
This section shortly recapitulates these hypotheses. 
First, because few grant funding systems completely equalise inter-jurisdictional 
differences in local tax capacity, it can be expected that the financial position of 
governments with high grant dependence is weaker than governments with low grant 
dependence (Clingermayer & Wood, 1995; Martell & Smith, 2004; Posner, 1998). From 
this perspective, grants contribute to error accumulation as expressed in the debt indicator. 
Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 5: grants are positively related to LG debt. 
 
Two main institutional factors may explain why grant allocations deviate from what 
would be expected based upon the technical characteristics of the grant system in place. 
A first group of explanations refers to party political linkages among intergovernmental 
actors as a moderating factor in grant allocations (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002; Khemani, 
2007; Magaloni, 2006). To investigate the relevance of partisan explanations it is 
expected that the positive relationship between grants and debt reduces in case of 
intergovernmental party political symmetry, either due to the allocation of more grants, 
or grants pertaining less risks to the financial position of the grant-receiving LG. The 
working of partisan effects in grant allocation will be affected by the particular political 
infrastructure in place. US research indicates that directly elected mayors are more 
effective at bringing in state and federal money (Basehart et al., 2000). It can be expected 
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that mayors provide an additional test to identify partisan effects on the grant-debt 
relationship. The following hypothesis has been formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 6: the positive relationship between grants and LG debt diminishes in 
case of party political symmetry between the grant-providing government and the 
grant-receiving LG. 
 
As the funding allocation of general grants tends to be determined through formula based 
mechanisms, this is likely to be more diverse for specific grants, paving the way for 
partisan motivated grant allocation (Kim, 2013; Sacchi & Salotti, 2014). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 7: party political symmetry between the grant-providing government 




In addition to partisan effects, empirical studies suggest that local interest representation 
is crucial to the operation of grant systems in practice (Borck & Owings, 2003; Sacchi & 
Salotti, 2014). It can be expected that the size of the local administration leads to the 
acquisition of grants that pose less risks to the local financial position, which will reduce 
the positive relationship between grants and debt. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 8: the positive relationship between grants and LG debt diminishes 
with an increase of the size of the local administration. 
 
The hypotheses formulated in this section are summarised in figure 5.1, which illustrates 
the institutional relationships to investigate in the analysis of grant systems. LGs that are 
aligned in partisan terms with the grant provider, and/or have a well-staffed and 
professional local administration, are able to reduce the risks posed by grants on local 
finances. 
 


















Before going to the empirical analysis, relevant background information is 
provided on the political and financial institutions related to the redistribution 
mechanisms in the three systems. 
 
5.3 Redistribution in the three systems 
Redistribution funding provides a relevant income source for Dutch, English and German 
LGs. Chapter 3 provides a macro-level analysis of the constitutional nature of the three 
systems. This section builds on this review by describing the political and financial 
institutions that affect grant redistribution. The most important political institutions are 
the electoral system and local executive structures. The discussion of the financial 
institutions is linked to the size of LG grant funding, changes implemented to grant 
funding, and the formal institutional characteristics of the allocation process.  
 
5.3.1 Political institutions: electoral systems and local executive structures 
The English system is a majoritarian democracy where the electoral first-past-the-post 
(FPP) system has led to a tradition of single party governments. The absence of a meso-
level and constitutional authority for the local level means, too, that power is strongly 
concentrated at the central level. The electoral districts in the English system are not equal 
but very similar to the boundaries of LGs. In addition, parties organised at the LG level 
are a major part of the electoral infrastructure of national parties and provide vital 
campaign support during national elections (Wilson & Game, 2011). Both reasons 
provide rational explanations for central government actors to target specific local areas 
with grant funding.  
Similar to the German federal level, the electoral system in NRW uses mixed-
member proportional representation. This means that although parliament mirrors the 
overall proportion of votes received, it includes a set of members elected by geographic 
constituency who are deducted from the party totals. Up until to 2010, constituency and 
party votes were combined into one vote, meaning that voting for a representative 
automatically meant voting for the representative’s party. In 2010 NRW changed to a 
system whereby voters first vote for the local person they prefer for local MP without 
regard for party affiliation (the direct candidate) and vote on a party list in a second vote 
(Andersen & Bovermann, 2012, p. 402).  
The partisan make-up of the NRW legislature is determined only by the party vote 
and in case a party wins more local seats than its proportion of votes justifies, the size of 
the Landtag increases so that the total outcome is fully proportional to the election result. 
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NRW is divided into 128 electoral districts, all representing a similar number of 
inhabitants (around 140,000). Since the elections in 2012, the NRW parliament has 237 
MPs in total. Although many of the 128 MPs held strong ties with their district, in 
parliamentary practice party interest continues to dominate over district interests 
(Andersen & Bovermann, 2012, p. 399). The dominance of party interests in the NRW 
system is likely to reduce the occurrence of politically motivated spatial targeting of grant 
funding. 
The electoral system in the Netherlands is a system of pure proportional 
representation (PR). This means that the entire country is treated as a single electoral 
district, which eliminates virtually all electoral incentives for central government to target 
specific areas with grant funding. Similar to NRW, PR incentivises the presence of 
multiparty executives, which itself further discourages an electoral use of grant allocation. 
 
Most English LGs are led by an executive arrangement called leader and cabinet, which 
are mostly drawn from the local majority party. In 2013, only 16 English LGs had a 
directly elected mayor. Partly due to the absence of a strong local mandate, few English 
local politicians enjoy the authority that would help them gain easy access to central 
government (Copus, 2006; Fenwick, 2010). Therefore, electoral considerations on the 
side of central government are likely to be the most relevant political determinants for 
grant funding. 
The German local administrative system is often portrayed as strongly legalistic 
and rather elitist, with a limited role for political variables (e.g. König, 2006). More 
recently, many German local systems experienced substantial institutional reforms. Since 
1999, mayors, who are present in all NRW LGs, are directly elected (including county 
heads in the counties). The introduction of the elected mayor has strengthened the 
leadership role of NRW mayors and increased their external authority by building their 
own electoral base (Wollmann, 2005, p. 29).  
The local leadership within Dutch LGs rests with the mayor, who is appointed by 
the national cabinet, after a recommendation made by the local council. While Dutch 
mayors are deprived of electoral legitimacy, their central level appointment, combined 
with their wide networks within national political parties, and increasing portfolio 
responsibilities especially in the safety domain, makes them relevant actors for central 
government to work with (Dölle, 2010, p. 119; Karsten, Schaap, Hendriks, van Zuydam, 




5.3.2    The aggregate amount of redistribution funding 
The three systems use different procedures to determine the overall budget available for 
LG. LG redistribution funding in the Dutch system is strongly linked to the central 
government budget. The Dutch Municipal Fund, which includes general LG grant 
funding, applies to one year and is one of the chapters in the government’s annual national 
budget. The funding determination follows the so-called standardised methodology 
(normeringssystematiek), which connects the Municipal Fund to the central government’s 
corrected net expenditure. Central government’s net expenditure includes most 
departmental expenditure, with the exclusion of repayments on the national debt, 
development aid and EU contributions (Zaalen, 2002, p. 32). The standardised 
methodology was first used in 1995 and intends to let the Municipal Fund claim an equal 
share in a rise in central government expenditure (mostly due to increased tax revenues), 
and avoid disproportionately suffering in central government expenditure cuts.65 The 
second Dutch intergovernmental fiscal tradition affecting the LG funding position is a 
maximisation of the maximum financial change considered to be permissible when 
implementing changes in the Municipal Fund. The protection has been agreed on between 
both central and local government and has been set at 15 € per inhabitant, per year (VNG, 
2012, p. 3). 
There are no federal regulations that specify how much the NRW state 
government should allocate to the local level. The German Basic Law contains a clause 
only obliging state governments to provide funding to the local level from the tax sharing 
system. The tax sharing system refers to the horizontal revenue sharing system among the 
Länder, which follows after the vertical tax distribution between the federal, Länder and 
local level. The tax sharing system distributes the most voluminous German taxes – 
income and corporate tax, and VAT. The actual determination of the amount of local 
funding from the tax sharing system is left to the discretion of the Länder. The tax sharing 
system (Allgemeiner Steuerverbund), set out in NRW’s Local Government Finance Law 
(GFG), determines that the NRW state allocates around 23% of its share in the national 
tax alliance to the NRW local level.66 This funding has been divided across NRW’s LG 
sector in shares that have been unchanged for almost three decades (78% is allocated to 
                                                          
65 Due to proportional differences, an increase in central government’s core budget expenditure of 1 
million € results in an increase of the Dutch Municipal Fund of around 180,000 € (VNG, 2012). The 
standardised methodology (normeringssystematiek) is also known as ‘going upstairs together, going 
downstairs together’ (‘samen de trap op, samen de traf af’).  
66 Gesetz zur Regelung der Zuweisungen des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen an die Gemeinden und 




county-free cities and county-dependent LGs, 12% to counties and 10% to the regional 
authorities).  
There are no fiscal laws or traditions in place in the English system that set the 
boundaries for central government’s decision-making when deciding on the overall 
budget available to the LG sector. However, damping mechanisms exist that demarcate 
the maximum change of annual funding to which individual LGs can be subjected. These 
micro level boundaries indirectly limit the extent of changes that can be implemented on 
the aggregate budget. 
In sum, a comparison of formal institutions shows that most financial protectoral 
mechanisms are in place for redistribution funding to Dutch LG. English LG enjoys a 
minimal amount of financial protectoral mechanisms, with NRW LG occupying a mid-
position. 
 
5.3.3 Changes to redistribution funding 
Changes to redistribution funding can be due to changes in the division of tasks between 
government layers or changes to the available aggregate budget. In every system, 
financial regulations determine that where central government proposes changes in the 
intergovernmental allocation of tasks, it has to explicitly set out the potential financial 
consequences for the subnational level.  
The Dutch Law on Intergovernmental Finances (Fvw), adopted in 1996, obliges 
central government to explain and quantify the intergovernmental financial consequences 
of proposed government legislation. In addition, it has to include a separate appendix with 
its legislative proposals that outlines how the subnational level would be able to absorb 
the financial consequences of proposed legislation (Fvw, Section 2, 2).  
Similar regulations exist in NRW since the introduction of the Connectivity 
Principle (Konnexitätsprinzip) in the NRW state constitution in 2004. Following the 
example of the other German Länder, the Connectivity Principle means that the state 
government is only allowed to assign new tasks to the local level if provided with 
sufficient funding.67 To guarantee adequate funding, a cost calculation has to be made 
prior to the task assignment and evaluated after its implementation (Bätge, 2014, p. 19).  
There are no financial laws in place in the English system demarcating central 
government’s decision-making space when implementing intergovernmental reforms. 
There have been several attempts over the decades to introduce more institutional 
                                                          
67 NRW State Constitution, art. 78, section 3. 
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guarantees for the English local level but these failed to receive central government 
support.68 Whitehall departments have a statutory duty to consult the local level in case 
of changes to the financial arrangements for local government, however, this is merely a 
procedural requirement, and is not a guarantee of funding for the local level.69  
 
5.3.4     The calculation of micro-level redistribution funding 
The three systems are similar in the division of redistribution funding into general and 
specific transfers. In principle, the allocation of general funding is left to the discretion of 
LGs, whereas specific transfers are attached to tasks LGs are required to implement on 
behalf of higher government levels. As such, budget surpluses on specific transfers have 
to be transferred back in most cases to the grant provider. Specific transfers range from 
multibillion social welfare transfers to small transfers (e.g. the aggregate amount of the 
smallest transfer is 189,000 € in the Dutch system). Across the three systems, methods 
for allocating specific grants differ among departments.  
The number of specific grants in place towards the local level in 2013 differs 
substantially between the systems: 46 in England, 45 in the Netherlands, and 250 in NRW 
(including federal grants) (BZK, 2013; DCLG, 2013; Landtag NRW, 2014). Whereas the 
UK central government is the main specific grant funder for English LGs, NRW LGs do 
receive specific grants from both the NRW state and the federal government. In 2013, 3.7 
billion € in specific grant funding was provided by the German federal government, via 
35 different grants, compared to 4.8 billion € provided by NRW state departments 
(Landtag NRW, 2014). Given the diversity of the 215 specific grants provided by the 
NRW state government, in combination with less distance between the local and state 
level as compared to the local and federal level, grant dynamics are likely to operate 
differently in case of state as compared to federal specific grants. Figure 5.2 shows the 
share of individual government departments in the distribution of specific grants and 
demonstrates that in all three systems social welfare and education related expenditure 
                                                          
68 Recommendations published by several official committees over the years to improve the (financial) 
position of the local level vis-à-vis central government have generally failed to mobilise sufficient support 
at the central level. Examples are the Lyons Inquiry into Local Government (2006), which, despite being 
assigned by central government, did not even receive an official government response, and more recently, 
an elaborate but unsuccessful attempt by the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee (2013) to codify English central-local relations.   
69 According to the English Local Government Finance Act 1988, central government has to consult 
representatives of local government before making a determination of the amount of Revenue Support 
Grant (section 78); and to notify representatives of local government of the general nature of the basis of 
distribution (section 78A); to notify those representatives of the general nature of the basis of calculation 
of payments authorities make or receive (top ups and tariffs) (Schedule 7B, paragraph 12). 
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Table 5.1           Comparative redistribution mechanisms: calculation and proportional size of LG grant funding (2013) 
 





Relative Needs Amount = calculated via different 
formula for 7 main local service areas. 
Basic amount per client, plus additional top ups 
depending on local circumstances.  
Most significant top up factors: area costs and 
deprivation. 
 
Five indicators, weighting factor in formula between 
parentheses: 
1. population – 20 categories (min. 100; max. 157); 
2. pupils (3.33 full day; 0.70 half day); 
3. social costs (15.3 per social benefit receiver); 
4. spatial centrality (0.65 per employee); 
5. area size (0.24 per sq. km). 
60 Indicators categorised in 14 clusters.  
Units of every indicator are multiplied with 
corresponding indicator amount. 
5 indicators distribute 61.7% of the Municipal Fund, 15 
indicators 93%. Top 5 indicators: 
1. population (133 €); 
2. living space (178 €); 
3. address density (63 €); 
4. inhabitants < 20 years (225 €); 




Formula grant = 50% of locally collected business 
rates and Revenue Support Grant (RSG).  
The RSG is calculated via the Aggregate Settlement 
Funding Assessment MINUS the local share of the 
business rates. 
The RSG is fixed via Departmental Expenditure 
Limits (DEL), part of the Spending Reviews. 
LG redistribution funding (Allgemeiner Steuerverbund) is 
23% of NRW’s state share in the federal vertical tax 
sharing arrangements (Finanzausgleich). 
Funding base multiplied by transfer coefficient 
(uitkeringsfactor). The coefficient is linked to central 





Relative Resource Amount = capacity of the council 
tax base, which is based upon the number of 
properties equivalent to Band D council tax. 
The capacity of the combined business and property taxes 
(Realsteuer), based upon fictional tax rates. The fictional 
tax rates are based on the average tax rates set by NRW 
LGs.  
Capacity local property tax (OZB rekentarief), based 




Step 4a: Central Allocation = amount leftover after 
steps 1-3, which is centrally allocated on a per 
capita basis. 
Step 4b: Floor Damping Block: sets out maximum 
reductions in grant. 
Step 4c: Grant changes based upon Ministerial 
judgement. 
To finance a LG consolidation package, which has been 
established by the NRW state, LGs with a fiscal capacity 
above a certain threshold temporarily contribute to NRW’s 
redistribution funding.   








General grants (business rates and      26.3 £ (16.8) 
RSG)                                                    
Capital expenditure grants                     9.1 £   (5.7)               
Dedicated Schools Grant                     30.8 £ (19.6) 
Other specific grants, current             46.2  £ (29.5) 
expenditure                                       
Total grants from central                  112.4 £ (71.7)    




Total England LG income               156.8 £ (100.0) 
General grants (NRW key support                   7.3 € (15.3) 
Grants – Schlüsselzuweisungen)                       
NRW capital expenditure grants                        1.3 €  (2.7) 
(incl. school investment grant)                     
NRW specific grants                                         4.8 € (10.0) 
Total grants from NRW state                          13.4 € (28.0) 
 
Specific federal government grants                    3.8 € (7.9) 
 
Total income from shared taxes                        7.1 € (14.9) 
 
Total NRW LG income                                  47.8 € (100.0) 
General grant Municipal Fund –               15.4 € (31.1) 
Algemene Uitkering Gemeentefonds) 
Integration grant Municipal Fund                 1.5 € (3.0) 
Decentralisation grant Municipal Fund        1.1 € (2.2) 
Total grants Municipal Fund                    18.0 € (36.4) 
 
Specific grants                                           12.7 € (25.6) 
 
Total grants from central                          30.7 € (62.0) 
government         
                              
Total Dutch LG income                           49.5 € (100.0) 
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occupies the majority of specific grant funding to LGs. The number of specific transfers 
has reduced in all three systems in favour of funding through general transfers, sometimes 
referred to as block grants. As illustrated in table 5.1, the mechanisms in use to allocate 
general funding differ substantially in institutional terms. 
In England, the ‘four block’ model was used to determine grant distribution in the 
English system prior to the reform of the local business rates system in 2013/14. The four 
blocks referred to the different steps required to calculate LGs’ grant allocation 
(consisting of: calculation of LGs’ needs, their local resources, a central allocation after 
distribution through the formula, and a floor dampening block).  
Since the reform of the Business Rates System, the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) 
is the primary source of central government funding for English LGs (excluding school 
expenditure that is allocated through a specific grant). The RSG compensates the 
difference between the aggregate Settlement Funding Assessment and the local share of 
business rates. The reform of the business rates system is substantial – 50% of locally 
collected business rates are no longer redistributed nationally but retained locally. Despite 
this change, the formula based system to distribute the remaining 50% of the business 
rates and the RSG itself has remained largely unchanged. Compared to the Dutch and 
NRW system, general grant calculation in the English system is exceptionally complex. 
Spending needs are based upon the seven main service areas provided by English LGs 
which each use their own formula. The formulas consist of different indicators which are 
organised differently by type of local authority, including different floor damping levels 
(DCLG, 2012). The formulas have a standard amount per unit/client, which, depending 
upon the local circumstances might be topped-up with additional funding. The biggest 
factors affecting the top-ups are area costs and deprivation. For example, Children’s 
Services and within this local service area the sub-block Youth and Community, uses top-
up indicators for the number of children in out-of-work families and pupils from low 
achieving ethnic groups (DCLG, 2012, p. 8). 
Formula funding in NRW is comparatively straightforward with five indicators in 
use in its formula, which distributes all NRW’s general LG funding. Local population 
size is NRW’s most significant distributional factor. In contrast to the Dutch and English 
systems, the weight that residents’ carry in the formula increases with a rise in population 
size. The system operates twenty different population classes (see appendix IV). The 
smallest class are LGs with a population size up to 25,000, who receive 100% of the basic 
funding amount, and the largest category are LGs with a population size above 634,000, 
who receive 157% of the basic funding amount. This means that a resident of the city of  
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Cologne, which has a total population of around one million, enters the formula with a 
weight of 1.57 higher compared to a resident of the city of Meckenheim, which has a 
population of just below 25,000 (Buettner et al., 2008, p. 74). The particular design of the 
indicator has a long history in German grant funding, and is mainly motivated upon the 
idea that more urbanised LGs need to make higher expenditures per capita to facilitate 
public goods, partly because these facilities are used by residents of neighbouring LGs 
(Popitz, 1927). The area size indicator has been implemented in NRW since 2012, 
following several years of deliberation, and was motivated on the assumption that low 
population density increases costs of local service provision. 
Although the Dutch system uses a relatively large number of around 60 indicators 
in its redistribution formula, more than 90% of funding is distributed through 15 
indicators (Rfv, 2010). In contrast to the NRW system, indicators do not have a %-share 
in the funding amount attached to them, but financial figures are presented in euros. The 
funding base of a Dutch LG is based upon its scoring on all indicators combined. The 
indicator coefficients, with which the indicator units are multiplied, are derived from 
analysing actual local expenditure on fourteen spending clusters. To illustrate this: the 
spending cluster ‘education’ uses 13 different indicators, including young inhabitants and 
students in secondary education. In case of a policy change in education, the redistribution 
cluster ‘education’ is used by central government to implement accompanying changes 
in education funding. The figure is based upon the scoring of a LG on all indicators 
combined, and is then multiplied with a coefficient calculated using the amount of central 
government funding available (itself based upon the standardised methodology set out 
above).70 
The third step in all three redistribution systems is to correct the calculated funding 
base for the local tax capacity. To prevent LGs being able to influence their funding 
allocation, the amount used is that which could have been raised based upon the local tax 
capacity and the average tax rates set by LGs in the system, and not the actual amount of 
local taxes raised. The fourth step includes the damping mechanisms formulated either as 
a percentage (England) or a nominal amount in euros (the Netherlands). In the English 
system, this step also includes the central allocation of money left over following the first 
three steps, and space for grant changes based upon Ministerial judgement. Since 2011, 
NRW applies a fourth step that determines that LGs with a fiscal surplus have to 
contribute to the redistribution mechanism. The measure is temporarily and has been 
                                                          
70 Interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, interviewee B, 23/01/2014. 
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implemented to finance a city consolidation package. The package has been implemented 
by the NRW state government aimed at NRW cities with the most problematic finances, 
partly as a response to growing concerns among LG borrowers about the creditworthiness 
of highly indebted NRW LGs. Despite support among a large part of NRW’s LG sector, 
the partly Robin Hood funding structure of the package has caused large controversies 
within NRW LG.71 The distributional mechanisms in use for specific grants strongly 
differ by program and departmental grant funder, and will not be analysed in-depth in this 
chapter.  
 
5.3.5 Financial organisations and redistribution funding 
The main ministries involved in redistribution funding in each system are the Finance and 
Interior Ministries. The main involvement of the Finance Ministries is in deciding the 
aggregate budget available for the local sector as part of the total government budget, 
whereas the Interior Ministries are responsible for the horizontal distribution among the 
local sector. In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Finance is also relevant, but the role of 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior in intergovernmental financial affairs is negligible. In 
all three systems, the budget available for the LG sector is managed by the Interior 
Ministry, but is institutionally separate from the Interior Ministry’s budget. Out of the 
three systems, it is only the Dutch system that has an independent council that provides 
the government and parliament advice on intergovernmental funding issues, especially 
related to the Municipal Fund. The Dutch Financial Relations Council (Rfv) is partly 
made up of (subnational) government practitioners and partly of academics. 
In all three systems, the LG redistribution budget is determined through financial 
settlements that mostly apply to a single parliamentary year. Efforts have been made in 
England to extend LG financial settlements to two years in order to better facilitate long-
term local budgeting but in practice changes have been made during the settlement.        
                           
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                          
71 In return for in total 5.85 billion € additional financial support over the period 2011-2020, the cities 
included in the programme are required to implement sufficient budget savings to realise a balanced 
budget without additional support by 2020. 61 Cities in total are included in the program, of which 34 
cities were obliged to participate – the already overindebted ones; while 27 cities that are threatened by 
overindebtedness jointed on a voluntary basis. See website NRW Ministry for the Interior and Local 
Government; ‘Stärkungspakt Stadtfinanzen’; http://www.mik.nrw.de/themen-aufgaben/kommunales 
/kommunale-finanzen/kommunale-haushalte/haushaltssicherung/staerkungspakt-stadtfinanzen.html 
(visited July 20, 2013). 
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5.4 Method and data sources 
The empirical analysis is based upon a panel dataset exclusively compiled for this 
research. Panel data relate to LGs in England, NRW, and the Netherlands, and cover the 
period from 2005 to 2012. Due to a number of local territorial amalgamations in England 
and the Netherlands during this period, the total number of LGs is 1,165 in 2012 compared 
to 1,252 in 2005 (N English LGs reduced from 389 in 2005 to 354 in 2012, N Dutch LGs 
reduced from 467 in 2005 to 415 in 2012, N NRW LGs remained unchanged at 396). LGs 
with missing data for more than three years have been deleted from the dataset, which 
brings the total number of LGs included in the panel dataset to 1,190. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is total debt size p/c. Log-transformation has been applied to 
control for skewed and wide distribution among data. While the log of debt in p/c terms 
is a common denominator in the empirical literature on LG debt (e.g. Bastida, Beyaert, & 
Benito, 2013; Cropf & Wendel, 1998), additional measurements of debt are used to check 
the robustness of the regression results deriving from the main dependent variable. First, 
following standardised LG financial stress denominators, debt has been calculated as 
percentage of a locality’s total income. 
Second, the debtminusreserves dependent variable has been compiled which 
corrects for (unallocated) reserve levels. This provides a more adequate debt indicator, 
since stable or reducing debt levels might be a consequence of declining local reserve 
levels, and increasing debt levels might be paralleled by a build-up of local reserves (cf. 
Audit Commission, 2012; Jacob & Hendrick, 2013, p. 13). Figures on local reserves are 
not available for all LGs, hence, the reduction of the number of English LGs to 312, and 
Dutch LGs to 335. Due to the cameral accounting system in place in NRW up to 2008 
and the gradual transition of the statistical information in NRW at the time of this 
research, figures on reserve levels were unavailable for NRW LGs.72 In order to have a 
more dynamic indicator than historical debt, the annual change in debt is used as the 
dependent variable for NRW LGs (log debt evolution). Using annual change figures to 
indicate the dependent variable is a common procedure in econometric research using 
longitudinal data (e.g. Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
                                                          
72 Although many of NRW’s LG accounting categories have changed due to the transition from a cameral 
to a double bookkeeping accounting system, the main variables used in this research have largely 




The independent variables of central interest relate to the institutional features of LGs: 
the degree of party political symmetry between a LG and its main grant funder, and LG 
interest representation. It is expected that party political symmetry and larger 
administrative capacity improves LG access to their grant providers, which positively 
relates to the effect of their grant allocation.  
 
Figure 5.3 Party political composition of grant providing governments, 2005-2012 
 
 
Variables indicating central-local party political similarity are most convenient to 
construct for the English system, where most local councils are dominated by one party. 
Over the 2005-12 period included in the dataset, around 20% of English LGs had no 
overall control by a single party (often referred to as ‘hung councils’) (BBC election 
results, multiple years). In the Dutch system, around 95% of the local council executives 
were multi-partisan in 2012, and 75% in NRW.73  
The political situation at the level of the main LG funder also differs across the 
systems. Figure 5.3 illustrates that in the period of the dataset England has been the only 
system with a single party government at the central level (2005-2010). In the Dutch and 
NRW system, the central government has been made up of at least two parties. In order 
to allow party political symmetry to be measured beyond Westminster systems, the 
                                                          
73 Dutch percentage own calculation based upon data from the Dutch Electoral Council (Kiesraad). NRW 
percentage own calculation based upon IT.NRW data (99 councils in total had a single party majority 
following NRW’s 2009 local elections – 89 dominated by the CDU and 10 by the SPD).  
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variable councilsym is measured as a dummy variable, whereby intergovernmental party 
political symmetry is assumed to be present if the largest party in the local council shares 
its party political colour with one of the parties represented in the central level 
government executive. The political science literature demonstrates the often precarious 
nature of coalition governments, which makes it unlikely that only the biggest party in 
the central government coalition will be able to politically direct grant allocation (Laver 
& Schofield, 1998). Hence, this provides a rationale to encompass all central level 
government parties in the operationalisation of the councilsym variable.  
 In addition to symmetry between the biggest local party and a central level 
government executive party, an alternative measurement for the Dutch and NRW system 
concentrates on party political symmetry between the local mayor and a central level 
government party. Mayors are present in every Dutch and NRW LG, but in only 13 
English LGs. The variable mayorsym is operationalised as a dummy variable, with a 
dummy coded 1 for Dutch and NRW LGs having a mayor of a similar party political 
colour as one of the parties represented in the central level executive.  
 In line with Grossman (1994), LG interest representation as the second 
moderating effect is measured via a proxy for local administrative capacity 
(staffcapacity). Administrative capacity is indicated by p/c expenditure on local 
administrative staff. In addition, for English and NRW LGs the number of local 
administrators for every 1,000 inhabitants has been used as an alternative measurement 
for administrative capacity.74  
 
Model specification 
In line with the hypotheses generated from the literature, independent variables are related 
to the financial, institutional and demographic features of LGs. The following empirical 
model has been formulated to identify the effect of the regressors on the dependent 
variable debt: 
      
(5.1) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)     
                      + 𝛽5(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑦𝑚) + 𝛽6(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽7(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) 




                                                          
74 LG level time series data on the number of municipal public servants were unavailable for the Dutch 
system.    
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𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the log of total debt size p/c. 
income is the log of total income p/c. 
totalgrants is the log of total grants p/c. 
taxes is the log of tax income p/c. 
expenditure is the log of total expenditure p/c. 
politicalsym is equal to 1 for Dutch and NRW LGs showing political symmetry between the party 
political colour of the mayor and a central level governing party, and for English LGs showing 
party political symmetry between the biggest party in the local council and a central level 
governing party, 0 otherwise.  
staffcapacity is the log of expenditure on administrative staff p/c.  
density is the log of inhabitants per sq. km. 
unemployed is the number of unemployed inhabitants as percentage of the total local population. 
 
To test the moderating effect of the institutional variables on LG debt accumulation 
interaction terms are included in the full estimation model. This model is as follows: 
           
(5.2) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)      
        + 𝛽5(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑦𝑚) + 𝛽6(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽7(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)                          
        + 𝛽8(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽9(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑦𝑚 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)              
       + 𝛽10(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖                                                                   
 
In a third step, country-specific estimations are formulated for the Dutch and NRW 
system that specify intergovernmental political symmetry as symmetry with the local 
mayor and/or the local council. This model is formulated as follows: 
   
              (5.3) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)      
       + 𝛽5(𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑚) + 𝛽6(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑦𝑚) + 𝛽7(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽8(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)       
       + 𝛽9(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽10(𝑚𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑚 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)        
       + 𝛽11(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑦𝑚 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) +𝛽12(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) +  𝜀𝑖     
 
Where  
councilsym is equal to 1 for LGs showing political symmetry between the biggest party in the 
 local council and a central level governing party, 0 otherwise. 
mayorsym is equal to 1 for Dutch and NRW LGs showing political symmetry between the 





Table 5.2 provides an overview of the sources and measurements of the variables. The 
grant figures in case of NRW only refer to state level funding, and exclude federal grants.  
 
Since the allocative dynamics of specific grants might differ from total grant figures, 
equations 5.1-5.3 have also been calculated with β2 totalgrants replaced by specificgrants. 
 
 
5.5 Quantitative empirical results  
Table 5.3 reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in the regression 
(natural logarithms). Table 5.4 shows the correlation matrix of the key variables. All 
variables show coefficients below the critical level of 0.7. The Hausman test has been 
conducted to determine if there are fixed effects for each LG and whether these can be 
modelled as random effect. A Hausman test indicating a statistically significant difference 
 Table 5.2 Variable names pooled data 
 
Variable Measurement Source Variable Measurement 
  England Germany/NRW The 
Netherlands 
debt Natural log of total debt p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
income Natural log of total income p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
totalgrants Natural log of total grants p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
specificgrants Natural log of specific grants p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
taxes Natural log of tax income p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
expenditure Natural log of total expenditure p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
politicalsym 1 for Dutch and NRW LGs with party 
political symmetry between the mayor 
and a central level governing party; 1 for 
English LGs with party political 
symmetry between the biggest party in 
the local council and a central level 







councilsym 1 for political symmetry between the 
biggest party in the local council and a 










mayorsym 1 for Dutch and NRW LGs with party 
political symmetry between the mayor 
and a central level governing party, 0 
otherwise. 
- IT.NRW Municipal 
websites 
staffcapacity Natural log staff expenditure p/c ONS IT.NRW CBS 
density Natural log of inhabitants per square km ONS IT.NRW CBS 
unemployed Unemployed  inhabitants as % total local 
population   
ONS IT.NRW CBS 
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Variable n Mean s.d Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
debt 1,190 2.70 1.05 -4.77 -4.15 3.06 3.95 5.83 
income 1,190 3.20 0.26 0 2.49 3.25 4.61 6.37 
totalgrants 1,190 2.83 0.34 1.79 1.84 2.81 4.24 6.29 
specificgrants 1,190 2.13 0.60 0.31 0.32 2.13 3.76 5.91 
taxes 1,190 2.43 0.52 -0.96 -0.62 2.38 3.42 5.66 
expenditure 1,190 3.18 0.30 0 2.25 3.26 4.66 6.38 
politicalsym 1,190 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
councilsym 1,190 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
mayorsym 799 0.57 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
staffcapacity 1,190 5.53 0.79 2.27 2.39 5.38 9.99 13.89 
density 1,190 2.62 0.50 -0.08 0.55 2.55 4.47 4.48 
unemployed 1,190 4.09 2.58 0.37 0.39 3.43 35.77 42.99 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 debt 1          
2 income 0.585 1         
3 totalgrants 0.278 0.435 1        
4 specificgrants 0.231 0.176 0.366 1       
5 taxes 0.251 0.595 -0.316 0.039 1      
6 expenditure 0.021 0.133 0.028 0.006 0.064 1     
7 politicalsym 0.067 0.630 -0.084 -0.077 -0.062 -0.014 1    
8 staffcapacity 0.270 0.450 0.315 0.477 0.572 0.108 -0.129 1   
9 density 0.246 0.309 0.522 0.294 0.033 -0.032 -0.062 0.303 1  
10 unemployed -0.004 -0.072 0.462 0.344 0.005 0.034 -0.129 0.454 0.349 1 
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between fixed versus random effect results is interpreted as evidence against the random 
effect assumption. With a p–value significant at the 0.001 level, the Hausman test 
indicates that H0 can be resoundingly rejected and the fixed effect method is appropriate 
to estimate the parameters (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 329). Robust standard errors are used 
to account for heteroskedasticity. 
 
5.5.1 Moderating effects and total grants: country estimations  
The first results of the country-specific estimations are presented in tables 5.5. The first 
column in table 5.5 shows the results for England. The control variables density and 
unemployed are highly significant at the 0.01 level and are positively related with local 
debt. In line with expectations, the variable income indicates that an increase in aggregate 
income is negatively related to local debt. Unpacking income, however, demonstrates that 
an increase in local dependence upon grants increases LG debt. This confirms hypothesis 
5. Although the direction of the coefficients of the interaction terms 
politicalsym*totalgrants and staffcapacity*totalgrants is in the expected direction, the 
interaction terms are non-significant when using total debt p/c/ (log) as dependent 
variables. Results are largely similar for England when using as robustness check debt as 
% of total income. However, the interaction term politicallsym*totalgrants is now nificant 
(P<0.1), and the same applies to the component variables politicalsym (P<0.1) and 
totalgrants (P<0.05). The interaction term staffcapacity*totalgrants lacks significance 
both when using total debt p/c (log) as the dependent variable, or total debt as % of total 
income.  
Similar to English LGs, local unemployment is positively related to the debt 
position of Dutch LGs. Dutch results on the financial variables taxes and expenditure are 
also similar to the English results; an increase in tax revenues increases debt making 
(coefficients β=0.178, P<0.01), whereas an increase in expenditure reduces debt making 
(coefficients β=-0.269, P<0.01). The positive relationship between taxes and local debt 
making seems counterintuitive at first, but can be well explained by own tax revenues 
being used as one of the main indicators of debt affordability in the Dutch and English 
system (e.g. CIPFA, 2013). In contrast to the English results, the total income of Dutch 
LGs is positively related to debt when measured on a total debt p/c log base. These results 
might be explained by the less strict intergovernmental regulatory framework of Dutch 
compared to English LGs, and the enhancing effect in the Dutch case of a rise in local 
income on debt making (see chapter 4). The Dutch results confirm the significance of, 
and the negative relationship with debt of the interaction term politicalsym*totalgrants
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(coefficients β=-0.157, P<0.01). The component variables politicalsym and totalgrants 
are both highly significant, at the 0.01 level and 0.05 respectively, and results are in the 
expected direction, confirming hypothesis 6.  
The last two columns in table 5.5 show the results for NRW. Using total debt p/c 
(log) as dependent variable, the control variables unemployed and density indicate 
moderate to strong levels of significance, and are, in line with expectations, positively 
related to local debt. From the financial variables, only the variable taxes is significant at 
the 0.01 level. The variable income is positively related to debt when using total debt p/c 
(log) as dependent variable but the direction of the variable reverses when using total debt 
as % of total income. In contrast to the Dutch and English system, taxes in NRW appear 
to be negatively related to debt (coefficients β=-0.246, P<0.01). This negative and 
strongly significant relationship between taxes and local debt provides strong support for 
the comparatively high tax dependence of NRW LGs (see chapter 6). The relevance of 
taxes is further confirmed by a weakly significant relationship between totalgrants and 
debt held by NRW LGs (P<0.1). The results for the interaction terms in NRW are very 
similar to the Dutch case. The interaction term politicalsym*totalgrants is significant and 
shows a negative relationship with debt (coefficients β=-0.213, P<0.05), while also the 
interaction variables politicalsym and totalgrants are significant separately. The 
interaction terms staffcapacity*totalgrants is insignificant for NRW LGs. 
 
5.5.2 Moderating effects and total grants: robustness check country estimations 
The robustness check identifies the financial impact of grants on debt levels corrected for 
reserves. The results of the robustness check are presented in table 5.6 and mostly confirm 
the relationships identified in table 5.5. The socioeconomic and financial control variables 
remain significant and in the same direction (although levels of significance show small 
differences). The interaction term politicalsym*totalgrants is significant both when using 
debt corrected for unallocated reserves in p/c terms, and when using debt minus reserves 
as % of income. The direction is similar to the results in table 5.5, demonstrating that 
political symmetry between central government and the local council reduces the debt 
enhancing effect of grants in the English system, which confirms hypothesis 6. The 
positive relationship, however, between totalgrants and English LG debt identified in 
table 5.5 appears weaker when controlling for local reserves. Table 5.6 shows that the 
variable totalgrants is significant at the 0.05 level for England, in the measurement of debt 
minus reserves in p/c terms. This indicates that English LGs with high transfer 










Table 5.5      Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of institutional variables on total grant allocations, panel data 
.                 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt p/c (log), including robustness check dependent variable total debt as % .     
.                   total income. Fixed effects    
 
   England The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total  debt % 
total income 
politicalsym*totalgrants -0.130 -0.167* -0.157*** -0.225*** -0.213** -0.245* 
 (0.146) (0.091) (0.054) (0.074) (0.102) (0.141) 
staffcapacity*totalgrants -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
income -1.246** -0.981** 0.586*** -0.293 0.570** -4.376*** 
 (0.614) (0.342) (0.199) (0.796) (0.236) (0.736) 
totalgrants 2.996** 2.075** 0.367** 0.601*** 0.224 1.364*** 
 (1.055) (0.807) (0.158) (0.146) (0.159) (0.341) 
taxes 2.117** 2.798*** 0.178*** 0.298*** -0.246*** -0.007 
 (0.703) (0.561) (0.061) (0.102) (0.063) (0.087) 
expenditure -0.927** -1.586*** -0.269*** -1.002 -0.505** -0.770 
 (0.463) (0.360) (0.085) (0.765) (0.225) (0.549) 
politicalsym 0.450 0.570* 0.491*** 0.698*** 0.593** 0.650* 
 (0.440) (0.296) (0.170) (0.230) (0.276) (0.370) 
staffcapacity 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.043) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) 
density 1.743*** 2.372*** 0.455 0.897 0.551** 1.513*** 
 (0.519) (0.395) (0.320) (0.959) (0.219) (0.531) 
unemployed 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.021* 0.015* 0.184*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.025) 
constant -10.207*** -11.328*** 0.561 4.743** 1.405 10.101*** 
 (3.049) (2.281) (0.973) (1.857) (1.016) (2.489) 
       
Observations 2,512 2,512 2,542 2,542 3,300 3,300 
Number of LGs 391 391 367 367 432 432 
Adj. R² 
 
.07 .10 .10 .12 .02 .06 










Table 5.6           Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of institutional variables on total grant allocations, panel data .                 .                   
.                   2005-2012. Robustness tests dependent variable: total debt minus reserves England and the Netherlands; NRW debt           .                     
.                        evolution. Fixed effects     
 
 England The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
minus unallocated 
reserves (log) 
total debt minus 
unallocated 
reserves % income 
total debt p/c 
minus unallocated 
reserves (log) 






total debt % 
administrative 
income 
politicalym*totalgrants -0.415* -0.159* -0.603*** -0.287*** -0.284 -0.245* 
 (0.221) (0.090) (0.229) (0.095) (0.495) (0.141) 
staffcapacity*totalgrants 0.000 0.000 -0.029 0.004 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
income 0.899 -0.919*** 3.315 -0.085 3.199*** -4.376*** 
 (1.035) (0.337) (2.054) (1.205) (1.176) (0.736) 
totalgrants 1.078 2.061*** 1.235* 0.477* 0.422 1.364*** 
 (1.105) (0.784) (0.656) (0.276) (0.863) (0.341) 
taxes 5.379*** 2.716*** 1.126*** 0.510*** -0.576 -0.070 
 (1.091) (0.553) (0.275) (0.134) (0.429) (0.087) 
expenditure -0.967 -1.570*** -2.529 -1.231 -0.050 -0.770 
 (0.771) (0.355) (1.965) (1.153) (1.130) (0.549) 
politicalsym 1.449** 0.545* 1.872*** 0.894*** -0.288 0.650* 
 (0.721) (0.291) (0.714) (0.294) (1.279) (0.370) 
staffcapacity -0.000 0.000 0.079 -0.019 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.158) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) 
density 4.140*** 2.345*** 4.330* 1.505 0.007*** 1.513*** 
 (0.988) (0.391) (2.323) (1.359) (0.002) (0.531) 
unemployed 0.027** 0.020*** 0.052** 0.021* 0.081 0.184*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.025) (0.012) (0.067) (0.025) 
constant -22.270*** -11.280*** -2.094 4.054 2.160 10.110*** 
 (5.919) (2.251) (4.886) (2.629) (4.598) (2.489) 
Observations 1,715 1,715 2,177 2,177 1,374 3,300 
Number of LGs 312 312 348 348 432 432 
Adj. R² .20 .10 .05 .09 .15 .06 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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The results in table 5.6 of the interaction effects in the Dutch and NRW system 
mirror the results of table 5.5. Party political symmetry between the mayor and one of the 
central level government executive parties remains a significant moderator on the 
relationship between total grants and local debt. The capacity of the local administration 
has no significant effect on debt evolution directly or indirectly via moderating total grant 
allocation in any of the three systems. An additional robustness test has been carried out 
for total grants, using lagged values of the dependent variable on the right- hand-side of 
the model. The lagged estimation results largely resemble the results of table 5.5, with 
the variable totalgrants continuing to be positively related with debt, and the interaction 
terms demonstrating significant effects in a similar direction as in table 5.5 (see appendix 
V). In case of NRW and England, an additional robustness test of the effect of 
administrative capacity has been conducted by using actual local administrative staff 
numbers (indicated as Full Time Equivalents), re-calculated as the number of 
administrators per 1,000 residents. This robustness test demonstrated similar results to 
the proxy staff expenditure p/c, with no significance for the recalculated variable 
staffcapacity separately or as part of the moderating term (in case of both England and 
NRW, and when using the two different total debt indicators). In sum, the empirical 
analysis confirms hypothesis 5 by demonstrating a positive relationship between grants 
and local debt. The debt enhancing effect of grants is reduced by party political variables. 
Staff capacity has no effect on the total amount of attracted grants.  
To specify for country-specific political institutional structures, political 
symmetry has been separated for the Netherlands and NRW into symmetry between a 
central level government executive party and the local council, and a central level 
government executive party and the local mayor. The regression results are reported in 
table 5.7. As explained above, the English case is excluded due to the absence of mayors 
in the majority of English LGs. The results indicate that political moderation of total 
grants is concentrated with mayors in the Dutch and NRW systems. Party political 
symmetry between the local mayor and a governing party at the level of the grant provider 
reduces the debt enhancing effect of grants. Again, the robustness of the results has been 
tested by using lagged values of the dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the 
model. The lagged estimation results largely resemble the results of table 5.7, with the 
variable totalgrants continuing to be positively related with debt, and the interaction terms 
demonstrating significant effects and in a similar direction (see appendix VI). The results 






The moderating effect of political and institutional variables is likely to be 
affected by the type of grant being allocated. Due to the different allocation mechanisms 
in place for specific grants, political and institutional variables might moderate the 
relationship between specific grants and debt differently compared to total grants and 
debt.  
   
5.5.3 Moderating effects via specific grants: country estimations 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 investigate the relationship between debt and specific grants. The debt 
size is again measured in p/c terms (log) and as % of total income. Many variables 
 
Table 5.7   Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of party political variables 
on total grant allocations, panel data 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt p/c (log), 
including robustness check dependent variable total debt as % total income. Fixed effects 
 
   The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total  debt % total 
income 
       
mayorsym*totalgrants -0.140** -0.197*** -0.267* -0.302** 
 (0.056) (0.074) (0.183) (0.147) 
councilsym*totalgrants 0.022 0.001 -0.191 -0.212* 
 (0.086) (0.112) (0.120) (0.128) 
income 1.568*** 0.586 0.550* -4.508*** 
 (0.246) (0.376) (0.313) (0.758) 
totalgrants 0.376*** 0.546*** 0.297* 1.057*** 
 (0.100) (0.140) (0.160) (0.242) 
taxes 0.168** 0.316*** -0.350* -0.008 
 (0.066) (0.104) (0.198) (0.088) 
expenditure -1.230*** -1.797*** -0.323 -0.575 
 (0.152) (0.255) (0.314) (0.564) 
mayorsym 0.439** 0.613*** 0.819* 0.825** 
 (0.176) (0.230) (0.490) (0.387) 
councilsym -0.067 0.001 0.448 0.691** 
 (0.267) (0.348) (0.320) (0.334) 
staffcapacity -0.027 -0.026 -0.001 -0.000** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.001) (0.000) 
density 1.478*** 1.915*** 0.875*** 1.474*** 
 (0.421) (0.626) (0.307) (0.536) 
unemployed 0.025*** 0.022* 0.0217* 0.180*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) 
constant 2.081* 5.459*** 4.544*** 10.49*** 
 (1.110) (1.562) (1.527) (2.669) 
     
Observations 2,542 2,542 3,300 3,300 




.09 .11 .03 .06 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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demonstrate effects in a similar direction and with comparable significance levels as 
shown in table 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 (e.g. density, unemployed and expenditure). However, 
compared to the regressions using total grant figures, table 5.8 indicates significantly 
different effects of specific grants.  
Firstly, specific grants are positively related to local debt in the English and NRW 
system, but do not have any significant effect on debt in the Dutch system. This indicates 
that in the Dutch system specific grants do not increase debt, and/or do not tend to be 
distributed towards LGs already characterised by high debt levels. Secondly, the 
moderating effect of specific grants contrasts significantly with the previous regressions 
using total grant figures. The results for England demonstrate that the relationship 
between specific grants and debt is moderated by both intergovernmental partypolitical 
symmetry and local staff capacity. The interaction term staffcapacity*specificgrants 
(coefficient β=-0.307, P<0.1), including significant coefficients for staffcapacity and 
specificgrants separately.  
While the coefficients remain around the same size, the significance level of the 
interaction term staffcapacity*specificgrants, and the component variables separately 
increase to the 0.05 level in the robustness check using debt as % of income. The 
interaction term politicalsymmetry lacks significance in the total debt p/c (log) 
calculation, and is only weakly significant when using as dependent variable debt as % 
of income. In the Dutch system, only the moderator politicalsym*specificgrants shows 
significance.  
Compared to the estimation results on total grant figures, moderating effects are 
more substantial in NRW in case of specific grants. The interaction terms 
politicalsym*specificgrants and staffcapacity*specificgrants appear to be highly 
significant (respectively at the 0.01 and 0.05 level). In line with expectations, 
intergovernmental party political symmetry and an increase in local administrative 
capacity, reduces the debt enhancing effect of specific grants. The component variables 
politicalsym and staffcapacity are also significant individually. Using total debt as % of 
income as the dependent variable does not substantially change the direction and 
























Table 5.8    Effect of specific grants on debt, and the moderating effect of institutional variables on specific grant allocations, panel 
.               data 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt p/c (log), including robustness check dependent variable total debt %          
.                  total income. Fixed effects 
 
 England The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total  debt % 
total income 
         
politicalym*specificgrants -0.121 -.0166* -0.050* -0.084** -0.192*** -0.105** 
 (0.136) (0.085) (0.029) (0.039) (0.068) (0.043) 
staffcapacity*specificgrants -0.307* -0.270** -0.033 -0.043 -0.251** -0.195*** 
 (0.174) (0.128) (0.073) (0.115) (0.103) (0.051) 
income -0.545 -0.564** 1.051*** -0.061 0.347 0.119 
 (0.554) (0.264) (0.155) (0.795) (0.234) (0.181) 
specificgrants 2.730** 2.435*** 0.167 0.218 1.692*** 1.331*** 
 (1.242) (0.927) (0.359) (0.573) (0.578) (0.261) 
taxes 2.860*** 3.099*** 0.155** 0.290*** -0.020 0.253 
 (0.674) (0.482) (0.061) (0.103) (0.055) (0.029) 
expenditure -1.012** -1.629*** -0.463*** -0.884 -0.237 -0.627*** 
 (0.491) (0.383) (0.066) (0.780) (0.220) (0.161) 
politicalsym 0.416 0.551** 0.137* 0.221** 0.387*** 0.120** 
 (0.394) (0.267) (0.078) (0.102) (0.140) (0.084) 
staffcapacity 0.832* 0.838** 0.085 0.134 0.482** 0.425*** 
 (0.475) (0.357) (0.195) (0.294) (0.187) (0.091) 
density -1.372 -0.264 0.713** 0.892 0.453*** 0.418*** 
 (1.472) (1.084) (0.321) (0.975) (0.086) (0.076) 
unemployed 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.019** 0.012 0.011 0.033** 
 (0.007) (0.500) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) 
constant -3.617 -6.684*** 0.563 4.249* -1.793 -1.568*** 
 (2.813) (1.825) (1.414) (2.333) (1.196) (0.608) 
       
Observations 2,512 2,512 2,540 2,540 3,300 3,300 
Number of LGs 391 391 367 367 432 432 
Adj. R² 
 
0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.11 




Table 5.9   Effect of specific grants on debt, and the moderating effect of institutional variables on specific grant allocations, panel data    .               
.                 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt (minus reserves) p/c and as % of total income. Fixed effects 
 
 England The Netherlands NRW 
 




total debt minus 
unallocated reserves 
% total income 
total debt p/c minus 
unallocated reserves 
(log) 
total debt minus unallocated 
reserves % total income 
total debt evolution p/c 
(log) 
  
     
politicalym*specificgrants -0.421* -0.159* -0.309** -0.098** -1.438*** 
 (0.217) (0.084) (0.145) (0.043) (0.453) 
staffcapacity*specificgrants -0.438* -0.272** -0.240 -0.102 -0.308 
 (0.231) (0.127) (0.281) (0.127) (0.365) 
income 1.254 -0.507* 2.712*** 0.637 2.362** 
 (0.819) (0.260) (0.613) (1.138) (1.039) 
specificgrants 3.714** 2.440*** 1.197 0.464 3.520* 
 (1.669) (0.916) (1.395) (0.634) (2.130) 
taxes 5.431*** 3.017*** 1.111*** 0.408*** 0.154 
 (1.044) (0.477) (0.269) (0.116) (0.225) 
expenditure -0.978 -1.607*** -1.242*** -1.298 2.462** 
 (0.813) (0.373) (0.261) (1.129) (0.990) 
politicalsym 1.406** 0.5289** 0.808** 0.247** 2.838*** 
 (0.678) (0.262) (0.384) (0.114) (0.910) 
staffcapacity 1.135* 0.838** 0.598 0.258 -0.165 
 (0.680) (0.352) (0.747) (0.324) (0.666) 
density 0.597 -0.299 3.400*** 1.807 0.788*** 
 (1.791) (1.070) (1.074) (1.294) (0.245) 
unemployed 0.023* 0.016*** 0.0389 0.019* -0.0624 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.024) (0.011) (0.045) 
constant -19.560*** -6.643*** -6.874 1.740 -16.001*** 
 (5.480) (1.803) (4.801) (2.730) (4.702) 
      
Observations 1,715 1,715 2,177 2,177 1,341 
Number of LGs 312 312 348 348 412 
Adj. R² 
 
0.21 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.12 





5.5.4 Moderating effects via specific grants: robustness check country estimations 
Similar to the total grants estimations, additional robustness tests are conducted on 
specific grants using English and Dutch debt indicators corrected for unallocated reserve 
levels, and debt evolution for NRW. The results are shown in table 5.9 and confirm the 
initial findings: specific grants continue to be positively related to the adjusted debt 
indicator in England and NRW, but lack significance in the Dutch system. The interaction 
terms for political symmetry and local administrative capacity continue to be significant 
in the English system. The only significant moderating effect in the Dutch system 
Table 5.10 Effect of specific grants on debt, and the moderating effect of party political 
variables on specific grant allocations, panel data 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt 
p/c (log), including robustness check dependent variable total debt as % of total income. Fixed 
effects 
 
 The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total  debt % total 
income 
       
mayorsym*specificgrants -0.042* -0.068* -0.156** -0.057 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.073) (0.044) 
councilsym*specificgrants -0.009 -0.090 -0.265*** -0.148*** 
 (0.038) (0.133) (0.071) (0.044) 
income 1.063*** 1.025*** 0.256 0.061 
 (0.162) (0.294) (0.227) (0.181) 
totalgrants 0.008 0.446 0.442*** 0.312*** 
 (0.041) (0.665) (0.107) (0.070) 
taxes 0.157** 0.308*** 0.073 0.087*** 
 (0.065) (0.105) (0.045) (0.028) 
expenditure -0.470*** -1.909*** -0.170 -0.585*** 
 (0.069) (0.263) (0.225) (0.160) 
mayorsym 0.115 0.180* 0.366** 0.156* 
 (0.082) (0.104) (0.143) (0.088) 
councilsym 0.019 -0.003 0.543*** 0.294*** 
 (0.103) (0.019) (0.146) (0.087) 
staffcapacity 0.002 0.252 0.016 0.064*** 
 (0.037) (0.342) (0.037) (0.024) 
density 0.784** 2.153*** 0.448*** 0.414*** 
 (0.385) (0.651) (0.085) (0.075) 
unemployed 0.021*** 0.014 0.011 0.033** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) 
constant 0.777 4.654** 0.290 0.151 
 (1.112) (2.331) (0.602) (0.436) 
     
Observations 2,540 2,540 3,300 3,300 
Number of LGs 367 367 432 432 
Adj. R² 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.11 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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continues to be the impact exerted by the local mayor. In contrast to table 5.8, the effect 
is significant both when using total debt p/c, and total debt as % of income as dependent 
variable (in both cases at the 5% significance level). The results for NRW using debt 
evolution as dependent variable reflect the results in table 5.8.  
 Table 5.10 again specifies the results for country-specific political institutional 
structures. The results show that political moderation of specific grants is present with 
mayors in the Dutch and NRW systems. Party political symmetry between the local mayor 
and a governing party at the level of the grant provider reduces the debt enhancing effect 
of specific grants. In contrast to the Netherlands, the effect also operates through the 
council in case of NRW (coefficient β=-0.265, P<0.01). 
 
5.5.5 Concluding empirical section on effects of grants 
The empirical analysis in this section indicates significant moderating effects exerted by 
political and institutional variables. However, the relevance of the interaction terms 
differs significantly across systems, and by type of grants, reducing the relevance of 
conducting a pooled regression and increasing the relevance of taking system specific 
institutions into account (see appendix VIII for a summary of the quantitative research 
findings according to the different variables measured for debt). 
To cross verify the patterns identified in the statistical analysis, the quantitative results 





5.6 Qualitative empirical results: what experts say about grant allocation and 
 local financial stress 
The statistical findings indicate significant differences among the countries and by type 
of grant. These statistical relationships are triangulated in this chapter by using qualitative 
information. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with intergovernmental actors 
in the three systems, which were combined with archival material. The reader is referred 
to chapter 3 for a further discussion of the methodological aspects of the qualitative 
strategies used in this chapter. The purpose of the qualitative research is twofold. First, 
the relationship is analysed between grants, and the local debt and reserve position. 
Second, the relevance of political and institutional variables is identified in the working 
of grant allocation.  
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5.6.1 Relationship between grants and LG debt 
The statistical results demonstrate a positive relationship between grants and local 
financial stress – indicated by debt, debt evolution, and reserve levels. Based upon this 
finding, it can be expected that LGs more dependent upon grants as part of their total 
income face larger financial risks. The statistical findings are triangulated by country case 
in the following sections. 
 
5.6.1.1   England: qualitative findings on the relationship between grants and LG debt 
Qualitative information on the English system supports the statistical findings. In line 
with estimations, the organisations investigated tend to emphasise the financial risks 
attached to a large local dependence on grants, and specific grants in particular. 
With grant funding providing the majority of income for most English LGs (see 
descriptive statistics), changes in central government funding are outlined by English 
interviewees as critical to the local financial position. Interviewees emphasise the 
historical background of English LG debt due to the strict borrowing regulations 
historically in place. However, increased borrowing freedom introduced with prudential 
borrowing in the English system in 2003, followed a couple of years later by 
unprecedented cuts on the English LG sector, has increased interactivity between central 
government funding and local borrowing behaviour. Interviewees emphasised that after 
years of relatively generous funding under the Labour governments, financial slack had 
been developed at the English local level that offered scope to absorb some of the early 
cuts implemented by the Conservative-led coalition government. However, the dimension 
and multiyear nature of the spending reductions introduced since 2010 increases 
creativeness in LG capital borrowing behaviour. A high-level interviewee at an English 
LG association describes this as follows: 
 
Central government spending cuts are putting us under increasing pressure to find 
creative financing solutions. Many of our members are optimising their capital borrowing 
freedom by deciding to invest in new assets, which can be financed through borrowing, 
rather than spending on the maintenance of existing assets, which must be financed 
through our increasingly squeezed current expenditure accounts.75 
 
Other interviewees in contrast emphasise the continuing robustness of the English 
intergovernmental regulatory framework, which would reduce the extent to which LGs 
                                                          
75 Interview English District Councils’ Network, 10/01/2014. 
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use borrowing to compensate for funding cuts.76 However, a large number of 
interviewees, including those from the second category, demonstrate a lack of knowledge 
about the exact causes of the recent growth of English LG debt.77 An interview with a 
senior official in the Audit Commission highlights the lack of attention for English LG 
debt: 
 
To be honest, I’ve been working here for thirteen years and I don’t really know why we 
didn’t look at it [debt]. We probably took the view that if the PWBL continued to provide 
loans, there was no reason to investigate it. Given the recent rise in local debt, we would 
now probably be investigating it, were we not in a process of liquidation.78 
 
The qualitative review confirms that specific grants have created the greatest risk to the 
financial position of English LGs. While specific grants saw a steady rise under the 
Labour governments, the Conservative-led coalition government that entered office in 
2010 has been implementing a 27% cut in current expenditure during its government 
period, exceeding the departmental average of 19% (HMT, 2010). While there have been 
limits on the maximum cut in formula grant due to the damping mechanisms, this has not 
been the case with specific grants. Hence, English LGs receiving substantial funding from 
specific grants have seen larger falls in government income.79 The allocation criteria used 
for specific grants are diverse, but many focus on tackling social needs and therefore tend 
to be distributed to LGs which already have a weaker socioeconomic structure. In 2014, 
the Government acknowledged that the effect of spending cuts has been greater for 
councils in more deprived areas, but said ‘this was not a conscious decision’.80 Despite 
their reduction, LGs that are most severely hit by the cumulative effect of central 
government cuts still receive an above average level of grant funding (DCLG, statistics, 
multiple years, up to 2013). It is these English LGs that seem to compensate their reduced 
grant funding by increasing borrowing and/or reducing reserve levels.  
 Overall, central government funding cuts have increased financial stress in 
English LGs but have not yet fundamentally affected the financial stability of the English 
LG sector. In 2013, more councils increased rather than reduced their reserve levels (63 
vs. 37%). Interviewees in English LGs, however, emphasise that the build-up of reserves 
                                                          
76 E.g. interview London Councils, 21/12/2012; interview Society of District Council Treasurers, 
04/02/2013. 
77 Interview Audit Commission, 30/12/2013; interview SIGOMA, 07/01/2013. 
78 Interview Audit Commission, 30/12/2013. 
79 Interview Audit Commission, 30/12/2013; and Audit Commission (2012) p.15. 
80 LGC, 27 November, 2014.  
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has been a precautionary measure in most cases against likely future cuts.81 DCLG, as the 
responsible department, has hitherto intervened once grant reductions threatened to 
interrupt service provision. An illustration is West Somerset Council, which hit the 
headlines because of unmanageable local finances in 2012. Central government increased 
its grant by 0.9% in 2013 for West Sommerset, and also allowed the council to set a higher 
level of council tax than what it allowed for the majority of English LGs (Keeling, 2013). 
The overall picture of the English system is that whilst grants and LG debt are positively 
related, the English regulatory framework and the central government’s response has 
hitherto prevented LGs from defaulting. However, given the extent of central government 
cuts, systemic financial risks have increased in the English LG system. Systemic risks are 
aggravated by the absence of back-up plans in central government in case a large number 
of LGs default, combined with a lack of forecasting and modelling techniques to estimate 
the long-term impact of central level decisions on LG finances and service levels.82 
 
5.6.1.2   NRW: qualitative findings on the relationship between grants and LG debt 
More substantially so than in England, there is a positive link between grant funding in 
the German system and local debt. In case of specific grants, the relationship is significant 
in all debt measurements used. These findings received strong qualitative support. From 
the interviewed actors in NRW and at the federal level in Berlin, it is only the NRW 
Ministry of Finance that emphasised that the grants received by NRW LGs do not have 
an intrinsic financial risk attached to them.83 Interviewees in the NRW Ministry of 
Finance refer to rulings from NRW’s State Court that labelled the amount of LG funding 
provided by the NRW state government as adequate ‘in light of the state’s own restricted 
budgetary space’.84 Reference to this court ruling is not a particularly strong argument to 
dispose of the notion of the debt increasing effect of grants, as the ruling only refers to 
the budgetary space of the NRW state, rather than the budgetary consequences of the 
state’s funding decisions on LG finances.  
 German statistics at the level of individual LGs do not provide detailed 
information on the composition of local expenditure, however aggregate statistics do. 
Aggregate statistics show continuously rising expenditure on social welfare by NRW LGs 
                                                          
81 E.g. interview Society of County Council Treasurers, 04/01/2013; interview Society of District Council 
Treasurers, 04/02/2013. 
82 Interview English Audit Commission, 30/12/2013; HoC PAC (2013); and NAO (2013). 
83 Interview NRW Finance Ministry, 24/04/2013. 
84 Interview NRW Ministry of Finance, 24/04/2013. The phrasing is confirmed in the actual court ruling; 
State Court NRW, 19 July 2011 (32/08). 
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during the past two decades. Nearly all of this local social welfare expenditure is a direct 
consequence of federal level legislation. Interviews conducted at the German federal level 
indicate that the federal government tends to underestimate the local financial impact of 
social welfare legislation, especially those implemented in the early 2000s. Examples of 
reforms are the Basic insurance for pensioners, the Basic insurance for the unemployed 
(SGBII), and Support for living maintenance (see appendix IX for an overview of the 
major social welfare reforms and local financial consequences). An interviewee in the 
German Federal Ministry of Finance confirms this view. The federal civil servant, 
however, highlights the different approach of the federal government: 
 
When the federal government negotiates with the Länder, safeguarding local finances is 
not a primary concern. It is the Länder, of which the local level is part of, who have the 
main responsibility to watch over local level interests.85  
 
Interviews conducted with the federal LG associations indicate that the associations try 
to stress the local financial risks attached to federal legislation, but often without much 
effect on the course of the federal legislative process.86  
The Länder appear to be natural allies of the local level – approval by the Federal 
Council is required during federal legislative processes for laws affecting state 
competences. Reconstructions made in the interviews of the legislative processes 
surrounding the social welfare reforms indicate that in practice the role of the Länder at 
the federal level is ambiguous. The primary responsibility to protect NRW’s financial 
interests at the federal level rests with NRW’s Finance Ministry. Interviewees in NRW’s 
Finance Ministry emphasise that the space to critically affect legislative processes in the 
Federal Council is often restricted for an individual state due to diverging financial 
interests among the Länder.87 Diverging interests include different conditions of LG 
finances, which are more problematic in NRW compared to the southern German states. 
The special financial position of the East German states also complicates NRW’s efforts 
to build an effective coalition within the Federal Council. As the East German Länder are 
still relying upon additional financial support from the federal level, they are often not 
eager to join a coalition aimed against federal government legislation.88  
                                                          
85 Interview German Federal Ministry of Finance, 02/05/2013. 
86 E.g. interview German Association of Counties, 26/04/2013; interview German Association of Cities 
and Communities, 29/04/2013. 
87 Interview NRW Ministry of Finance, 24/04/2013. 




 The German unification and the massive transition costs following from it has a 
direct effect on the local level in NRW. On a net base, NRW is one of the five contributing 
Länder to the federal level equalisation mechanism, and the NRW state government has 
made LG in NRW a direct financial contributor towards the state’s payment into the 
federal equalisation. An interviewee at one of NRW’s LG associations recalls the effect 
of this decision in a most illustrative way: 
 
For some LGs in NRW, the main reason of debt making is their payment towards NRW’s 
share in the federal equalisation mechanism. [-] The federal financial arrangements are 
having very direct consequences on our local public services. In practice, it works out 
like local swimming pools are being closed in NRW to reopen them in Saxony.89 
 
Inter-state financial differences hinder effective coalition-building within the Federal 
Council. However, interviews conducted within NRW’s LG associations indicate that the 
NRW state government at the time of the social welfare reforms in the early 2000s did 
not make much effort at the federal level to try to protect the financial interests of NRW 
LG at the federal level. The interviewees unanimously suggested that the party political 
similarity of the coalition at the NRW state level and at the federal government level at 
the time of decision-making on the major social reforms – both the social democratic SPD 
and the Greens – undermined NRW’s assertiveness in the Federal Council.90  
 Recent institutional changes are reducing the local financial risks posed by federal 
and state level grant funding. First, the introduction of the mentioned Connectivity 
Principle in NRW has resulted in a more careful approach of the NRW state government 
when designing local funding mechanisms. In particular, the state government changed 
its funding practices after LG associations won several cases in the NRW state court, 
which forced the state to reconsider or increase its local funding.91 Second, since the 
implementation of the Federalism Reform I in 2006, the federal government is no longer 
allowed to assign tasks directly to the local level.92 This is seen as an improvement at the 
local level, since the federal government now has to negotiate directly with the states, 
who, due to the implementation of the Connectivity Principle, are more assertive in 
defending the financial interests of the local level. Third, several measures have been 
                                                          
89 Interview NRW Association of Counties, 22/04/2013. 
90 Interview NRW Association of Counties, 22/04/2013; interview NRW Association of County-
dependent Cities and Municipalities, 22/04/2013; and interview NRW Association of Cities, 23/04/2013. 
91 E.g. the court case Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiFöG), 12 October 2012; organised by 17 county-free 
cities and 2 counties. 
92 Art. 84 Federal Basic Law, Par. 1, sentence 7. 
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taken by the federal government to relieve financial pressures at the local level. The most 
substantial reform is the re-federalisation of the ‘Basic insurance for pensioners’ from 
2012 onwards.93 Fourth, some procedural changes implemented at the federal level have 
improved the position of LG in federal policymaking processes, which might prove 
beneficial to the financial interests of the local level. Notably measures include the 
installation in 2010 of a subcommittee exclusively for LG affairs within the Federal 
parliament, and intensified procedural requirements for federal government departments 
to inform and consult LG associations on legislative proposals.94 Of the above outlined 
institutional changes, the interviewees emphasise that the Connectivity Principle has 
resulted in the most significant reduction of the financial risks attached to grant funding. 
However, from the perspective of LG interviewees, the principle has two major 
drawbacks. First, the principle sometimes intensifies instead of reduces 
intergovernmental tensions. As an interviewee at NRW’s County Association recalls: 
 
The introduction of the Connectivity Principle has led to an almost phobia among some 
of NRW’s state departments against transferring any new tasks to the local sector. They 
prefer to work with their own agencies, as they reason working with ‘the local sector is 
too much of a hassle’.95  
 
The second and most important drawback of the Connectivity Principle from the 
perspective of the local level is its exclusive application to new legislation introduced 
since 2004. Due to this, much of the social legislation introduced before 2004 lacks 
connectivity relevance. The restriction to new legislation also significantly reduces the 
amount of legislation relevant to the Connectivity Principle, as the majority of legislative 
processes concern changes to existing laws. Hence, it is uncertain if the implemented 
institutional changes will halt the debt increasing effect of grants, as demonstrated by the 





                                                          
93 For the period 2012-2020, the measure leads to an expenditure reduction of around 18.5 billion € for 
the entire German local level (Der Neue Kämmerer, 2 August 2012). 
94 See Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien (2012); section 47, par.1 determines that 
the ‘LG associations at the federal level have to be informed, if possible in an early stage, on federal 
government proposals that might affect their members’ interests’. The sentence has been included in 2011 
following recommendations by the Federal Local Government Finance Commission 
(Gemeindefinanzkommission). 
95 Interview NRW Association of Counties, 22/04/2013. 
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5.6.1.3   The Netherlands: qualitative findings on the relationship between grants and LG 
  debt 
Qualitative information on the Dutch system confirms the relationship between grants 
and debt. Historically, Dutch LGs with higher grant dependence have shown a weaker 
local financial structure, reflected by relatively high expenditure and a low level of locally 
generated revenues. Civil servants in the Dutch Interior Ministry indicate that the local 
financial effects of the main Dutch redistribution fund for general funding, the Municipal 
Fund, have improved over the years by including more and more sophisticated indicators, 
especially following the reform of the intergovernmental finance law (Fvw) in 1997.96 
Interviewees at the LG representative groups confirm the view that historical inequalities 
in local financial positions were partly caused by the redistribution mechanism.97 The 
impact of the previous redistribution system is still reflected in current LG debt positions. 
For example, the city of Gouda long experienced financial difficulties due to ground 
subsistence increasing the city’s infrastructure costs. Although the inclusion of an 
indicator for ground subsistence in the Municipal Fund has reduced the city’s financial 
problems, Gouda still has a debt level more than three times above the Dutch local 
average (debt as percentage of Gouda’s income was 91%; or 3,422 € p/c in 2012) (CBS 
statistics).  
Due to a continuous sophistication of the redistribution mechanism and an almost 
uninterrupted growth of the aggregate budget of the Dutch Municipal Fund during the 
1990s and 2000s, redistribution funding has not been a significant driver for the recent 
debt growth among Dutch LGs. The research findings of chapter 4 show that low LG 
borrowing costs and a weak intergovernmental supervision structure, in combination with 
the property bubble that presided over the Dutch housing market, constitute the main 
drivers of the recent growth of Dutch LG debt.  
 The statistical results in section 5.5 demonstrate that specific grants in the Dutch 
system do not have any significant effect on LG debt. The interviewees confirm this 
finding. The general view among both central and local government actors is that Dutch 
specific grants receive tight funding, but LGs have been able to cope with them without 
a negative structural effect on their finances. A Dutch MP, and member of the Public 
Expenditure Select Committee in the Dutch Lower House, recalls:  
 
                                                          
96 Interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 23/01/2014.  
97 Interview Dutch Association of Municipalities, 30/01/2014; interview Dutch 100,000+ Municipal 
Treasurers Association, 20/01/2014. 
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Throughout my parliamentary career, which now covers nearly twelve years, I have 
experienced a range of decentralisations, and only once did the cabinet decide to transfer 
the entire budget with the decentralisation. In all other cases, efficiency cuts were 
implemented at the minimum of 10%. However, Dutch municipalities seem to have been 
able to cope with these reductions, partly due to a continuous annual increase of the 
Municipal Fund.98 
 
The influential role of the Dutch Association of Municipalities in central government 
policymaking is significant in protecting the local level against negative financial effects 
of government grants. The Association, which is referred to by one of the interviewees as 
the second most influential lobby group after the Dutch Employers’ Federation, is often 
included by central government departments in policymaking processes and regularly 
meets with government Ministers.99  
 However, the future effectiveness of the Association in safeguarding adequate 
grant funding proves controversial among interviewees. Doubts regarding the 
Association’s performance are especially related to the decision taken in 2013 to 
decentralise several social welfare tasks to the Dutch local level, totalling 16 billion €. 
The decentralisation, which received strong support from the Association’s leadership, is 
implemented with substantial budget cuts from the original budget – ranging between 10 
to 30% – and will significantly contribute to central government’s planned budget 
savings. However, given the financial and operational risks attached to the 
decentralisations, the cuts have caused a significant amount of controversy within the 
Association of Municipalities.100   
 
5.6.2 Moderating variables in grant allocation: qualitative evidence 
The qualitative investigations aim to identify moderating political and institutional 
variables in grant allocation. For many of the interviewees, discussing political variables 
in grant allocation appeared to be a sensitive topic. In these circumstances, it was mostly 
possible to acquire information on the existence of moderating variables by formulating 
interview questions in a more indirect way.  
                                                          
98 Interview Dutch member of the House of Representatives, and member of the Finance Select 
Committee, and Public Expenditure Select Committee, 23/01/2014.  
99 F.e. together with the other subnational associations, the Dutch Association of Municipalities meets at 
least twice a year with the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance in what is referred to as the 
Meeting of Government Layers (Overhedenoverleg). 
100 One civil servant at the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations phrased this as follows: 
‘We are holding the VNG [Association of Dutch Municipalities, DW] in the air’. Interview Dutch 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, interview B, 23/01/2014.   
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5.6.2.1   England: moderating variables in grant allocation 
Qualitative findings on the English system confirm the presence of political influence on 
total and specific grant allocation. A 2011 investigation on formula funding by the House 
of Commons’ Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) indicates that nearly 20% of local 
authorities in 2011-12 received funding allocations which differed by more than 10% 
from their calculated grant allocation. One LG, Wokingham, received double its 
calculated funding needs (increase of 98.6%), while Christchurch experienced the largest 
reduction (25.6%).101 The difference between calculated and final grant allocation can 
largely be explained by government Ministers’ judgement as to the reasonableness of the 
rate of change in grant funding from year to year. However, the motivations behind the 
changes remain largely unarticulated. 
With respect to DCLG’s Formula Grant the CPA concludes that ‘it is virtually 
impossible to follow the link between calculated needs and funding allocations’ (HoC 
CPA 2011, p. 5). This view is widely spread among English interviewees, indicated by 
phrases such as ‘No-one any longer understands where the number [the grant allocation, 
DW] comes from’. Other terms used to describe the redistribution system are ‘broken’ 
and ‘utterly complex’. 102 Some English interviewees offered a more positive evaluation 
of the system since the introduction of the Business Rates Retention reform, mainly 
because the reform strengthened their authority’s financial position. However, these 
interviewees also indicate that in contrast to the reform’s stated objective, Business Rates 
Retention has not led to a more transparent local finance system.103  
The complexity of the English system of LG finance reduces its transparency and 
makes it difficult to determine the extent to which political variables affect grant 
allocations. Political influence mostly occurs through the discretionary freedom that 
Ministers have regarding Formula Grant allocations (step 4 in table 5.1). Formally, this 
responsibility rests with the Secretary of State of Local Government, but it is often used 
following inter-departmental coordination. Interviewees representing LGs and LG 
associations generally regard the extent to which Ministers use their discretionary space 
as substantial and Whitehall actors indicate that political considerations play a prominent 
role in case of grant adjustments. A civil servant at the Treasury indicates this when 
stating: 
 
                                                          
101 Written evidence from the Permanent Secretary of DCLG, included in: House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts (2011) p.19. 
102 Interview Society of London Treasurers, 07/02/2014; interview SIGOMA 07/01/2013. 
103 Interview Society of District Council Treasurers, 04/02/2013. 
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Based upon DCLG information, the Treasury develops alternative proposals mostly 
focused on whether Ministers prefer policies with more or less redistributive 
consequences. Generally, Ministers choose to make some adjustments based upon these 
proposals. For example, the current Chief Secretary of the Treasury, who’s a Liberal 
Democrat, tends to be quite concerned about the distributional consequences of 
government policies, especially regarding places that would have most difficulties in 
generating growth.104 
 
Political influence in the English system is further stimulated by the absence of an 
independent advisory commission on LG grant funding. There are intergovernmental 
working groups around formula grant funding, e.g. the annual Local Government Finance 
Settlements, which include members from different LG and local treasury associations. 
Interviewees, who personally participated in these working groups, indicate that the main 
function of the working groups is to generate feedback from the local level on the 
technical aspects surrounding formula funding, with very limited involvement of the local 
level on more fundamental financial and institutional design questions. In addition, the 
working groups meet irregularly and lack organisational resources.105 
Interview information indicates that in the English system, direct contacts with 
central government Ministers are more relevant to influence LG funding than 
administrative Whitehall working groups. Party political symmetry helps significantly in 
getting access to government Ministers. The chairman of a large LG group within the 
LGA, who shares his party background with the incumbent government, recalls: 
 
Having Conservative Ministers in DCLG helps us a lot as a subgroup within the LGA in 
getting access to the Department, and is beneficial for Ministers’ willingness to take our 
requests into account in policy processes.106 
 
An interview at the LG group SIGOMA confirms the importance of party political 
symmetry in intergovernmental interactions. The interviewee indicates that his 
association had more lobbying success with central government under the previous 
Labour government, partly because the majority of SIGOMA members are urban 
authorities based in the Midlands and north of England, where most of Labour’s electoral 
base can be found.107 
                                                          
104 Interview HM Treasury, 11/02/2013.  
105 Several interviews, e.g. Society of London Treasurers, 07/02/2014; and House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts (2011), p. 19. 
106 Interview District Councils’ Network, 10/01/2014. 
107 Interview SIGOMA, 07/01/2013. 
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 The indicators used in the Formula Grant distribution do not seem to (strongly) 
favour a particular type of LG or geographical region. This is confirmed by elements of 
the Formula Grant system being criticised across the English LG sector, including LGs 
of the London region represented in London Councils.108 The system shows capacity to 
adapt to changing spending needs of different types of LGs, such as an additional 
efficiency support grant for ‘super sparse areas’ in place since 2014 (DCLG, 2014).   
 In sum, the qualitative findings indicate an influential role for party political 
dynamics in the English system. The complexity of the system, and especially the lack of 
transparency surrounding Minister’s use of their discretionary space, complicates the 
identification of clear-cut partisan factors in grant allocation processes. Many of the 
interviewees assume political influence, but given the complexity of the system are unable 
to provide evidence. The statistical findings do demonstrate that the substantial scope for 
discretionary decision-making in the English formula system is used not only to stabilise 
grant allocations but also to favour councils that show party political symmetry with 
central government.   
 
5.6.2.2   NRW: moderating variables in grant allocation 
Qualitative findings on the NRW system provide mixed results for the presence of 
political and interest group variables in grant allocation. Interviewees highlight that due 
to the straightforward calculation of grants in NRW’s main general grant mechanism, 
partisan influence would be easily detectable. Due to its simple design, local officers are 
able to calculate their forthcoming grant allocation once the total funding amount is 
known, and as such the system generates high certainty. Other features of the NRW 
system also make party political steering of grants more difficult. Most relevant are a 
tradition of multiparty governments at the NRW state level, which prevents a single party 
from having complete control over the executive, and an influential state court that 
regularly reviews whether grants are distributed objectively and in line with the 
constitution. In addition, due to the stable and small number of indicators used in the 
NRW’s redistribution mechanism, differences in local administrative capacity are 
unlikely to affect general grant allocation. In contrast to interest representation at the level 
                                                          
108 According to an interviewee at London Councils (21/12/2012), London LGs have strong criticisms 
with the redistribution system, even though outside the London area ‘the impression sometimes exists that 
as a result of the redistribution system London streets are paved with gold’. Criticisms by London 
boroughs are diverse, but focus on the accuracy of the census data. 
168 
 
of individual LGs, LG interest representation at an associational level has a significant 
impact on the design of NRW’s general redistribution mechanism.   
The influence of the associations is reflected in the indicators used in NRW’s 
general grant formula. The main indicator in the formula is population size, which as 
indicated in section 5.3.4, is used as a grading system, whereby the funding amount per 
inhabitant increases in case of a rising population. Ever since its implementation in the 
1980s, the population size classification system (Verstaffelung) has received strong 
support from NRW’s Association of Cities and strong criticism from the other 
associations. 
An interviewee at the NRW Association of Cities and Municipalities (22/04/2013) 
states: ‘How can a resident in a rural area be worth less funding than someone living in 
a large city?’ This view was also brought forward by NRW’s Association of Counties. 
The huge division within NRW’s LG community about the population indicator leaves 
the NRW Interior Ministry in a difficult position. Partly to compensate for criticisms on 
the population indicator, the NRW Interior Ministry decided in 2012 to approve a request 
by the NRW Association of Counties and the NRW Association of Cities and 
Municipalities to include an area size indicator, which should compensate rural LGs for 
their assumed higher costs in providing public services. The inclusion of the area size 
indicator was strongly criticised by interviewees at NRW’s Association of Cities 
(23/04/2013), especially for the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the higher costs 
of public service provision in large area size LGs.109 
 Although interest representation affects the design of NRW’s redistribution 
mechanism, it has not resulted in an equalisation system that consistently favours a 
particular type of LG or geographical area.110 The NRW Interior Ministry is an important 
actor in keeping the general redistribution mechanism relatively simple and stable in its 
design. Avoiding inter-local tensions is also one of the drivers behind the Ministry’s 
approach. A leading civil servant in the NRW Interior Ministry recalls: 
 
                                                          
109 One argument brought forward against the area size indicator is that in case rural LGs have 
concentrated city centres, their costs of public service provision would not be significantly different from 
other types of LGs. Instead of including an area size indicator, detailed indicators would be required, such 
as regarding the total length of municipal roads. Interview Association of Cities in NRW, 23/04/2013. 
110 Possibly, the small number of specific capital investment grants can be mentioned that are being 
allocated in NRW for over a decade to LGs with spa bath facilities, and those having a military base. 
Notwithstanding the effective lobby of NRW LGs that profit from the grant to continue with their 
funding, the quantitative financial meaning of the grants is limited. Hence, the funding does not result in a 
substantial systematic bias in NRW’s general redistribution system.  
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Discussions on the general funding system do only have losers. Those who see their 
position improved, will not be openly grateful, whereas municipalities that experience a 
reduction in their allocation will not get tired pointing out the unfairness of the reform.111 
 
The transparency and relative simplicity of NRW’s general funding mechanism virtually 
eliminates the chance for individual LGs to manipulate their grant allocation. However, 
this does not mean that local funding in NRW is free of moderating institutional and 
political variables. Qualitative information indicates that scope exists for LGs to affect 
their allocation of specific grants. A professional and good-sized local administration is 
beneficial for having access to the NRW state departments. This also relates to the funding 
methods used to provide specific grants. Both the NRW and federal government 
departments frequently use matching and start-up funding methods 
(Anschubfinanzierung), via which LGs compete for specific grants and their allocation is 
decided, amongst others, on the basis of the quality of submitted proposals. Having a 
sizeable and professional staff significantly increases successes in attracting these often 
temporary, specific grants. Interviewees indicate that the prospect of matching funding 
often has a decisive impact on spending decisions by German LGs.112 
Political variables also affect the allocation of specific grants. Qualitative data 
points at the relevance of intergovernmental networks and negotiation strength. The 
democratic mandate of NRW mayors, in combination with their role as head of the local 
administration, improves access of mayors to the state departments. Intergovernmental 
symmetry in the party political colour of local leaders and the incumbent state government 
further improves the mayor’s access to state departments. Although there are no 
indications of direct party driven pork barrel politics, interviewees indicate that local 
political leaders that are politically aligned to one of the state level government parties 
seem to be better and faster informed on the funding opportunities available.113 In general, 
the NRW Interior Ministry aims to realise equal funding arrangements across the LG 
sector. However, the role of the Interior Ministry is marginal in the allocation of specific 
grants as it allocates less than 5% of NRW’s specific grants, with the rest being provided 
by federal and counter state-level departments.114 Negotiation authority and party 
political symmetry are crucial elements that contribute to attracting grants. While the 
                                                          
111 Interview NRW Ministry of the Interior, 24/04/2014. 
112 Interview Finance Committee of the Association of Cities in NRW, 10/07/2013; interview Finance 
Committee of the German Association of Cities, 10/07/2013. 
113 E.g. interviews NRW Finance Ministry, interviewee A, 24/04/2013; and interview Association of 
Cities in Rhineland-Palatinate 09/07/2013. 
114 Source Landtag NRW, Drucksache 16/5097, 19 February 2014. 
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allocation of specific grants formally mostly depends on external factors, such as the 
length of existing roads where infrastructure funding is concerned, previous studies 
confirm that the actual amount of funding acquired is often a matter of intense bargaining 
between government levels (e.g. Garlichs, 1980; Kemmerling & Stephan, 2002).  
 
5.6.2.3   The Netherlands: moderating variables in grant allocation 
The quantitative empirical investigations in section 5.5 demonstrate that specific grants 
do not significantly affect Dutch LG debt. However, the variable mayor proved 
significant throughout the estimations and exerted a debt reducing effect as part of the 
interaction term mayorsym*totalgrants and mayorsym*specificgrants. The qualitative 
investigations provide support for an effect of local political leaders on LG grant 
allocation. 
 According to the majority of interviewees, the clearest indication of political 
influence in the Dutch redistribution system is the indicator included in the Dutch 
Municipal Fund for the biggest four Dutch LGs – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, 
and Utrecht. The cities work closely together in the G-4, a Dutch acronym for grote-4, or 
big 4. Lobbying activities from the G-4 in the early 1990s resulted in the inclusion of an 
additional fixed amount of funding for each of the cities in the Municipal Fund. The 
biggest supplement of approx. 190 million € in 2012 was awarded to Amsterdam as the 
most populous city, and the smallest supplement – approx. 45 million € in 2012 – to 
Utrecht as the least populous city of the G-4 (BZK, 2012).  
Ever since its inclusion, the G-4 indicator has been highly controversial. An 
interviewee at G-4 member city Rotterdam defends the indicator by referring to the 
additional tasks G-4 cities carry out on behalf of central government, especially in the 
area of culture and social expenditure.115 A civil servant at the Dutch Interior Ministry 
confirms that the additional tasks of the G-4 initially motivated the inclusion of a special 
G-4 indicator, but that due to changed funding arrangements this argument no longer 
holds. Despite its reduced justification, the indicator has continued in the Municipal Fund, 
which seems to have set the G-4 cities further apart from the rest of the Dutch LG sector. 
This was indicated in interviews at other Dutch LG groups by phrases such as ‘the G-4 
does not really feel part of the Dutch local government community’, and ‘the G-4 has too 
much influence’.116  
                                                          
115 Interview G4 city Rotterdam, 29/01/2014.  
116 Interview G-32, 20/01/2014; and interview P10, 24/01/2014.   
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 With the G-4 indicator increasingly criticised, the Ministry of the Interior 
attempted to discontinue the indicator during its 2013-14 review of the Municipal Fund. 
However, interviewees in the Interior Ministry indicate that this proved less simple than 
expected following fierce resistance by the G-4. The lobby of the G-4 with central 
government proved successful, which several interviewees explain by referring to the 
short communication lines of G-4 local political leaders to Dutch cabinet members.117 In 
the post-2014 structure of the Dutch Municipal Fund, the fixed amount for the G-4 cities 
continues to exist but is no longer visible as a separate indicator. Instead, the amount is 
spread across multiple adjusted formula indicators, which is almost similar to their 
previous fixed funding amounts.118 The interviewee at the Dutch Advisory Council for 
Intergovernmental Financial Relations reflects on the G-4 funding amounts as follows:   
 
It is unclear to what extent the real costs of the G-4 cities have been taken into account 
when the decision was made to continue their additional funding. It is very coincidental 
that their future funding is allocated through adjusted indicators on which almost only the 
G-4 cities score. Our council cannot help thinking that the indicators have been designed 
towards a preferred outcome.119 
 
Although the G-4 indicator is a notable illustration of political influence on the Dutch 
grant system, it is the only non-objectified indicator in the Dutch Municipal Fund. Many 
other indicators have been included over the years in the Municipal Fund to accommodate 
specific local requests, hence why it ended up with 60+ indicators, but they all have an 
objectified base. As such, and with the exception of the G-4 indicator, the Dutch 
Municipal Fund is not biased in its funding towards particular groups of LGs.  
Similar to the NRW system, dynamics are different in the allocation of specific 
grants. Qualitative data indicates that Dutch local political leaders are increasingly 
important to the position of LGs. Dutch mayors have received more policy 
responsibilities (e.g. in the safety domain), and increasingly cooperate with higher 
government levels following a trend of scaling up of service provision.120 Due to these 
developments, the party political profile of Dutch mayors has grown stronger over the 
past decade (cf. Karsten et al., 2014).  
 
                                                          
117 E.g. interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 23/01/2014; interview G-32, 
20/01/2014; and interview P10, 24/01/2014.   
118 The original total fixed amount for the G-4 was 600 million € p/a, which, in the revised funding 
method will, be around 40 million € p/a less (Bekkers, 2014). 
119 Interview Financial Relations Council, 21/01/2014; and consultation response Municipal Fund, by the 
Financial Relations Council/Rfv (2014).   
120 Interview Dutch 100,000+ Municipal Treasurers Association, 20/01/2014. 
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In conclusion, the qualitative findings provide strong support and help to understand the 
quantitative results in all three systems. Table 5.11 presents a summary of the findings. 
 
Table 5.11 Summary qualitative and quantitative findings grant funding systems 
  England NRW Netherlands 
Total grants Relationship 
with debt: 


















 Staff capacity: No effect No effect No effect 
Specific grants Relationship 
with  debt: 













of specific grants 
 
 Staff capacity: Reduces debt 
enhancing effect 
of specific grants 
Reduces debt 
enhancing effect 




5.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter investigates the relationship between grants and LG debt, and the existence 
of a moderating effect of party political and interest representation variables. A major 
shortcoming identified in the political economy literature on grant allocations is the bias 
towards FPP electoral systems. Hence, hypotheses have been formulated suitable to the 
diverse electoral systems present in the European context.  
Hypothesis 5 concentrates on the positive relationship between grants and LG 
debt. Strong empirical support for this hypothesis is found across the systems. Cuts in 
English specific transfers increase the interactivity between grants and English LG debt. 
English LGs facing the largest spending reductions since 2010 have shown an above 
average increase in LG debt. Research findings of chapter 4 indicate that English LG debt 
is weakly monitored as central government supervision concentrates on the use of 
aggregate instead of micro level LG data. Due to the reduction of specific grants and a 
decrease by half of the central level redistribution of the business rates from 2014 
onwards, heterogeneity in LG financial stress levels has increased in the English system. 
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Growing financial divergence provides a strong reason to improve the monitoring and 
forecasting of the effects of central government grant changes on English LG finances.  
The relationship between grants and LG debt in the Dutch system has changed 
over the past two decades, and the original debt increasing effect of the Dutch grant 
system has evaporated due to the continuous sophistication of its design. Quantitative and 
qualitative evidence demonstrates that the positive relationship between grants and LG 
debt is strongest in NRW. High expenditure on social welfare arrangements can be 
identified as the main driver behind local debt accumulation in NRW. From the three 
European systems included in this study, the funding adequacy of tasks delegated by 
higher government levels to the local level turned out to be most prominent in interviews 
conducted in the German/NRW system. All three selected European systems show a 
strong connection between local finances and macroeconomic trends. The institutional 
standing of the Dutch system delays the impact of central government cuts most strongly, 
whereas central government cuts affect the local level fastest in the English system.  
Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 focus on the impact of a moderating effect on the 
relationship between grants and LG debt following party political symmetry between the 
grant provider and local government. A significant negative moderating effect on the 
grant-debt relationship is exerted by party political symmetry. This confirms the core 
voter hypothesis and demonstrates that political symmetry between political actors at the 
local and central level reduces the financial risks posed by grants on the local debt 
position. The relevant actors for partisan effects differ across the systems.  
In the Dutch and NRW systems, the main party political actor is the mayor. The 
moderating effect is significant and in the expected direction for both aggregate and 
specific grants, and is confirmed in robustness tests using different measurements of the 
dependent variable. Subsequently, party political symmetry between mayors and grant 
providing governments increases the latter’s successes in channelling resources to their 
local authority.  
 Local administrative capacity has no significant moderating effect when using 
aggregate grant figures as regressor. The size of the local administration, however, 
moderates the debt-grant relationship in case of specific grants. Confirming hypothesis 8, 
the interaction term staffcapacity*specificgrants is significantly and negatively related to 
LG debt in each of the systems. Hence, a bigger local administration either increases the 




 Triangulation was conducted in the second part of the chapter. The qualitative 
data support the quantitative findings on the moderating effects. In addition, they help to 
clarify the institutional interpretation of the statistical results. English results demonstrate 
that the calculation of the Formula grant, as the main general grant in the English system, 
proceeds in a technically complex manner but is not overly biased in its design to specific 
types of LGs or geographical areas. However, despite the neutral technical appearance of 
the system, there are substantial differences in the English system between calculated 
versus allocated grants due to Ministerial discretion. Party political factors are one reason 
why Ministers diverge from calculated grant figures.  
The transparent design of the redistribution mechanism used in NRW for general 
funding, with no discretionary freedom for Ministers in the allocation process of general 
grants, eliminates the chance of partisan factors affecting general grant allocation, and 
leads to high certainty regarding the expected grant allocation. Instead, most discussions 
in NRW concentrate on the institutional design of the general grant mechanism at an 
institutional level, and changes are mainly an outcome of interaction between LG 
associations and the NRW state apparatus. Hence, it is interest group variables that 
dominate policymaking regarding the general grant funding mechanism in NRW, instead 
of party political variables. However, party political variables are not absent in NRW as 
scope exists for partisan dynamics in the allocation of specific grants. Similar to the Dutch 
case, local political leaders are influential actors who play an important role in the 
intergovernmental allocation of specific grants.  
In conclusion, this chapter has identified some preliminary evidence about the 
impact of intergovernmental institutional factors on the relationship between LG debt and 
grant funding. Following the focus on regulations and borrowing costs in chapter 4, and 












CHAPTER 6  
 
Local fiscal responses to financial 




Fiscal federalism theory argues that an increase in the share of local income generated via 
local taxes is beneficial to local fiscal behaviour (Oates, 1972). According to the theory, 
a large local tax space incentivises local tax paying citizens to carefully scrutinize the 
financial decisions made by local politicians, which in turn increases the allocative 
efficiency of local financial decision-making. Influenced by fiscal federalism theories, a 
strong preference is articulated in many government systems to prioritise local taxation 
in favour of other revenue sources. In practice, local taxation is often one of the smaller 
local income sources, but a large spread in local tax space can be observed. Measured as 
a percentage of total national tax revenues, local taxes range from 0.8% in Greece to 
35.6% in Denmark. Grants provide the majority of funding for most LGs across the 
OECD (OECD, 2012).  
Despite the quantitative dominance of grants, local tax revenues are a vital local 
income source even when providing a relatively small contribution to the overall local 
budget. First, local taxes offer larger discretion to local decision-makers compared to 
other local income sources, such as grants and fees. Second, the less equalising the grant 
system, the more relevant it is for the local financial position to optimise local tax space. 
Local tax space refers to the taxes LGs are allowed to levy, including their discretionary 
competences regarding rate setting. Tax capacity refers to the amount of taxes a local 
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authority would be able to levy if it would optimise its tax space (e.g. Ter-Minassian, 
1997).  
The chapter concentrates on how the nature of local tax space impacts the fiscal 
response of LGs to local financial stress. The main question investigated is whether LGs 
in each of the systems respond to financial stress by increasing their tax rates. The analysis 
demonstrates to what extent local tax space contributes to the error correction capacity of 
different IGR financial systems. It also sheds light on the question to what extent local 
financial stress is (partly) caused by fiscal decision-making at the local level. In addition, 
the chapter tests to what extent theories of local tax space that have mainly been 
developed in the US can be applied within the European context. As such, the chapter 
improves our understanding of IGR financial structures and it adds important empirical 
evidence to the literature. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. The chapter starts by shortly recapitulating 
the hypotheses developed in chapter 2. The subsequent section describes the institutional 
features of local tax structures in the three selected systems. Section 6.4 provides a 
description of the dataset and presents the model. The empirical results are discussed in 
section 6.5, including estimation results by country system. Qualitative material is used 
to triangulate the quantitative research findings in section 6.6. The last section concludes 
the chapter.  
 
6.2 Hypotheses 
The literature review in section 2.3.3 introduces four hypotheses to investigate the 
relationship between local tax effort and LG financial stress. This section shortly 
recapitulates those hypotheses.  
First, previous research suggests that financial stress, as indicated by higher debt 
service or a reduction in LG income p/c, increases local tax rates (Buettner, 2001; 
Leprince et al., 2007). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 9: LG debt is positively related to LG tax rates. 
 
The literature provides several indications that local tax effort might also be affected by 
the types of spending in which LGs are involved, with different effects for expenditure 
on local staff versus capital investment (Hendrick, 2011; Wolman, 1983). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 10: LG tax rates are positively related to LG staff expenditure, 




The US literature indicates that Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) incentivise 
revenue shifting strategies from taxation to nontax revenues (Joyce & Mullins, 1991; 
Shadbegian, 1999). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 11: stringent intergovernmental tax limitations are positively related 
with a replacement effect of LG tax revenues by nontax revenues. 
 
Another finding in the TEL literature is that the effects of tax limitations are not uniform 
across localities, with the effect of TELs more constraining on small LGs. In the absence 
of TELs and in case of increasing LG financial stress, small LGs are likely to have the 
strongest incentive to increase taxes (Brown, 2000). The exact form of the tax 
replacement effect will be affected by the financial and political features of the 
intergovernmental structure in place. Tax limitations in more centralised 
intergovernmental systems are more likely to be replaced by increased grant funding. In 
intergovernmental systems that are less vertically integrated, LG associations will have 
less access to their grant provider, reducing the likelihood of a revenue shift from taxation 
towards grant funding (Blom-Hansen et al., 2014). Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 12: an increase of the level of centralisation is positively related to a 
 replacement effect of LG taxes by grant funding.    
 
Within the selected constitutional systems, it can be expected that the strongly vertically 
integrated English intergovernmental structure will be subjected to a significant tax 
replacement effect by grant funding. In contrast to England, no upper limitations on local 
taxes are in place in NRW. Hence, it can be expected that in NRW taxes are more 
intensively used to offset budgetary imbalances, when compared to local strategies aimed 
at increasing funding from higher level grant providers. The next section provides more 
background information on the institutional differences of LG fiscal structures in the 
selected European cases. 
 
6.3 Main fiscal structures 
Local tax space shows large differences between the three systems. Figure 6.1 shows the 
average share of taxes as part of a locality’s total income. With taxation constituting over 
50% of local income, the average German LG has a significantly larger income share 
deriving from taxes compared to Dutch and English LGs. However, on average only 
around 25% of the revenues of German LGs are own taxes, whereas the remaining taxes 
are shared between the local, Länder, and federal level. The share of the local level in the 
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shared taxes is set for multiple years and is primarily a result of negotiations between the 
federal government and the Länder. Own taxes at the German local level are made up of 
the tax on business profits (Gewerbesteuer) and two property taxes.  
 
Figure 6.1  Breakdown of LG government revenues  
 
Source: own illustration, based upon data from Dexia (2008). 
 
Tax revenues of Dutch LGs are not shared between government levels, and as 
such can be classified as own source taxes. In international comparisons, the English 
National Non Domestic Rates (NNDR) is officially labelled a shared tax (e.g. OECD 
2012). It is a tax on non-domestic property collected by LGs, who are funded by the tax 
after it has been pooled nationally. Due to the central redistribution and the fact that rate 
setting powers of the NNDR solely rest with central government, NNDR has functioned 
in practice more as a government grant than a shared tax (Potter, 1997, p. 347). The 
implementation of the business rates retention reform in 2013 has transformed NNDR 
into more of a shared tax as it localised up to 50% of the business rates growth. However, 
due to the recent implementation of the business rates reform, the financial consequences 
of the reform are not reflected in the statistics used in this chapter, hence, the reformed 
English NNDR system will not be further discussed here.  
To allow cross-country comparisons of LG tax responses, the chapter focuses on 
taxes that LGs can influence and therefore excludes the shared German taxes and the 
English NNDR. Even with the limitation to own source taxes, the Dutch, English and 
German systems show substantial differences regarding the extent to which local taxes 
can be genuinely locally determined. 
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6.3.1 Germany/NRW: local fiscal structure  
Similar to the rest of Germany, the business tax constitutes the largest own local tax 
source in NRW. The tax is levied over the profits of local businesses. The importance of 
the business tax as an autonomous income source for German LGs has declined in recent 
decades. The largest reform affecting the business tax was implemented in 1969, when, 
in exchange for a local share in the federal income tax, German LGs were obliged to 
transfer a percentage of the business tax to the federal level and the Länder governments. 
This reform reduced the share of the business tax in total local tax income from over 80% 
before 1969 to around 45% after the reform. The introduction of the business tax transfer 
and the inclusion of the local level in the federally set income tax reduced German local 
tax autonomy, but also reduced volatility and inter-local divergence in local tax revenues 
(Henneke, 2012b). 
Additional reforms on the German local business tax were implemented after the 
reform of 1969. Local level interests generally played a minor role in these reforms. 
Originally, the local business tax rested on three pillars: a tax on business profit, a tax on 
business capital and an optional local payroll tax. A reform in 1980 abandoned the payroll 
tax, while the business capital tax was removed in 1998. In addition, over the years an 
increasing number of businesses have received exemptions from the business tax via 
federal legislation, such as the independent professions. This means that today the 
German local business tax only applies to specific categories of mid- and large size 
enterprises. The federal level reforms have considerably narrowed down the tax base of 
the local business tax and have increased its already high volatility. Table 6.1 illustrates 
that at present, the business tax constitutes around 35% of German local tax income on 
average. However, there is a large spread with, in NRW, the smallest contribution of the 
business tax to by the state calculated local income needs being only 1.5% 
(Gelsenkirchen), versus a maximum of 128.0% (Krefeld) (IT.NRW 2012).  
The second largest German local own tax source is property taxation. Property 
taxation is divided into a Property Tax A on agricultural land, and a Property Tax B on 
non-agricultural land. Both property taxes allow for local rate setting. The financial 
relevance of the two property taxes is highly unequal, with the Property Tax B generating 
around 90% of all revenues deriving from property taxation (see for further details 
appendix X). Besides the business and property taxes, German LGs are allowed to 
introduce additional taxes. This opportunity is widely used in NRW, especially in 
financially stressed LGs. Several new taxes have been introduced in recent years, 
including creative taxes such as a ‘tax for offering sexual services for financial reward’, 
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first introduced in NRW by Cologne in 2004. The actual financial contribution of these 
additional taxes is highly limited: they contribute less than one per cent to the budget of 
German LGs, and for some taxes the collection costs outnumber tax revenues (Destatis 
2012; Henneke, 2012b, p. 146). The German system further discourages the 
implementation of new taxes – this is because new taxes are frequently contested in court 
procedures, which further increases their implementation costs and regularly leads to 
cancellation altogether.  
 
6.3.2 England: fiscal structure 
Local taxes in England focus on the taxation of property. There have been regular 
discussions about broadening the tax base of English LGs, e.g. by creating a local income 
tax (e.g. HoC-PCRC, 2012; Layfield Committee, 1976). However, in practice the taxation 
of property has continued to be the only own tax source for English LGs. While the origins 
of the English local property tax go back to the Poor Law Act of 1601, the current council 
tax system was introduced in 1990, replacing the disastrously failed implementation of 
the Community Charge, better known as the poll tax (for a history, see: Butler et al., 
1994). The council tax is calculated as follows: each of the levying authorities sets a 
precept (total amount) to be collected from households in their area. This amount is then 
divided by the number of properties of a certain property value within their area – referred 
to as Band D –, which provides the average Band D council tax amount. There are eight 
valuation bands in total, all derived upon the calculated Band D amount for the area. As 
the implementation of property revaluations has proven politically sensitive in England, 
the assumed capital values being used to calculate council tax are still based upon 1991 
values, including newly constructed properties that are assigned a nominal 1991 value 
(Keep, 2013). English LGs lack the competence to introduce new taxes, but some of their 
charges provide a relevant revenue source that provides them with some spending 
discretion. An example is parking charges, which added around 714 million £ to the 
budget of English LGs in 2012. Although income from parking charges has increased in 
recent years, it only constitutes around 6% of the total income of English LGs from the 
income category sales, fees and charges (which was 11.1 billion £ in 2012) (DCLG/ONS, 
2013).   
 
6.3.3 The Netherlands: fiscal structure 
Similar to England, property taxation is the main source of local tax revenues in the Dutch 
system. The Dutch property tax was introduced in 1971 (Wassenaar & Verhagen, 2006, 
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p. 166), and over 90% of Dutch local tax revenues derive from this source (CBS). As a 
property tax, it is levied in three different ways: a tax for owners of residential houses, a 
tax for owners of non-residential houses, and a tax for renters of non-residential houses. 
A fourth pillar of the property tax, which contained a tax on renters of residential houses, 
was abandoned by central government in 2005. The three remaining property taxes 
represent around 8% of the total income of Dutch LGs (CBS, 2012). The capital base of 
the Dutch property tax is revaluated annually.  
 Similar to the German/NRW system, Dutch LGs have the powers to raise a range 
of additional taxes, such as tourist, advertising, and dog taxes. However, whereas German 
LGs are allowed to introduce new taxes, Dutch LGs can only implement additional taxes 
from a range of previously agreed taxes. In 2012, 984 million € was raised via these taxes, 
with the majority (617 million €) deriving from parking taxes. Although there has been 
an increase in recent years, the additional taxes still contribute only marginally to the 
budget of Dutch LGs – on average 1.9% in 2012 (CBS).  
 
A comparative overview of indicators is provided in table 6.1. The indicators confirm that 
while subnational taxes – measured as a share of total public sector tax revenues – are 
most substantial in Germany, only 25% of these taxes are truly autonomous, whereas the 
others offer limited discretion to LGs.  
 
Table 6.1 Comparative indicators of local tax space (2005) 
 





taxes in % GDP 
Autonomous 
tax revenues in 




local tax in % 
total local 
revenues 
England 6 2 15 15 
Germany/NRW 9 3 25 15 
Netherlands 3 1.8 10 8 
 
Source: Campos & Vammalle (2011, p. 99) and DCLG. 
 
 
 6.4 Statistical analysis local tax rates – data and model 
This chapter relies on some of the statistics used in chapters 4 and 5. Several variables, 
however, are added to the dataset in order to identify the impact of institutional, socio-
demographic and treasury variables on local rate setting. The added variable taxrate is 
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most important; it is the main dependent variable and indicates local tax effort, expressed 
by the tax rate set by LGs. Given their large contribution to overall own source local tax 
revenues (see section 6.3), the focus is on the main local tax source in each system. This 
is Band D council tax in England, the business tax in NRW, and the OZB residential tax 
in the Netherlands. 
In addition, institutional variables are added to test the political economy 
explanations provided in the literature. First, ideology is added to identify the impact of 
political ideology on local fiscal decision-making. The variable is measured as a dummy 
variable; with 1 indicating councils with a left-wing political majority, and 0 in case of a 
right-wing council or no overall majority. In line with the hypotheses in the literature (e.g. 
Allers et al., 2001) , the data is used to test whether, in order to finance an assumed higher 
level of public service provision, left-wing councils set a higher tax burden compared to 
non-left-wing councils. Most local political parties in each of the three systems have a 
clear left- or right-wing signature, and are treated accordingly.  
Given the large number of local political parties in Dutch and NRW LGs, 
additional information has been collected by visiting the websites of the respective 
political parties and verifying their fiscal policy stance. In case it proved impossible to 
identify a clear ideological profile, the LG council has been treated as no-overall-majority 
and coded 0. Another political variable added to the dataset is election, which indicates 
the number of years until the local election, with 4 indicating four years up to the 
elections, descending to 0, indicating the actual election year. Time series data on the 
number of parties participating in local executives proved unavailable for the Dutch case; 
hence the weak government hypothesis will not be tested. 
It has been possible via the respective government departments and statistical 
offices to collect the tax rates set by most English and NRW LGs during the period 2005-
2012. For England, these data encompass 353 LGs, constituting the majority of English 
LGs with rate setting power. Rates of the three main local taxes used in NRW have been 
collected for all NRW LGs with rate setting power; i.e. the county-free cities and county-
dependent LGs. Since the counties in NRW have virtually no own tax space, and instead 
strongly rely upon transfers from their lower tier, the statistical data referring to NRW 
excludes the counties. The Dutch national statistical office (CBS) does not collect local 
tax rate data. It has been possible, nonetheless, to collect Dutch LG tax rate statistics in 
an alternative way, through data collected by an independent Dutch public data collector 
(Cijfernieuws.nl). From this source, tax rates are available for the period since 2007 and 
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Table 6.2 Variable names pooled dataset Dutch, English and NRW LGs (2007-12) 
 
 
cover 293 Dutch LGs, located in 11 out of the 12 Dutch provinces. Given the time span 
of the Dutch data, the pooled dataset covers a six year period (2007-2012) and contains 
1,030 LGs in total. To allow for comparison, most variables have been calculated on a 
per capita base. Further information on the sources of the variables used in the dataset is 
provided in table 6.2.  
 
Model specification 
The main dependent variable used in the regressions is the tax rate set for the main own 
local tax source.  
 
The following statistical model has been formulated to identify the determinants of local 




Variable Measurement Source 




taxrate Natural log of rate main own local tax source 
(England: Band D council tax; NRW: business 
tax; the Netherlands: OZB) 
DCLG IT.NRW Cijfernieuws 
debt Natural log of total debt p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
income Natural log of total income p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
totalgrants Natural log of total grants p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 
feesincome Natural log of income p/c deriving from fees 
and user charges 
   
capitalexpenditure Natural log of capital investment expenditure 
p/c 
DCLG  IT.NRW CBS 
staffexpenditure Natural log of staff expenditure p/c DCLG IT.NRW CBS 










election Time to election: 4 is four years etc., 0 is 









density Natural log of inhabitants per square km ONS IT.NRW CBS 
oldinhabitants Natural log of the number of inhabitants age 65 
and older 
ONS IT.NRW CBS 
younginhabitants Natural log of the number of inhabitants age 18 
and younger 
ONS IT.NRW CBS 
unemployed Unemployed  inhabitants as % total local 
population   




𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
 + 𝛽5(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽6(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) +  𝛽7(𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦)       
              + 𝛽8(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽9(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽10(𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)     
              + 𝛽11(𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽12(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑) +𝜀𝑖  
 
Where  
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the log of the rate of the main local tax.  
debt is the log of total debt size p/c. 
income is the log of total income p/c. 
totalgrants is the log of total grants p/c. 
feesincome is the log of income p/c deriving from fees and user charges. 
capitalexpenditure is the log of total expenditure on capital investments p/c. 
staffexpenditure is the log of expenditure on administrative staff p/c.  
ideology is the political colour of the local council, on a left-right scale using a dummy. 
election is the time to the election (4 is four years etc., 0 is election year).  
density is the log of inhabitants per square km. 
oldinhabitants is the log of the number of inhabitants age 65 and older. 
younginhabitants is the log of the number of inhabitants age 18 and younger. 
unemployed is the number of unemployed inhabitants as percentage of the total local population. 
 
 
6.5 Quantitative empirical results  
Table 6.3 reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in the regression (using 
natural logs), while table 6.4 shows the correlation matrix of the key variables. The 
majority of variables show coefficients that do not exceed the critical level of 0.7. The 
only exception is the variable younginhabitants. To avoid potential bias due to 
multicollinearity, alternative measurements of the variable have been used as a robustness 
test, and provide largely similar results. The Hausman test has been conducted to 
determine if there are fixed effects for each LG and whether these can be modelled as 
random effect. With a p–value significant at the 0.001 level, the Hausman test indicates 
that H0 can be resoundingly rejected, and the fixed effect method is appropriate to 
estimate the parameters in the model.  
Table 6.5 demonstrates the effects of the independent variables on local tax rates. 
The first column in table 6.5 demonstrates the results on the pooled panel dataset of 
English, Dutch and NRW LGs for the period 2007-2012. The results show that LG debt 
has a significant and positive effect on local tax rates, indicating that LGs with  higher
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Table 6.4 Correlation coefficients pooled panel dataset Dutch, English and NRW LGs (2007-2012)
Variable N Observations Mean s.d Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
taxrate 1,035 6,441 2.09 0.90 0.06 1.04 2.57 2.63 3.28 
debt 1,035 6,938 2.74 1.04 -4.77 2.68 3.08 3.33 5.83 
income 1,035 6,938 3.22 0.26 1.98 3.17 3.27 3.37 6.37 
totalgrants 1,035 6,937 2.85 0.34 1.79 2.60 2.87 3.10 6.29 
feesincome 1,035 6,938 2.22 0.31 -0.21 2.04 2.31 2.41 5.39 
capitalexpenditure 1,035 6,407 2.09 0.37 -0.81 1.86 2.09 2.33 5.42 
staffexpenditure 1,035 6,938 3.71 1.14 1.48 2.28 4.24 4.56 8.02 
dumideology 1,035 6,390 0.35 0.38 0 0 0.34 0.63 1 
election 1,035 6,938 1.85 1.11 0 1 2 3 4 
density 1,035 6,938 2.63 0.51 -0.08 2.26 2.56 2.98 4.48 
oldinhabitants 1,035 6,938 3.88 0.53 2.20 3.50 3.83 4.28 5.61 
younginhabitants 1,035 6,938 3.99 0.52 2.25 3.59 3.92 4.37 5.56 
unemployed 1,035 6,394 4.06 2.64 0.37 2.23 3.25 5.2 18.8 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 taxrate 1             
2 debt -0.194 1            
3 income -0.160 0.560 1           
4 totalgrants -0.265 0.222 0.625 1          
5 feesincome -0.086 0.294 0.606 0.332 1         
6 capitalexpenditure 0.349 0.049 0.391 0.409 0.281 1        
7 staffexpenditure 0.650 -0.319 -0.193 0.143 -0.090 0.349 1       
8 ideology 0.224 0.178 0.294 0.109 0.150 0.271 -0.017 1      
9 election 0.001 0.043 0.043 -0.051 0.043 0.007 -0.062 0.095 1     
10 density 0.104 0.114 0.340 0.490 0.266 0.349 0.222 0.089 -0.014 1    
11 oldinhabitants 0.244 -0.021 0.116 0.243 -0.005 0.171 0.473 -0.073 -0.049 0.277 1   
12 younginhabitants 0.288 -0.057 0.103 0.324 -0.009 0.239 0.577 -0.048 -0.062 0.352 0.883 1  
13 unemployed 0.520 -0.103 -0.037 0.266 -0.052 0.368 0.593 0.136 -0.001 0.363 0.334 0.421 1 
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debt levels tend to set higher tax rates (coefficient ß=0.08, P<0.05). This confirms 
hypothesis 9. Total income and the level of grant funding are highly significant (P<0.01), 
and are also positively related with LG tax rates (coefficients ß=0.904 and ß=0.076). 
Income deriving from fees and charges is negatively related to the local tax rate 
(coefficient ß=-0.046, P<0.05). The variables indicating expenditure show opposite 
directions. Expenditure on capital investment is negatively related to tax rates, whereas 
expenditure on staff increases tax rates. This confirms hypothesis 10. The political-
institutional variables are both significant in the pooled regressions. In contrast to 
expectations, a left-wing council is negatively related to local tax rates. The results of the 
time variable election are in line with expectations: the closer a council is to its election 
date, the higher the likelihood that local tax rates will be reduced. Of the control variables 
density, oldinhabitants, and unemployed all show significant signs, and are positively 
related to tax rates.   
In addition to the pooled regression results, table 6.5 provides the country specific 
estimations, which in the case of England and NRW cover the period 2005-2012. 
Regarding the impact of LG debt, the English findings confirm the pooled regression 
results. The significance levels and the direction of the variables income, totalgrants, and 
staffexpenditure also mirror the results from the pooled dataset. The variable 
capitalexpenditure, however, has no significant effect, and the same applies to election. 
The non-significance of capitalexpenditure can be well explained by the fact that capital 
investments by English LGs are financed through dedicated capital expenditure grants, 
more than in the Dutch and NRW system. The lack of significance for the election 
variable can be explained by the particular set-up of the English electoral system at the 
local level. In a large number of English LGs (around 130), council members take it in 
turn to stand in each election, resulting in more frequent elections. The specific English 
local electoral cycle largely evaporates potential political business cycle effects on local 
budgeting.  
LG debt does not significantly affect the tax rates set by Dutch LGs, but debt has 
an impact on the business tax rates set by NRW LGs. Similar to England, the level of 
grant funding positively affects tax rates set by Dutch LGs. Grants have no significant 
impact upon rates set by NRW LGs, and also other treasury variables, such as feesincome 
and capitalexpenditure, lack significance in the results for NRW. In the Dutch case, the 
estimations for staffexpenditure, as well as the political-institutional variables ideology 
and election, are in line with the pooled regression results. When comparing the R-squares 





English case is in line with models used in the literature, but the low R-square for NRW 
might indicate omitted variable bias.       
To identify the effect of the independent variables for different LG types, separate 
regressions have been run for the different types of LG that exist in England and NRW. 
In both systems, the main distinction is between two-tier and single-tier areas. In the two-
tier areas, the lower tier is responsible for tax collection. These include the districts in 
England and the county-dependent municipalities in NRW. Table 6.6 demonstrates that 




Table 6.5    Determinants of tax rates, panel data. Dependent variable: rate main local      












Rate main local 
tax 
Rate main local tax 
– council tax 
Rate main local 
tax – OZB 
residential houses 
Rate main local 
tax –  business 
tax 
       
debt 0.008** 0.005** 0.102 0.001*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.067) (0.000) 
income 0.904*** 0.477*** 0.927*** 0.000 
 (0.093) (0.104) (0.148) (0.011) 
totalgrants 0.076*** 0.566*** 0.877*** 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.107) (0.215) (0.002) 
feesincome -0.046** 0.078*** 0.137 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.212) (0.001) 
capitalexpenditure -0.041** 0.001 -0.078** -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.035) (0.001) 
staffexpenditure 0.212*** 0.158*** 0.903*** -0.001 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.198) (0.002) 
ideology -0.140*** 0.016*** -0.225*** -0.005*** 
 (0.028) (0.005) (0.035) (0.002) 
election -0.019*** -0.001 -0.053*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
density 0.331* 0.636*** 0.241 0.006 
 (0.170) (0.153) (0.405) (0.008) 
oldinhabitants 0.800*** 0.011 6.001*** 0.079*** 
 (0.292) (0.013) (0.388) (0.024) 
younginhabitants 0.041 -0.051 0.262 -0.133*** 
 (0.087) (0.035) (0.529) (0.020) 
unemployed 0.003** -0.004*** 0.011 -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) 
constant -5.700*** 0.666 -31.450*** 2.812*** 
 (1.099) (0.513) (2.860) (0.134) 
     
Observations 5,235 1,935 1,293 3,053 
Number of LGs 1,030 353 287 396 
Adj. R² .20 .50 .69 .21 




Table 6.6 Determinants of tax rates, England and NRW by type of LG, panel data
  2005-2012. Fixed effects 
                                    England: band D tax rate                                  
.                                             (banddtaxlog) 
NRW: business tax rate (gewerratelog) 
 Unitary 
Authorities 




      
debt 0.002 0.006**  0.003 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.000) 
income 2.064*** 0.301***  0.062*** -0.006 
 (0.237) (0.076)  (0.021) (0.012) 
totalgrants -0.559** 0.616***  -0.003 0.000 
 (0.235) (0.124)  (0.004) (0.002) 
feesincome 0.060** 0.079***  0.009 0.001 
 (0.025) (0.021)  (0.008) (0.001) 
capitalexpenditure -0.013 0.016  -0.006** -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.001) 
staffexpenditure 0.111** 0.160***  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.041)  (0.005) (0.002) 
ideology 0.008 0.018**  -0.003 -0.005*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.002) 
election 0.001 -0.005***  0.001** 0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
density 1.697*** 0.126  0.078 0.008 
 (0.287) (0.276)  (0.200) (0.008) 
oldinhabitants 0.033 -0.001  0.047 0.026 
 (0.032) (0.023)  (0.020) (0.023) 
younginhabitants -0.610** -0.046  -0.062 -0.173*** 
 (0.233) (0.029)  (0.098) (0.024) 
unemployed -0.001 -0.004***  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
constant -1.583** 2.063***  2.246*** 3.158*** 
 (0.705) (0.720)  (0.628) (0.163) 
      
Observations 636 1,074  184 2,869 
Number of LGs 111 210  23 373 
Adj. R² .71 .43  .47 .21 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
set within the two-tier areas, again confirming hypothesis 9. However, LG debt does not 
significantly affect tax rates set by single-tier LGs – i.e. the county-free cities in NRW 
and the Unitary Authorities, metropolitan districts, and London boroughs in England. 
This difference might be related to the fact that for LGs with limited tasks, tax instruments 
constitute a dominant financial steering instrument, including to influence debt, whereas 
with an increase of tasks the number of financial instruments at a city’s disposal increases, 
such as increased grant payoffs from intergovernmental lobby activities (see chapter 5). 
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In addition, the literature indicates that inter-local tax competition is more severe for large 
LGs, which restricts their fiscal space in practice (Buettner, 2001).  
In addition to LG type, separate regressions were run and organised by population 
categories. Tables 6.7-6.9 demonstrate the estimation results depending upon LG 
population size. The impact of the independent variables on rate setting shows significant 
differences depending upon local population size. In the Dutch system, LG debt has a 
significant impact on local tax rates, except in case of LGs with less than 25,000 
inhabitants. For the population categories above 25,000 inhabitants, the debt variable is 
positively related to LG tax rates, which contrasts with previous research which 
demonstrates that the positive relationship between LG debt and LG tax rates increases 
with a reduction in local population size (Brown, 2000).  
Table 6.8 demonstrates that LG debt has a positive and highly significant impact 
on local tax rates set in NRW by small (<25,000 inhabitants) and large (50,000> - 
<100,000 inhabitants) LGs (coefficient ß=0.001, P<0.05; and ß=0.004, P<0.01). Table 
6.9 shows that in England, only the category of LGs in the population class 100,000> - 
<200,000 show a positive and significant relationship between debt and the development 
of local tax rates (ß=0.007, P<0.05). Given the statistically large number of LGs in NRW 
which are in official financial emergency arrangements, an institutional variable has been 
included in the estimations for NRW which tests whether LGs within these emergency 
arrangements set significantly higher tax rates compared to LGs that are not in such 
arrangements. The institutional variable ‘emergency’ is significant and in the expected 
direction for both small and medium size LGs (P<0.01 and P<0.05). The estimations 
indicate that being in a financial emergency procedure does not significantly affect the 
tax rates set by NRW LGs exceeding 50,000 inhabitants. This result may indicate that 
optimising local tax space could be a less than optimal financial recovery strategy for 
large LGs.  
Additional treasury variables that have been used to analyse local fiscal responses 
to financial stress are the level of capital investment and spending on local staff. The 
variables demonstrate significantly different results across the systems. The country 
estimations in table 6.5 demonstrate only significant results for capital investment in the 
Dutch system (P<0.01). The estimations show that an increase in capital expenditure goes 
together with a reduction of local tax rates. For the Dutch case, the regressions organised 
by population class confirm the negative relationship between capital expenditure and 
local tax rates for most LG classes. In addition, table 6.7 demonstrates that the relationship 


























Table 6.7    The Netherlands: determinants rate main local tax (OZB residential houses) by LG population size, panel             
.                    data 2007-2012. Fixed effects 
 
 All <25,000 25,000> - <50,000 50,000> - <100,000 100,000> 
      
debt 0.102 0.018 0.150* 0.381*** 0.473** 
 (0.067) (0.050) (0.090) (0.138) (0.194) 
income 0.927*** 0.941*** 0.950*** -0.502 0.484 
 (0.148) (0.246) (0.220) (0.480) (0.461) 
totalgrants 0.877*** 0.884*** 0.823*** 0.167 1.802*** 
 (0.215) (0.309) (0.286) (0.644) (0.398) 
feesincome 0.137 -0.038 0.124 -0.675 0.218 
 (0.212) (0.285) (0.285) (0.672) (0.622) 
capitalexpenditure -0.078** -0.057 -0.112** 0.109 0.091 
 (0.035) (0.058) (0.049) (0.130) (0.136) 
staffexpenditure 0.903*** 0.820*** 1.301*** 1.250* 0.138 
 (0.198) (0.286) (0.287) (0.643) (0.332) 
ideology -0.225*** -0.213*** -0.158** -0.319*** -0.209** 
 (0.035) (0.079) (0.062) (0.042) (0.097) 
election -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) 
density 0.241 -5.938** 0.169 -1.475 13.860*** 
 (0.405) (2.469) (0.279) (5.544) (4.172) 
oldinhabitants 6.001*** 6.555*** 5.834*** 8.598*** 6.351*** 
 (0.388) (0.587) (0.423) (1.132) (1.741) 
younginhabitants 0.262 1.700* -0.203 0.882 0.456 
 (0.529) (0.859) (0.683) (1.393) (2.105) 
unemployed 0.011 -0.008 0.025 -0.036 -0.053 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.028) (0.041) (0.049) 
constant -31.450*** -20.800*** -29.807*** -34.655*** -84.280*** 
 (2.860) (5.044) (3.369) (12.168) (9.841) 
      
Observations 1,293 531 527 124 111 
Number of LGs 287 124 113 35 23 
Adj. R² .67 .69 .71 .80 .77 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parenteses. 
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Table 6.8        NRW: determinants rate main local tax (business tax – Gewerbesteuer) by LG population size, panel data .      
.                      2005-2012. Fixed effects 
 
 
  All <25,000 25,000> - <50,000 50,000> - <100,000 100,000> 
      
debt 0.001** 0.001** 0.004 0.004*** 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) 
income 0.001 0.000 -0.045 0.013 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.042) (0.021) (0.017) 
totalgrants 0.000 -0.006*** 0.010 0.008 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
feesincome 0.001 0.002* 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
capitalexpenditure -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
staffexpenditure -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
emergency 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ideology -0.005*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) 
election 0.000*** -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
density 0.006 -0.001 0.074 0.075*** 0.115 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.046) (0.022) (0.181) 
oldinhabitants 0.080*** 0.021 0.087* -0.062 0.046 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.051) (0.064) (0.068) 
younginhabitants -0.127*** -0.148*** -0.237*** -0.146 -0.058 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.071) (0.087) (0.068) 
unemployed -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
constant 2.785*** 3.063*** 3.088*** 3.235*** 2.131*** 
 (0.129) (0.121) (0.395) (0.566) (0.567) 
      
Observations 3,053 1,699 753 368 233 
Number of LGs 396 226 103 48 30 
Adj. R² .22 .29 .21 .24 .43 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.9 England: determinants rate main local tax (council tax – band D tax     .     
.                       rate) by LG population size, panel data 2005-2012. Fixed effects 
 
in NRW. These results corroborate hypothesis 10 and demonstrate the discretionary 
nature of much capital investment expenditure.  
Although also constituting an expenditure post with substantial local spending 
discretion, the estimations for the treasury variable staffexpenditure strongly contrast with 
capitalexpenditure. In line with hypothesis 10, the results confirm that an increase in 
expenditure on local staff increases tax rates of Dutch and English LGs. Table 6.9 
demonstrates that in England, the relationship is positive and highly significant for all LG 
types and population classes, except those exceeding 200,000 inhabitants. The non-
significance of the relationship between staff expenditure and local tax rates in case of 
200,000+ English LGs can be explained by the decreasing amount, relatively spoken, of 
p/c expenditure on staff by LGs exceeding a certain population level. Table 6.9 excludes 
a row for English LGs with less than 25,000 inhabitants, due to their statistically small 
number (n = 6). In case of Dutch LGs, the positive relationship between staff expenditure 
 All 50,000> - <100,000 100,000> - <200,000 200,000> 
     
debt 0.005** 0.003 0.007** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) 
income 0.477*** 0.393*** 0.248*** 2.028*** 
 (0.104) (0.057) (0.086) (0.277) 
totalgrants 0.566*** 0.662*** 0.810*** -0.394 
 (0.107) (0.100) (0.117) (0.278) 
feesincome 0.078*** 0.103*** 0.046** 0.063*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
capitalexpenditure 0.001 0.019 0.011 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) 
staffexpenditure 0.158*** 0.085* 0.243*** -0.067 
 (0.032) (0.045) (0.050) (0.061) 
ideology 0.016*** 0.007 0.020* 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
election -0.001 -0.005*** -0.003** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
density 0.636*** 0.299 0.548 0.970*** 
 (0.153) (0.706) (0.348) (0.228) 
oldinhabitants 0.011 -0.214 0.006 0.019* 
 (0.013) (0.215) (0.0306) (0.010) 
younginhabitants -0.051 -0.191 -0.024 -0.058 
 (0.034) (0.399) (0.135) (0.047) 
unemployed -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
constant 0.666 3.047** 0.341 -0.949 
 (0.513) (1.225) (1.010) (0.739) 
     
Observations 1,935 486 811 620 
Number of LGs 353 106 150 109 
Adj. R² .50 .45 .51 .75 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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and local tax rates is concentrated in LGs with a population of 25,000 to 100,000 
residents. The variable lacks significance in case of the largest Dutch LG population class 
(100,000+); however, only 22 observations are included in the category, so the results 
should be interpreted with carefulness. The estimations in table 6.8 do not show 
significant findings on the staff expenditure variable for NRW. Overall, the positive 
relationship between staff expenditure and local tax rates demonstrates an opposite effect 
to local capital expenditure – the decision of Dutch and English LGs to increase tax rates 
is partly made to accommodate local discretionary decision-making, or, to put it 
negatively, local spending pressures related to expenditure on administrative staff.  
 
Given its fiscal structure and the available data, additional estimations have been carried 
out for NRW. The NRW statistics provide data on both the predicted tax capacity and the 
revenues from taxes actually raised. Following this, NRW LGs can be divided into two 
groups: LGs with a tax capacity shortage, i.e. LGs that raise less in tax revenues than 
indicated by their calculated tax capacity, versus LGs with a tax capacity surplus, i.e. LGs 
that raise more tax revenues than indicated by their calculated tax capacity (see appendix 
X for further descriptive statistics on both groups). Separate regressions have been run 
for the two groups with debt used as the dependent variable and results are presented in 
table 6.10. Model 2 in table 6.10 shows that local taxes for NRW LGs with a tax capacity 
shortage demonstrate a significant relationship with LG debt. The direction and effect 
size of the other independent variables remain largely unchanged compared to model 1, 
providing support for the robustness of the estimations. Model 3 of table 6.10 shows the 
base model for the group of LGs with tax capacity surplus. Most important difference 
between the two LG groups is related to local tax rates. Model 4 demonstrates that the 
rate of the business tax is no longer significantly related with local debt in case the 
authority demonstrates a tax capacity surplus. The results of table 6.10 demonstrate that 
the debt position of LGs with a tax capacity shortage is on average amended by 
adjustments to local tax rates, whereas the debt position of LGs with a tax capacity surplus 
is far less susceptible to changes in local tax rates. This indicates that debt in NRW has a 
significant impact on LG tax rates, but only for the category of LGs that raise less tax 





Table 6.10 NRW, impact of tax rates on debt evolution, LGs with tax capacity  
     shortage and LGs with tax capacity surplus, panel data 2005-2012. .    .  .                        
.                       Fixed effects 
 
 
 LG group tax capacity 
shortage (dummy 0) 
 LG group tax capacity 
surplus (dummy 1) 
 Total debt p/c (log)  Total debt p/c (log) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
propertytaxarate  2.323   0.140 
  (1.511)   (0.220) 
propertytaxbrate  -3.724***   -0.405 
  (1.302)   (0.309) 
businesstaxrate  5.328***   0.826 
  (1.594)   (0.629) 
income 0.196 0.281  0.239* 0.213 
 (0.366) (0.364)  (0.137) (0.141) 
totalgrants 0.055 0.042  -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.089) (0.092)  (0.042) (0.044) 
feesincome -0.026 -0.026  -0.006 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043)  (0.038) (0.033) 
capitalexpenditure -0.097** -0.099**  -0.038 -0.031 
 (0.047) (0.047)  (0.032) (0.032) 
staffexpenditure -0.055 -0.080  -0.025 -0.030 
 (0.095) (0.093)  (0.061) (0.061) 
emergency 0.058 0.051  0.000 0.001 
 (0.055) (0.055)  (0.011) (0.011) 
ideology 0.006 0.006  -0.169** -0.176** 
 (0.162) (0.162)  (0.070) (0.068) 
election -0.010** -0.009*  0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) 
density 0.094 0.017  -3.389** -3.429** 
 (0.119) (0.159)  (1.607) (1.619) 
oldinhabitants -0.970 -1.061  0.946* 1.015* 
 (1.308) (1.345)  (0.516) (0.510) 
younginhabitants -0.108 0.052  -0.766 -0.818 
 (0.821) (0.812)  (0.507) (0.511) 
unemployed 0.030* 0.032**  0.004 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.006) (0.006) 
constant 6.273 -3.665  12.550*** 11.210** 
 (4.965) (5.820)  (4.573) (4.589) 
      
Observations 2,680 2,680  373 373 
Number of LGs 372 372  79 79 
Adj. R² .01 .02  .35 .36 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
To improve confidence about the empirical existence of the financial relationships 
identified in the regressions, the next section provides additional qualitative information 






6.6 The intergovernmental impact on local tax space: qualitative evidence 
The previous section has indicated similarities and differences in the cross-country 
relationships between local financial variables and tax rate developments. Using 
qualitative information, this section further elaborates upon the institutional dimension of 
these relationships.  
 
6.6.1 Germany/NRW: qualitative evidence  
The case with the most local autonomy over own-source taxes is NRW. In contrast to the 
Dutch and English system, there is no maximum in place in NRW to limit the (annual) 
rate increase set by NRW LGs for own source taxes. However, the German system has 
applied a minimum tax rate (Hebesatz) since 2004. The minimum tax rate is 200, which 
in practice means that the taxable base is multiplied by 2% (e.g. business profits in case 
of the business tax). The implementation of a tax rate minimum follows a ruling by the 
German federal constitutional court, which aimed to address the negative effects of a local 
tax race to the bottom observed in several German regions (Henneke, 2012b). The same 
federal court ruling authorised the Länder to implement a maximum limit on the increase 
of business and property taxes set by LGs, however this has been ignored by NRW.121 
To determine the level of local grant funding, the NRW system calculates the local 
income base, which is broader than only the local tax capacity. The income base is 
calculated via four different components, whereby the first two components – the 
municipal share in the income and VAT tax, and compensation payments due to a social 
welfare reform – enter the formula using actually generated revenues. Some Länder do 
not include the full amount, such as Lower Saxony, where only 90% of the local share in 
the income and VAT tax enters the formula. Failing to enter the full amount in the income 
base formula is advantageous to the local authority as it will positively affect the amount 
it receives in grant funding. The other two factors entering the equation refer to the sum 
of the capacity of the business and property taxes, reduced by the business tax transfer. 
The sum of the business and property tax capacity is calculated using fictional tax rates, 
which are the tax rates deemed reasonable by the state government (Buettner et al., 2008, 
p. 124).   
The calculation method of the fictional collection rates differs among the German 
Länder. Some calculate the fictional rates as an average of the actual collection rates set 
by all LGs, whereas in other Länder the fictional rates are more loosely connected to the 
                                                          
121 BVerfGE 125, 141, 142f.  
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actual collection rates. NRW is part of the second group since its fictional collection rates 
have remained constant over significant periods of time, with the actual collection rates 
only infrequently updated.122 Different fictional collection rates are in place depending 
upon the type of tax (e.g. business or property tax).123 The fictional collection rates are 
deducted by 5% from what the NRW state government calculates as the average tax rates 
set by its LGs. The deduction is aimed at reducing institutionally driven rate increases.   
NRW has set its fictional rates for the business tax and property tax B at a level 
that has consistently been among the top of the German Länder.124 A 2008 investigation 
conducted by the IFO research institute indicates that, as a result of the high fictional tax 
rates, around 89% of every additional euro in business tax revenues generated by a LG in 
NRW disappears in the form of reduced general grant funding as a result of the state 
equalisation mechanism (Buettner et al., 2008, p. 7). Due to this, the actual tax rates of 
NRW LGs are at least partially determined by the fictional rates. NRW LG associations 
consulted as part of this research all emphasise that it has been one of their continuous 
policy objectives to urge the NRW state government not to set fictional tax rates above 
the German average in order to prevent institutionally driven increases in local tax 
rates.125 The associations have been supported in their plea by independent investigation 
committees, who have made similar appeals (e.g. IFO in 2008 and FIFO in 2013). In 
defence, NRW state representatives emphasise that the fictional collection rates are 
deducted by 5% from what is calculated as the average tax rates set by LGs, which aims 
to reduce institutionally driven rate increases.126   
                                                          
122 The following equation is used to calculate the tax capacity for each of the three own source taxes (i.e. 











 is the tax revenues generated in municipality 𝑖 using fictional tax rates. 𝑅𝑖
𝐼𝑠 is the tax 
revenues collected in practice, as reflected in the official statistics. 𝑡𝑖
𝐼𝑠 refers to the actual collection rate 
set by municipality 𝑖.  𝑡𝑖
𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙
 refers to the fictional collection rate, as determined by the state 
government (Buettner et al., 2008, p. 88). 
123 In addition, some Länder, such as Lower Saxony, further differentiate their fictional rates depending 
upon type of LG, with generally lower fictional rates set for smaller LGs. NRW used to have different 
fictional tax rates in place for LGs with more than 150,000 inhabitants, but operates uniform fictional 
rates since 1996 (Buettner et al., 2008, p. 129).   
124 For example, in 2007, NRW had a fictional collection rate for the business tax of 403, the highest 
among the German Länder, strongly contrasting with the fictional collection rates of other Länder, for 
example set by Hesse (310) or Rhineland-Palatinate (325). NRW’s rate of property tax A has generally 
been set below the German average, however, it is a tax with very limited financial importance (see also 
appendix X).  
125 E.g. interview Finance Committee of the Association of Cities in NRW, 10/07/2013; and interview 
Association of Cities in NRW, 23/04/2013. 
126 Interview Ministry for the Interior and Local Government NRW, 24/04/2013. 
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Due to the inclusion of local tax capacity in NRW’s grant allocation formula, 
fiscal structures in NRW do not directly cause the accumulation of financial errors at the 
local level. The average rates calculated by the state government, accounting for the 5% 
deduction, are set at a level that does not appear to significantly reduce fiscal steering 
space for LGs facing financial stress. The majority of financially stressed LGs in NRW 
set tax rates that are substantially higher than the minimum average rate determined by 
NRW’s state government. However, as business tax is the dominant local tax in the 
German system, the revenues contribute to financial error accumulation in a different 
way: as the tax is levied on business profits, which are volatile and raised from mobile 
capital, the tax itself causes inter-local tax competition, which in certain regions of NRW 
substantially reduces local fiscal space for upward rate setting. This explains the previous 
estimation results that show that tax rate decisions by county-free cities are not 
significantly affected by debt levels. In contrast, interviewees in NRW indicate that large 
LGs especially tend to base their tax rate decisions upon rates set by neighbouring LGs.127  
 
6.6.2 England: qualitative evidence 
Intergovernmental tax regulations in place in the English system strongly contrast with 
Germany. Tax limitations used to be implemented in the English system through a rate 
capping mechanism, which was first implemented in England with the Rates Act of 1984. 
The capping mechanism strongly contributed to the polarisation of English 
intergovernmental relations during the Thatcher period. Government minister Heseltine 
remarked: ‘we took their council powers away because they were making such a mess of 
it’ (quoted in Jenkins, 1996). The capping policy seemed to have some rationale, since 
some councils deliberately chose to heavily subsidize public services, and abstained from 
redundancies among council staff, just by increasing their local rates. In Sheffield, for 
example, business rates went up by 40% in 1980, and by 37% in 1981, with a strong 
reduction in private sector investments as a result. Many local councils nevertheless 
continued their policies, gambling that the central government would bail them out in 
case of near financial collapse (Fry, 2008, p. 170). While councils organised substantial 
resistance against central government’s increased possibilities to intervene in subnational 
fiscal policymaking, especially illustrated by the ‘rate-capping rebellion’ of 1985, local 
government’s resistance remained ineffective largely due to internal disagreement (Fry, 
2008). 
                                                          
127 Interview Finance Committee of the Association of Cities in NRW, 10/07/2013; and interview 
Association of Cities in NRW, 23/04/2013. 
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The Conservative governments led by Major between 1991 and 1997 moderated 
capping by introducing a system called ‘universal capping’. According to this method, 
the criteria for capping were announced by central government before LGs set their 
budget, thereby enabling LGs to be sure that the budgets they set would not be capped. 
Capping in this system was not simply focused on council tax levels but took account 
both of the authority’s budget increase and council tax increase. Due to this it was possible 
to have a high budget increase alongside a low council tax increase, or vice versa, without 
the authority being capped (Berman & Sear, 2004). This illustrates that in its 
operationalisation, the capping mechanism was primarily an expenditure limitation, and 
worked only indirectly as a tax limitation. Universal capping was abolished by the Labour 
Government elected in 1997 in the LG Act 1999 (Stewart, 2003, p. 231). 
Despite Labour’s stated intention to rebuild central-local relations as a 
partnership, the LG Act 1999 continued to give the Secretary of State of DCLG capping 
powers, but of a more discretionary nature. The Act ((Chapter IVA 52B (1)) gave the 
Secretary of State the power to designate an authority ‘that he considers [that] its budget 
requirements are excessive’. While the authority was able to challenge this decision 
within 21 days after the announcement, the Secretary of State had the power to set out the 
maximum budget increase in an order that had to be approved by resolution of the House 
of Commons. In both the universal and discretionary capping methodology, the 
government had the option to either ‘designate’ a LG for capping within the budget year 
(‘in year’) or ‘nominate’ an authority, indicating that the Secretary of State intended to 
authorise a cap in the next budget year (Berman & Sear, 2004, p. 15).  
Initially, discretionary capping powers remained unused and not a single authority 
was capped in the first five years following the implementation of the powers in 1999. 
However, the fact that capping was not formally used by Ministers does not imply the 
powers did not have any impact. Interviewees state that Labour government figures of 
this period regularly contacted LGs who were intending to implement a large council tax 
increase, reminding them of the Government’s capping powers.128 Indications of this are 
also provided in government documents, such as Labour Minister Raynsford’s statement 
given in answer to parliamentary questions in 2004. Raynsford clarified that he had 
‘already written to some 54 authorities that have indicated that they were considering 
unreasonably large increases’.129 Parliamentary reports indicate that Government 
                                                          
128 Interview Society of District Council Treasurers, 04/02/2013. 
129 LGC (2004, 5 February) ‘Raynsford issues written warnings to 54 authorities – and ready for more’, 
Local Government Chronicle.  
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Ministers used to meet representatives from designated LGs to listen to their explanation 
for planned council tax increases. For example, LGs originally designated for capping in 
2004-05 attended a thirty-minute meeting with the Secretary of State and his officials 
(Berman & Sear, 2004, p. 30). 
Increases in council tax were particularly high in 2003-04 with an average of 
12.9%. The increase led to considerable pressure from central government to reduce 
council tax levels in 2004-05. Figure 6.2 shows that, whereas in the 1980s around 15 LGs 
were confronted each year with capping, this number fell between the 1990s and 2000s, 
but shows a peak in 2004/05 with 14 LGs being capped. Among them was an authority 
that had been classified as ‘excellent’ in the benchmarking system from the Audit 
Commission. Capping this authority went against the Government’s earlier 
announcement that excellent councils would be given more financial freedom and 
capping would not apply to them.130  
The capping system was affected by some major practical disadvantages. The 
drawbacks were especially visible with in-year capping, which obliged LGs that had 
already sent out their council tax bills to re-bill. Table 6.11 shows that the costs of  
 
Figure 6.2 Number of LGs in England subject to capping measures 
 
Source: own illustration, based upon statistics provided by Hay & Martin (2013) 
                                                          
130 LGA, LGA frustration and disappointment over government capping announcement, LGA press 






































































































































rebilling for the six designated LGs during 2004/05 amounted to approximately 40% of 
the amount saved as a result of capping. Rebilling costs for Nottingham in 2004 turned 
out to exceed the over-budget savings of 180,000 £. In addition, the discretionary use of 
the capping powers caused major budgetary uncertainty at the local level. Observing 
capping as a major impairment of local democracy, the Conservative-led coalition 
government that entered office in 2009 took the decision to cancel capping. The decision 
was partly motivated by prominent government assigned evaluations of central-local 
relations undertaken in the early 2000s, such as the Lyons Inquiry, which saw capping 
‘as a sign that central and local government have together failed to make the system 
work’ (Lyons Inquiry, 2007, p. 10) .    
 
Table 6.11 Costs of rebilling of designated LGs during 2004/05 
LG Budget Savings - £ Billing Costs - £ 
Nottingham City    180,000    250,000 
Torbay    614,000    100,000 
Herefordshire    253,000      93,000 
Fenland    300,000    100,000 
Hereford & Worcester 1,000,000    500,000 
Shepway     600,000      93,000 
TOTAL 2,947,000 1,136,000 
Source: Sear & Berman (2004, p. 10). 
 
In the Localism Act 2011, the coalition government introduced the novelty of the council 
tax referendum. LGs have to organise a referendum when they propose a council tax 
increase above a threshold that is annually determined by central government. In 2014, 
the threshold was set at 2%. In the three years after its implementation, no single English 
LG has organised a council tax referendum to obtain an increase in council tax that would 
be officially classified by central government as ‘excessive’ (Keep, 2013). Based upon 
interviews conducted with English LG representatives, four reasons can be identified that 
explain the lack of popularity of English council tax referendums.131 First, all local 
interviewees highlight that a local referendum that proposes an above average tax increase 
has high political risks attached to it as voters are unlikely to approve tax increases.132 
Second, the practical costs attached to organising a referendum can be a substantial part 
                                                          
131 The leader of Brighton and Hove City Council announced in January 2014 that he wished to hold a 
referendum on a 4.75% increase in council tax. However, the plan was abandoned two months later when 
the city’s Green administration compromised with the minority Labour group to pass a budget with a tax 
rise of 1.99%, just below the 2% referendum threshold Source: Wiggins (2014). 
132 E.g. interview SIGOMA, 07/01/2013; interview Society of London Treasurers (SLT), 07/02/2014. 
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of the increase in tax revenues proposed, especially for small LGs. Third, the 
Conservative-led coalition government introduced a council tax freeze grant given to LGs 
which decide to freeze or reduce their council tax level. In 2011-12, 100% of LGs took 
up the freeze grant, with an aggregated total of 675 million £. Of the three selected 
European systems, the English system alone explicitly links the abstention from local tax 
increases with a higher grant allocation. This supports hypothesis 12, stating that a rise in 
the vertical integration of the intergovernmental system is positively related to a 
replacement effect of LG taxes by grant funding.133 The fourth reason for the absence of 
council tax referendums hitherto, has been willingness by Government Ministers to take 
the special circumstances of some groups of LGs into account and permitting them to set 
a council tax increase above the threshold. This applies to LGs with a historically low 
council tax level, which is the case for many district councils.134 Party political links 
between the leadership of LG organisations, such as the Conservative dominated District 
Councils’ Network (DCN), and central government during the Conservative-led coalition 
government has been an important factor in softening the council tax regulations for some 
groups of LGs.135 
 
6.6.3 The Netherlands: qualitative evidence 
In the Dutch system, central government and LG associations agree annually upon a 
maximum permitted increase of the property tax (OZB), the main Dutch local tax. The 
operationalisation and monitoring of the property tax has seen some major changes 
overtime. In the initial years, Dutch LGs were largely free to determine their property tax 
level, but in 2006 a micro norm was introduced. The main motivation to start 
micromanaging the local property tax was the fear at the central government level that 
LGs would try to compensate for the cancellation of one part of the property tax – the tax 
on renters of residential houses – in 2005 (see section 6.3) by increasing the remaining 
property taxes. One year after its introduction, central government had already concluded 
that the system did not work. The system had particular disadvantages in terms of its local 
financial consequences and administrative requirements.  
                                                          
133 The regulations for the freeze grant changed in 2012-13, when grants equivalent to a 2.5% council tax 
increase were valid for one year only instead of multiple years of the Spending Review period. This 
change incentivised around 12% of English LGs to no longer freeze their council tax level, and increase 
their grants up to the referendum threshold level (3.5% in 2012-13) (Keep, 2013). 
134 E.g. in 2013-14, 52 LGs were allowed to set a maximum council tax increase in the range of 4-8% 
without requiring a referendum. Source: Keeling (2013). 
135 Interview District Councils’ Network (DCN), 10/01/2014.  
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Negative local financial consequences followed from the application of similar 
maximum increases of the property tax across LGs, which assumes that a certain set 
increase in property taxation results in an equal revenue rise across LGs. However, since 
1997, local tax capacity has not been fully equalised in the Dutch system. From the 
calculated tax capacity of the category non-residential houses, 70% of the revenues are 
equalised, compared to 80% for the category residential houses.136 Due to the partial 
equalisation of local fiscal capacity, Dutch LGs with above average property values 
possess more general funding at a certain property tax rate, compared to LGs with lower 
average property values, while setting the same tax rate (Allers et al., 2007, p. 20). Hence, 
by not taking historical differences into account, the micromanaging of rate increases, 
enlarged inter-local financial differences, which went against its intended effect.  
The system also had substantial administrative disadvantages. A central 
government interviewee explains: 
 
The system was very demanding in terms of administrative capacity. The budgets of all 
400+ municipalities had to be checked individually, including judgement on their 
proposed property tax increase. While this was already extremely burdensome, the work 
was further complicated by several exceptions that had been agreed upon. For example, 
it was decided that municipalities that set a ‘disproportionate’ tax increase would not be 
sanctioned in case they had received dispensation from their provincial regulator.137 
 
Due to the difficulties attached to the micro norm, the Dutch central government and the 
Dutch local government association (VNG) agreed to replace the micro norm by a macro 
norm from 2008 onwards. The macro norm represents the maximum allowable increase 
of the property tax annually, and is monitored by central government at an aggregated 
level, rather than at the level of individual LGs. Decision-making on the macro norm is 
done in a typically consensus-oriented Dutch way with the economic predictions from the 
CPB, an independent Dutch government agency for economic policy analysis, playing a 
leading role. The macro norm is calculated by multiplying the predicted economic growth 
with predicted inflation, both calculated by the CPB. In the intergovernmental agreements 
made as part of the macro norm, the Dutch local government association has committed 
itself to actively promoting local compliance with the macro norm, whereas central 
                                                          
136 The equalisation occurs on the basis of the total property tax value within a municipality, multiplied by 
a percentage that represents the average property tax rate set by all Dutch LGs, known as rekentarief or 
calculation rate. For example, in 2012 this percentage was 0.0963% for owners of residential houses, 
0.1043% for owners of non-residential houses, and 0.1294% for renters of non-residential houses. Source: 
BZK (2011). 
137 Interview Dutch Financial Relations Council, 21/01/2014. 
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government itself retained the power to correct potential encroachment of the norm via a 
reduction of local grant funding.   
 The standard procedure, agreed upon between central government and the local 
government association, is to first discuss situations in which the norm has been 
trespassed within the so-called Governmental Consultation Meeting on 
Intergovernmental Financial Relationships – the Bofv (Bestuurlijk Overleg Financiële 
Verhoudingen). The Bofv is a high level working group consisting of the Minister of the 
Interior, the Minister of Finance, and the Chairman of the Dutch Association for Local 
Government (VNG), and the Dutch Association of Provinces (IPO). A recent government 
evaluation of the macro norm showed that in 2008, the increase of the local property tax 
exceeded the macro norm. However, during the Bofv meeting on the 2008 norm, the 
decision was taken to re-evaluate the implementation of sanctions if the macro norm 
would be violated again in 2009, which did not happen. The macro norm was again 
violated in 2012, forcing central government to implement a reduction on the macro norm 
for 2013 by the percentage amount the norm was exceeded in 2012. Currently, the system 
is being evaluated as both central and subnational actors prefer to adapt the indicators 
being used to calculate the macronorm.138 Overall, analysis of the Dutch system 
demonstrates that, largely due to the consensus-oriented and pragmatic approach of Dutch 
intergovernmental actors (see chapter 3), individual Dutch LGs have substantial leeway 
in setting their tax rates.   
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyses how the nature of local tax space impacts on the fiscal response of 
LGs to financial stress. The chapter focuses on taxes that LGs can influence, and shows 
that even for own source taxes, fundamentally different intergovernmental arrangements 
are in place across European systems. While US style TELs are not directly observable 
in the European context, in all three systems there are institutional mechanisms in place 
that affect local rate setting powers. In the Dutch and English systems these institutional 
restrictions have been strongly driven by national level concerns about the effects of 
growing local fiscal pressures on the national tax burden. The German/NRW system 
differs from the Dutch and English systems as no limitations are in place to maximise 
local tax rates.  
                                                          
138 Interview Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 23/01/2014; interview Dutch 
Association of Municipalities, 30/01/2014. 
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The empirical findings confirm that the LG financial stress indicator used in this 
thesis – LG debt – is positively related to the local tax effort by several types of LGs. The 
relationship is most relevant for the lower tier in the two-tier areas in England and NRW, 
and for Dutch LGs with more than 25,000 inhabitants. Findings also demonstrate that 
expenditure on staff has a positive, and opposite, effect on local tax effort compared to 
capital expenditure. This shows that local tax effort is affected by the type of spending in 
which LGs are involved. Support and disapproval is found for the political economy-
driven hypothesis. In contrast to expectations, a left-wing council is negatively related to 
local tax rates in the Dutch case, but the results of the time variable election are in line 
with expectations. 
Expenditure on capital investment appeared to be strongly negatively related to 
rates set by Dutch LGs and NRW county-free cities. The systems also demonstrate 
similarities and differences regarding the error correction capacity of local fiscal 
structures. First of all, the error correction capacity of local taxes is restricted due to the 
limited share of local taxes as part of a locality’s total income. Hence, in the Dutch and 
English system in particular, local taxes often only make minor adjustments to total 
budget capacity. Second, error correction capacity of local taxes has shown inter-local 
divergence due to changes in equalisation mechanisms. Equalisation of inter-local 
differences in fiscal capacity mainly occurs through adjustments of grant funding. These 
adjustments substantially reduce the potential financial errors that would result from local 
taxes in case no equalisation took place. However, the systems have not been stable on 
this dimension: inter-local differences in fiscal capacity in NRW have reduced following 
the inclusion of the local level in the federal income and VAT tax, in exchange for an 
increased share of the federal government in local business tax revenues. In England, to 
contrast, equalisation has reduced overtime, and especially since the partial localisation 
of the business rates from 2014 onwards, local tax revenues are causing significant 
increases in financial leeway for fiscally strong LGs, but at the same time reduce the fiscal 
correction capacity for LGs with a weaker tax base. Hence, the most contrasting cases in 
this study have converged in recent decades, with the German intergovernmental financial 
system having become more vertically integrated, whereas the English system has 
become less financially integrated. 
The findings of this chapter provide several directions for future research. A 
relevant question for scholars and policymakers alike is as follows: why do different types 
of LGs use their fiscal space in a different manner, and to what extent do local fiscal 
strategies reflect concerns among key local actors about the financial health of the local 
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authority. Country comparative research into the spatial effects of local finances provides 
another promising research avenue, both in terms of empirical contribution and 
methodological advancement. As this chapter has concentrated on local taxes, the 
question has remained unanswered to what extent the different dynamics in local fiscal 
structures identified in this chapter reflect an institutional logic that fits with the wider 
intergovernmental financial structure of each of the three systems. To answer this 
question, a comparative institutional analysis is provided in the next and final chapter of 
the thesis which covers the core intergovernmental financial institutions that have been 































This thesis analyses the role of intergovernmental systems in the evolution of LG financial 
stress. The study applies a most-different system approach in its comparison of three 
European constitutional systems: a unitary-centralised, a federal, and a unitary-
decentralised system. The focus is on three core intergovernmental financial institutions: 
intergovernmental regulations, grant funding systems, and local tax space.  
To identify LG financial stress, LG debt has been used as a stress indicator. 
Quantitative results, and triangulation of those findings with qualitative evidence, confirm 
the relevance of debt as an indicator in a country comparative study of LG financial stress. 
Debt is a relevant financial stress indicator in case of all three IGR financial institutions. 
Findings demonstrate that intergovernmental institutions fundamentally affect the causes 
of, and responses to LG financial stress. Some intergovernmental institutions enhance LG 
financial stress, whereas others reduce stress, reflecting different processes of error 
accumulation and different capacities for error correction.  
This concluding chapter provides a review of the policy context in 
intergovernmental financial systems, analyses the relevance of a framework based upon 
error accumulation processes and error correction dynamics, and relates the findings to 
cross-country differences in discretion and certainty. The final section discusses the 
contributions of the thesis to the literature, the limitations of the research findings, its 





7.2 Regulatory structures and LG financial stress 
The regulatory framework provides a potentially strong institutional contribution to error 
correction capacity. Strict regulations and active monitoring improve effective 
enforcement of regulations, which can reduce financial error accumulation at the local 
level. In practice, the error correction capacity of the regulatory structures in the Dutch, 
English, and NRW systems is more limited. Some of the regulatory features contribute, 
directly or indirectly, to error accumulation – articulated in an increase in LG debt levels.  
The regulatory regimes are a primary explanation for low effective borrowing 
costs across the three systems. The individual financial position of LGs does not have any 
impact on the interest rates set by the specialised LG lenders, who strongly dominate the 
English and Dutch LG borrowing market, and are also prominent in NRW. Private sector 
borrowers also barely adjust the costs of borrowing to the financial features of LGs. The 
empirical findings indicate that low borrowing costs enhance the positive relationship 
between a locality’s income and its debt accumulation in all three constitutional systems. 
The effect is especially strong for large LGs – reflecting the greater ability of large LGs 
to strategically use fluctuations in interest rates, due to their larger, more consistent need 
to borrow. The regulatory regimes directly affect LG budgeting practices, and as such 
help to explain LG deficit and debt trends. The analysis shows that despite the strong 
belief among credit markets in the quality of the regulatory frameworks, and hence 
indirectly the creditworthiness of LGs, the supervision systems show flaws in practice. 
Different regulatory elements reduce their effectiveness as error correction mechanisms.  
The English regulatory system used to provide the most heavily regulated system 
of the three cases in this study, but the introduction of the Prudential Borrowing 
Framework (PBF) has transferred many treasury decisions that were previously subjected 
to intergovernmental inspection to the local level. The local level in NRW has also 
experienced a relaxation of intergovernmental regulations, the most notable being the 
removal of the credit ceiling on short-term liquidity, and the extension of the requirement 
of setting a balanced budget from the fourth to the tenth year after the identification of an 
unbalanced budget. In the Dutch system, provincial supervision on LG finances has been 
reduced in favour of a larger scrutiny role for local politicians. The expected effects of 
the Dutch reforms regarding a greater local control over LG finances have not 
materialised. The Dutch system also demonstrates substantial local leeway to temporarily 
escape from the system’s balanced budget rule.  
The English, NRW and Dutch reforms increased local level financial flexibility, 
but they have exerted mixed effects regarding local level discretionary space. In the 
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English system, PBF has strongly increased discretion at the English local level. The 
reforms in the Dutch and NRW system have acquired an administrative legal character. 
Due to this, the reforms increased local level financial flexibility but have not 
substantially enlarged the discretion of Dutch and NRW LGs. The regulatory changes 
implemented, apply to all LGs, such as legislation introduced by the NRW parliament to 
extend the balanced budget rule from the fourth to the tenth year. Hence, from the three 
systems, local level discretion in the regulatory space is most substantial in the English 
system. This demonstrates that in contrast to the theoretical expectation, the centralised 
case in this study offers most space for error accumulation in the regulatory domain. 
Discretion in the Dutch and NRW systems does exist but is concentrated to the role played 
by intergovernmental regulators in performing their regulatory duties. Regulatory 
discretion has a strong political dimension due to intergovernmental partisan linkages 
between regulators and regulated LG entities. Opposite to the English system, the use of 
discretion in the Dutch and NRW regulatory domain is observed as a system feature that 
undermines institutional performance because of its partisan nature.  
The Interior Ministries in each of the three country cases officially fulfil the role 
of safeguarding the institutional and financial stability of the intergovernmental systems. 
However, given cognitive limitations among policymakers, the practical translation of 
this role is performed by analysing the institutional components in a serial way, hence, 
the dominant response mode to local financial errors is ad-hoc. This is despite the frequent 
employment of investigations into local finances across the three systems, the impact of 
which on the processing of policy information appears rather limited. Illustrations of the 
ad-hoc response mode are NRW’s city consolidation package, and regulatory changes 
implemented in the Dutch system to provide a local budgetary leeway for the – largely 
unforeseen – negative financial consequences of the involvement of Dutch LGs in the 
country’s property bubble.  
Bounded rationality, in the form of cognitive limitations among regulators, is 
deepened by understaffing of regulatory agencies, and an underutilisation of scale 
advantages in monitoring. The latter particularly affects the Dutch and NRW systems due 
to the organisational fragmentation of often highly autonomously operating regulatory 
agencies. These regulatory weaknesses reduce the error correction capacity of regulatory 
frameworks, making it particularly difficult to adequately monitor the finances of large 
LGs. In line with information processing theory, information exchange is more 
fragmented in systems that are more decentralised (Workman et al., 2009). In the Dutch 
system, the provinces monitor the factual number of LGs with unbalanced budgets, but 
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policymakers in the Dutch Interior Ministry largely ignore such information and focus on 
the much smaller number of LGs that are part of the intensified supervisory arrangements. 
The features of policy information streams strongly affect the performance of the 
regulatory systems. 
The regulatory system in NRW operates in a more centralised manner than the 
Dutch system, and this reduces inefficiencies in the processing of information about LG 
finances between the NRW state and the regional regulators on LG finances. However, a 
large fragmentation in information processing exists in the German systems between the 
state and the federal level, as these intergovernmental channels have a strong political 
rather than administrative character. This has resulted in inefficient information 
processing on local finances between the state and federal actors, which has contributed 
to financial error accumulation at the German local level.  
Of the three intergovernmental institutions, the regulatory framework provides the 
clearest illustration of self-undermining feedback (Jacobs & Weaver, 2014). An unspoken 
preference can be observed in all three country cases among intergovernmental actors to 
enable LGs to profit from low local borrowing costs. This focus on short-term financial 
advantages affects the thoroughness of intergovernmental monitoring, reduces its 
transparency to the outside world, and biases local budgeting behaviour towards 
borrowing instead of exploring other financial options.   
 
7.3 Grant funding systems and LG financial stress 
The three country cases all demonstrate a relationship between LG financial stress and 
grant funding systems. LGs with higher grant dependence demonstrate higher debt levels. 
The relationship is concentrated with specific grants, and differences exist between the 
countries. In the English system, reductions in central government funding have been 
compensated by increased local borrowing. While there have been limitations on the 
maximum cuts in formula grant, this has not been the case with specific grants. Specific 
grants pose the greatest risk to the financial position of English LGs.  
In the NRW system, it is also specific grant arrangements that most negatively 
affected the financial position of LGs. Strongly driven by a wish to control public finances 
after the German unification, German social welfare arrangements were drastically 
reformed by the federal government in the early 2000s. The reforms increased LG 
financial stress in NRW regions with a struggling economy and high demand for social 
services. While recent institutional reforms have improved the political and financial 
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position of the NRW local level, local funding difficulties resulting from social welfare 
legislation have only partially been addressed.  
The quantitative findings demonstrate a historically positive relationship between 
grant allocation and Dutch LG debt. Interviewees indicate that while the relationship was 
strong in the past, the debt enhancing effect of grants has reduced with the increasing 
sophistication of the Dutch formula system. While the funding of specific grants contain 
increasing risks for the financial position of Dutch LGs, consequences on Dutch LG 
financial stress have been limited over the period of this research.  
In all three systems, there are partisan effects that influence the allocation of 
grants. Party political congruence has a positive financial effect for the involved LGs. 
However, the financial perks enjoyed by politically aligned LGs are likely to go at the 
cost of making funding available for unaligned LGs, hence, contributing to financial error 
accumulation amongst the latter group. This can be explained by the fact that the 
aggregate budget available for grants is mostly fixed, and changing the allocation 
mechanisms in favour of one group of LGs results in financial disadvantages for the other 
group. 
 
Error correction mechanisms in grant funding 
The investigations demonstrate that several institutions reduce the debt increasing effect 
of grant funding. LG financial stress resulting from grant mechanisms can be prevented 
when policymakers are incentivised to account for the local financial consequences of 
grant mechanisms as part of the legislative process. Due to their preventive nature, these 
institutions can be labelled ex-ante error correction mechanisms. 
The introduction of the NRW Connectivity Principle and the Dutch 
Intergovernmental Finance Law 1997 strengthened the capacity of ex-ante error 
correction mechanisms in the NRW and Dutch systems. The mechanisms reduce 
cognitive limitations among policymakers and operate in a relatively effective way – even 
though social welfare legislation is excluded from NRW’s Connectivity Principle. The 
functional allocation of the supervision of the enforcement of the aforementioned ex-ante 
error correction mechanisms at the Interior Ministry in the Dutch and NRW systems plays 
a supportive role in their implementation, as opposed to leaving their administration 
entirely to individual departments. The interdepartmental power position of the Interior 
Ministry seems to influence the effectiveness of the implementation of the mechanisms – 




The standardised methodology is another mechanism that reduces error 
accumulation in the Dutch grant system. The mechanism does not protect Dutch LGs 
from cuts, but delays their implementation and guarantees that cuts are proportionate 
compared to those implemented in the rest of the Dutch public sector. The Dutch 
standardised methodology demonstrates its relevance when comparing the larger cuts 
implemented by the Conservative-led coalition government upon the English LG sector, 
relative to other parts of the English public sector. Although there are constitutional 
protections in place in NRW, these have infrequently operated as error correction 
mechanisms since the NRW State Court has tended to back the budgetary decision made 
by the NRW state government. 
Next to intergovernmental institutional mechanisms, partisan effects and 
administrative staff capacity affect the working of error correction mechanisms. 
However, in line with recent scholarly findings (Kim, 2013; Sacchi & Salotti, 2014), the 
results demonstrate fundamentally different dynamics between specific and total grants. 
Party political congruence has no significant effect on the allocation of general grants to 
NRW LGs. The transparency and relative simplicity of NRW’s general funding 
mechanism eliminates the chance for individual LGs, and state level actors, to influence 
general grant allocations. Partisan influence affects the allocation of NRW’s specific 
grants, and dynamics operate via both the local council and the mayor. The introduction 
of the elected mayor in NRW has improved local access at higher government levels. This 
has enabled NRW LGs that demonstrate party political congruence to reduce the positive 
effect of grants on debt. This illustrates that for those NRW LGs to which it applies, party 
political congruence increases error correction capacity.  
The non-significance of specific grants in relation to LG debt in the Dutch system 
confirms the limited contribution of Dutch grant funding to local error accumulation. 
Qualitative evidence explains the effectiveness of error correction mechanisms in the 
Dutch grant system. Grant mechanisms have become more sophisticated over the years, 
the system has a special arrangement in place for the small number of LGs for which the 
redistribution system still exerts negative financial consequences (Section 12), and errors 
in the design of grant mechanisms are relatively quickly identified and addressed 
following regular financial reviews. In the policy actor space, the Dutch system is the 
only case from the three countries that has a Council for Intergovernmental Finances in 
place. The council initiates and (partly) executes the review processes, but its role is not 
imperative in the process of correcting institutional errors. In fact, the Council’s authority 
among policymakers has reduced in recent years. The Dutch Association of 
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Municipalities is an actor whose everyday negotiations play the most critical role in the 
Dutch system to safeguard local financial interests. It has great access to central 
government and the ongoing decentralisation of tasks to the Dutch local level has 
strengthened the association’s intergovernmental negotiating position. Similar to NRW, 
Dutch local political actors are able to positively affect the financial consequences of 
specific grants, with an influential role occupied by the mayor. The findings are in line 
with emerging research that demonstrates that individual Dutch LGs put increasing 
resources in professionalizing their lobby activities at the level of grant providers (cf. 
Haan & Venetië, 2014). 
  In the English system, ex-ante error correction mechanisms are weakly 
developed. There is no institutionalised independent council on intergovernmental 
finances and only weakly institutionalised procedures to involve LG interest groups in 
central level decision-making. Hence, the strongest error correction mechanisms in the 
English system operate ex-post, i.e. once financial errors have occurred. The responsive 
error correction mode in the English system does not imply that English correction 
mechanisms are less effective than the more preventive Dutch and German mechanisms. 
The English system illustrates that in its ex-post mode it possesses the capacity to correct 
errors quickly and pragmatically. Government mediation during the financial crisis that 
faced West Somerset Council, the additional grant funding implemented by the 
Conservative-led coalition government for rural councils, and willingness by government 
Ministers to exempt specific LGs from the council tax referendum requirement, 
exemplify the fast error responses by the centre in the English system.  
The large discretion in the English system provides space for government 
Ministers to respond in a flexible manner to local financial difficulties that occur due to 
grant funding. However, larger discretion also creates larger space for partisan influence. 
The likelihood that rural LGs would have received a similar funding priority under a 
Labour government as during the Conservative-dominated coalition government is 
smaller. Field research findings demonstrate that Conservative and Labour dominated LG 
interest groups have more success in defending their financial interests when ‘their’ party 
is in government. Political effects in the English system influence the allocation of grants 
to LGs. Party political congruence reduces the debt enhancing of grants at the English 
local level. Despite the technical appearance of England’s general grant system, 
government Ministers have substantial discretion to adjust calculated grant allocations. 
As space for local actors to adjust their general grant allocation is marginal in England, 
allocative dynamics are strongly driven by central level considerations. The findings on 
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specific grants indicate that a bigger local administration either increases the amount of 
attracted specific grants, or leads to grants with less financial risks attached to them. This 
confirms the scholarly portrayal of the English system as having the strongest 
intergovernmental links between local and central level bureaucrats and professionals, 
rather than politicians (Laffin, 2009).  
In all three systems, government departments frequently use matching and start-
up funding methods, through which LGs compete for specific grants and their allocation 
is decided, amongst others, on the basis of the quality of submitted proposals. Having a 
sizeable and professional staff significantly increases the chance of success in attracting 
these grants. The increasing importance of local skills in attracting grants provides at least 
a partial explanation for the growing divergence in the financial position of Dutch, 
German and English LGs. LGs that put more resources into their local staff tend to have 
administrators who are more specialised and experienced in interacting with grant-
providers, and results indicate this contributes positively to the impact of specific grants 
on the local financial position. As expenditure on local staff is one of the main targets in 
the austerity measures implemented by LGs with weak finances, staff reductions are 
likely to further reduce the performance of LGs in attracting grants, hence increasing 
financial pressures on LGs with already weak finances.  
 
7.4 Local tax space and LG financial stress 
In all three country cases, local taxes serve as a mechanism to help correct financial 
imbalances that are caused by the larger intergovernmental financial architecture. Local 
fiscal structures also contribute to local discretionary spending capacity. In all three 
systems, error accumulation processes in local tax space are reduced due to the fact that, 
as part of the grant calculation, local tax capacity is taken into account. However, the 
institutional design of local tax systems exerts risks on the local financial position due to 
the level of the fictional tax rates that are used as part of the grant calculation, which is 
particularly high in NRW. The error correction capacity of fiscal structures is further 
reduced due to intergovernmental limitations on local fiscal space, which reduce local 
fiscal options to respond to financial stress. Even when limited to own source taxes, the 
Dutch, English and German systems show large differences regarding the extent to which 
local tax rates can be locally determined. The working of intergovernmental limitations 
on local tax space is strongly related to processes of error accumulation as caused by the 
organisation of local fiscal space: the bigger the financial errors caused by local fiscal 
space, the more relevant is the system’s capacity to correct those errors. 
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 The institutional feature that has most strongly contributed to error accumulation 
in the English local fiscal domain has been the continuing postponement of property 
revaluations. Due to the effect of council tax capacity on the grant level received by LGs, 
calculating council tax on the basis of 1991 property values benefits LGs that have seen 
a relative rise in property values and weakens the financial position of LGs that have 
experienced a decline. Ignoring this effect on the grant calculation, the postponement of 
revaluations has starved English LGs across the spectre of a potentially buoyant revenue 
source. With re-evaluations occurring annually in the case of the Dutch property tax, and 
NRW tax levies being connected to the actually generated business profits, error 
accumulation due to the calculation of the taxable base is minimal in the Dutch and NRW 
system.    
A second weakness in the design of the Dutch and English tax system is that due 
to the relatively small size of own source taxes, as a proportion of the locality’s total 
income, local tax rates have to be significantly increased in order to generate a small 
increase in total local income. With (in)direct limitations on rate increases in place, the 
gearing effect significantly reduces the actual error correction capacity of local fiscal 
structures in the Dutch and English systems. Given the larger share of own source taxes 
as part of total local income the gearing effect is smaller in NRW, and, from an 
institutional perspective, rate increases are easier to implement due to the absence of rate 
limitations. However, given the nature of the business tax in NRW, LGs face pressures 
from inter-local tax competition not to increase tax rates, which makes that error 
correction capacity is limited also in the NRW case.  
A third source of error accumulation carries financial risks in the long-term. 
Expenditure on capital investment appeared to be negatively related to rates set by Dutch 
and NRW LGs. In line with findings outside the country selection in this study (e.g. 
Hendrick, 2011), rate increases by Dutch and NRW LGs are seldom used for capital 
expenditure purposes. Although putting limitations on capital expenditure might generate 
financial space in the short-term, it builds up internal risks and often results in large 
expenditure obligations in the long-term. Major and often sudden capital expenditure 
obligations following long periods of cuts on capital investment are a major feature of 
Dutch and NRW LGs in financial emergency arrangements. The English system 
contributes less to this type of error accumulation as local capital expenditure is more 
frequently financed through dedicated capital grants. Hence, capital expenditure is less 




Despite the gearing effect reducing the error correction capacity of local tax space, 
findings indicate that LGs facing higher levels of financial stress set higher tax rates. The 
use of tax space as an error correction mechanism is particularly concentrated in smaller 
LGs, which seems related to the smaller number of financial instruments available for 
correcting financial errors at the disposal of smaller LGs. In Dutch and English LGs, the 
use of the tax instrument is positively related to local staff expenditures – indicating that 
tax rate increases are triggered by local discretionary spending preferences to protect 
spending on local staff.  
Limitations in error correction capacity of fiscal structures in the Dutch and 
English systems interact with grant funding mechanisms. In both systems, a lack of fiscal 
error correction capacity is compensated by increased grant funding – which is most 
visible with the council tax freeze grant in the English system. The strong vertical 
integration of core welfare functions in the English system provides English LGs with a 
stronger strategic position than one would expect from a sole comparison of constitutional 
structures. Although less formalised than the council tax freeze grants in England, the 
Dutch system also provides evidence of error correction capacity in the intergovernmental 
consultation arrangements related to local tax limitations and grant funding. The 
consensus-oriented approach in the Dutch system partly explains why the Dutch central 
government chooses to monitor local tax decisions at an aggregated level and intensely 
coordinates decisions affecting local finances with subnational actors. In England, 
correction capacity is present but operates mainly at a micro level – LG associations have 
limited influence, and central government takes most decisions unilaterally. The 
relatively fixed legal structure of intergovernmental funding arrangements in the German 
system, in contrast, eliminates much of the scope for a tax replacement effect by non-tax 
revenues, especially grants. At the same time, the German system has reduced local tax 
space by allowing Länder governments to implement a maximum limit on the increase of 
local tax rates, even though this possibility has not been used by NRW to date. Hence, 
the findings confirm that increases in local tax revenues are likely to be replaced with 
increased grant funding in case of more vertically integrated intergovernmental systems 
(Blom-Hansen et al., 2014).    
 
7.5 Intergovernmental financial institutions combined: cross-country 
 comparison 
The investigations in this thesis demonstrate that intergovernmental financial structures 
can be seen as complex systems (Érdi, 2007), with continuous interactions among their 
216 
 
subsystems. The expectation was formulated in the literature review that IGR financial 
institutions are more rationally designed in NRW than in the English system, with the 
Dutch system occupying a mid-position. The financial implications of the designs are that 
the NRW, and to a lesser extent the Dutch system, export fewer financial risks to the local 
level than the English system does. Findings indicate that LG is in a less stable position 
in England. Changes are implemented frequently, resulting in a relatively ungrounded 
English state structure (Dunleavy, 1989), even when the system gives a stable and 
technical impression from the outside. In line with the institutional and IGR literature (cf. 
Benz & Zimmer, 2012; Hendriks & Schaap, 2012), more constitutional protections are in 
place in the German and Dutch systems. Implementing institutional changes in the 
German and Dutch systems is also more time intensive. Based upon the insight from 
information processing theory that more time being spent on a problem reduces 
policymakers’ cognitive limitations, the expectation is reinforced that the German and 
Dutch systems develop more sensibly designed systems, which will export less financial 
risks to the local level.  
The quantitative and qualitative findings into core intergovernmental financial 
institutions do only partly confirm these expectations. Despite the constitutionally 
stronger position of LGs and their interest groups in the German/NRW, and to a lesser 
extent Dutch system, financial error accumulation is stronger in the German and Dutch 
systems, than in England. Hence, the financial position of English LG is volatile but less 
fragile then in the German/NRW system. The intergovernmental financial structure in 
England carries a higher risk to implement design failures than the German and Dutch 
systems. However, the fluid constitutional structure generates high capacity in the English 
system to rapidly and comprehensively respond to local financial errors caused by the 
intergovernmental financial design.  
The centralised English system has limited debt accumulation, reflected in the 
comparatively smaller amount of LG debt in England versus NRW and the Netherlands. 
As such, the comparatively healthier financial position of English LG is an indirect 
consequence of this framework. Due to its pragmatic nature, the English framework 
remains largely unarticulated, which means that the position of English LG is an outcome 
of immediate responses by the centre to changing material circumstances, rather than long 
running reform processes. The high fluidity of the English framework implies that 
changes can be implemented quickly, including reforms that contrast an apparent path 
dependent logic. The strong increase in English LG financial stress over a short period of 
time shows that error accumulation in the English system can accumulate rapidly, but due 
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to the system’s large error correction capacity the consequences of stress accumulation 
as to the long-term financial stability of English LGs are less severe compared to the 
German and Dutch systems.  
The legalistic and federal design of the German/NRW intergovernmental system 
offers institutional features that are beneficial to the position of the local level, such as 
constitutional reviews, the Connectivity Principle, and a great access at the local level to 
grant providers. The structure, however, also contributes to financial error accumulation 
and reduces error correction capacity. The institutional separation between the actors that 
draft legislation – which has a local financial impact – and actors that fund that legislation 
increases the risk of tightened funding for local service provision. The functional 
separation also increases institutional decision costs. In addition, the limited fiscal space 
of the Länder as the main grant provider of German LG, creates incentives at the Länder 
level to find short-term solutions to local spending pressures. An illustration of this is the 
relaxation by the NRW state government of the balanced budget rule applying to the local 
level.  
The unitary-decentralised Dutch system was expected to present a mid-position 
in terms of its effects on error accumulation processes and error correction capacity. In 
the Dutch case, the causes of, and responses to LG financial stress are in many cases 
indeed a mix of what is observed in the centralised English and federalised NRW systems. 
The design of the three core institutions in the Dutch system is more affected by local 
influence than in the English system, but has less formal protections surrounding it as in 
NRW. The consensus-oriented approach of the Dutch governing culture (Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2009) is strongly observable in the design of its intergovernmental financial 
institutions. The Dutch redistribution system reflects the centre’s ambition to 
accommodate as many interests as possible, and the implementation of intergovernmental 
tax limitations proceeds through intensive coordination with the local sector, and leaves 
Dutch LG with substantial discretionary space.  
The effect of the Dutch governing style on the evolution of LG financial stress is 
mixed. This is noticeable when comparing the effects of different intergovernmental 
financial institutions. The consensus approach has a positive impact on grant funding 
mechanisms, which pose limited financial risks to the financial position of Dutch LGs, 
notwithstanding the disproportionate influence of the G-4 cities. However, the consensus 
approach contributes to error accumulation in the regulatory domain. Dutch 
intergovernmental monitoring occurs in a more politicised context than in the English and 
NRW system, and this combined with a political culture of conflict avoidance, explains 
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the particular Dutch background of ineffectiveness in the enforcement of 
intergovernmental financial regulations. The negative financial consequences on Dutch 
LGs following from the Dutch property bubble, and the belated response by Dutch 
provincial regulators, demonstrates that the threshold of response in the Dutch regulatory 
system is far from being adequate. This shows that the explanatory strength of 
information processing theory can be improved by extending its focus on formal 
institutional structures to informal rules.  
Constituting one of the main areas determining local performance, the analysis of 
the financial dimension in this thesis demonstrates that ‘institutions matter’ but that the 
working of their subsystems differs from how the three European systems are portrayed 
in the literature. The system which possesses the most capacity for parallel processing is 
the English system. Although the English system stands out in its historically evolved 
complexity, the larger capacity for parallel processing is not reflected in intelligent system 
design. Rather, it is the administrative and political discretion that generates capacity at 
the English centre for parallel processing (Booth, 2007; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999). The 
investigations confirm a particular political character of the English system, but political 
factors also affect the performance of Dutch and NRW intergovernmental financial 
systems. The extent and impact of these political factors is strongly influenced by the 
nature of the policy subsystem and the direction of the institutional dynamics – i.e. 
whether policy behaviour is focused on preventing or correcting error accumulation, or, 
unintentionally, contributes to error accumulation. This demonstrates the relevance of 
focusing on specific domains of local government in cross-country analyses, rather than 
comparing LG systems across a range of dimensions (e.g. Loughlin, Hendriks, & 
Lindström, 2012). An investigation into one institutional dimension improves the 
analytical capacity to distinguish between institutional processes that have predominantly 
a local level background, or instead strong intergovernmental determinants. Policy 
dynamics theory proves highly valuable in identifying the positive and negative impact 
of separate intergovernmental institutions, and analysing them in conjunction. 
 
7.6 Contributions to the literature 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. Five contributions stand out. 
First, by comparing the impact of fiscal institutions on local finances in three 
European systems, this thesis expands second-generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) 
beyond its dominant focus on the meso-level (Oates, 2005; Rodden, 2006; Von Hagen, 
2008). By using non-aggregate local statistics and developing cross-country local fiscal 
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stress indicators, the thesis strengthens the empirical and methodological base of SGFF 
perspectives on intergovernmental finances. The thesis findings demonstrate that 
behaviour by actors in the intergovernmental finance game does not solely result from 
‘common good considerations’, providing support for a core claim made by SGFF 
scholars. The empirical chapters of the thesis demonstrate that political considerations 
regularly affect actors’ judgements – reducing the technical nature of grant funding and 
intergovernmental supervision techniques. While SGFF rightly extends the traditional 
rational-economic explanation for governments’ fiscal performance with political 
variables, this thesis demonstrates that in some cases it is neither economic-rational nor 
political considerations that affect local fiscal outcomes. Rather, the findings point at the 
relevance of macro level constitutional structures. These ‘lower-level institutions’ (Von 
Hagen, 2008, p. 474) strongly affect the ability of actors to process information, adapt to 
environmental changes, and implement institutional reforms. Hence, the findings of this 
thesis do not solely underline the relevance of a SGFF approach to intergovernmental 
finances but illuminate the importance of enlarging SGFF towards the underlying 
constitutional architecture of intergovernmental financial systems, including the fiscal 
effects at the local level.    
Second, given the strongly segregated state of empirical research on local 
finances, this thesis contributes to the literature by analysing the combined impact of the 
main intergovernmental financial institutions on local finances.  The  effects of these 
institutions appear highly contingent (Weaver & Rockman, 1993). In the German/NRW 
system, increased LG financial stress as caused by grant funding arrangements has been 
addressed by relaxing LG budgetary regulations on local debt and deficit making. 
Institutional interactivity is also visible in the Dutch system. The standardised 
methodology linking central government spending to the size of the Dutch LG budget 
reduced local financial stress in the Dutch system. However, low borrowing costs and a 
loose intergovernmental financial regulatory framework incentivises local politicians to 
increase their debt position. The thesis demonstrates that LG debt, including the local 
level political strategic drivers behind it (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001), can only be 
explained by accounting for the contingency among intergovernmental institutions – 
which can only be captured by conducting an in-depth analysis of multiple 
intergovernmental institutions simultaneously.   
Third, the thesis points at the transforming role of mayors in European political 
systems, and sheds new light on the functioning of German local administration. In 
contrast to the dominant portrayal of German local administration as predominantly 
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legalistic (e.g. König, 2006), partisan elements do affect grant processes to the German 
local level. In contrast to England, partisan dynamics have a strong bottom-up effect in 
the German system. The findings from this thesis resemble an emerging empirical 
research strand that demonstrates the growing importance of mayoral leadership for 
bringing different actors and resources together, and representing the local authority 
externally (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007; Wollmann, 2005, p. 29). The increased importance 
of local political leadership is clearly articulated by John (in: Goldsmith & Larsen, 2004, 
p. 122): ‘Leadership is crucial to the new urban governance. The politics of 
decentralisation, networks, participation, partnership, bureaucratic reform, rapid policy 
change and central intervention need powerful but creative figures to give direction to 
local policy-making’. 
Fourth, the thesis provides a unique application of policy dynamics theory which 
leads to a reconsideration of the conventional portrayals of intergovernmental relations in 
the systems studied. Using core concepts from policy dynamics theory, the analysis 
demonstrates that the political nature of discretion does not only contribute to processes 
of error accumulation but can also strengthen error correction capacity. The political 
nature of discretion in the English intergovernmental system leads to a redefinition of the 
influence of LG interest groups in the English system. While the formal institutional 
position of LG interest groups in England is weakest from the three country selection, the 
influence of English LG groups on intergovernmental financial decision-making within 
the centre can be substantial in case of party political alignment between the government 
in power and the leadership of the LG groups. This finding contrasts with conventional 
wisdom about English IGR interactions that emphasises the limited influence of English 
local interest groups at the centre (John & Copus, 2012). Intergovernmental party political 
alliances also impact on intergovernmental financial decision-making in the German case. 
However, given the larger number of government levels, complexity in decision-making 
and conflicting interests, party political effects may also exert negative financial effects 
on the position of LG (e.g. Harz IV in the German case). This leads to the expectation 
that party political effects in IGR financial systems exert more financial risks on LG in 
systems characterised by power diffusion, as opposed to power concentration (cf. Weaver 
& Rockman, 1993).  
A final main contribution of this thesis is that it demonstrates that punctuated 
equilibrium theory can be significantly strengthened by extending the approach with 
concepts from policy dynamics theory. While punctuated equilibrium theory explains 
why complex interactions within political systems give rise to a punctuated reform style 
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(Baumgartner et al., 2014), policy dynamics theory relates the temporal aspects of reforms 
to the errors that may build up within government systems, and their capacity to correct 
those errors. Put it differently, whereas punctuated equilibrium theory concentrates on 
how people process and respond to signals from their environment, and explains how 
these processes translate into a particular reform mode, the ‘error correction’ argument 
extends the punctuated equilibrium analysis by including the policy output generated 
through the interaction between people and institutional contexts. Due to the inclusion of 
policy outputs, policy dynamics theory is in a stronger position than punctuated 
equilibrium theory to theorize about the relationship between institutional structures and 
the speed and comprehensiveness of the correction capacity of intergovernmental 
systems.  
The findings of the thesis demonstrate that policy dynamics theory has particular 
strengths within a country comparative research design, including detailed analysis of 
individual actor constellations. Three examples from the German findings illustrate this. 
First, the German case demonstrates that a more legal-constitutional nature of institutional 
mechanisms does not automatically imply less error accumulation at the German local 
level. The stronger presence of judicial institutions does not have an unequivocal 
beneficial effect on the intergovernmental fiscal position of the local level, since the local 
level is administratively part of the Länder, and judicial institutions – at least in NRW – 
have tended to side with the state government, rather than the local level. The approach 
of judicial institutions in the German case also demonstrates that an increase in the 
number of veto players does not automatically improve the system’s error correction 
capacity, either in an ex-ante or ex-post manner. Second, the German case shows that the 
legal-institutional nature of error correction mechanisms may lead to a higher threshold 
of response as changes are more difficult and time-consuming to implement. In practice, 
this might expose LG to a higher, instead of lower degree of financial risk. Third, the 
German case demonstrates that error correction capacity within institutional subsystems 
can change fundamentally over time. Whereas the German local level was in a 
strategically weak intergovernmental position in the early 2000s, institutional reforms 
improved its position. Rather than the sole focus of policy equilibrium theory on stability 
and change in policy systems, the policy dynamics approach connects policy trends with 
policy outcomes. The distinction between error accumulation processes and error 
correction mechanisms on the one hand, and institutional structures on the other hand, 
enables one to specify the impact of policy output in processes of incremental or 
punctuated institutional change. 
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Overall, the thesis research findings indicate that in order to adequately identify a 
system’s error correction capacity, scholars need to make much more detailed and 
longitudinal analyses of actors and their mutual interactions within their specific 
institutional settings than the political economy literature currently accounts for.  
 
7.7 Policy recommendations 
The contingent nature of IGR financial institutions has important implications for 
policymakers. First, it demonstrates the necessity to better analyse the consequences of 
the implementation of reforms in one subsystem, on the other subsystems. The findings 
indicate that the current capacity to analyse financial interactions at system level is highly 
limited among policymakers. This is most visible in the Dutch and German systems. 
Following the abandonment of the Audit Commission and the budgetary savings 
implemented on Whitehall departments, capacity for parallel processing has also reduced 
in the English system. The limited policy capacity for system analysis explains the regular 
implementation of IGR reforms that alleviate financial errors in one subsystem, but 
increase financial errors in the system as a whole. In order to address policymakers’ 
cognitive limitations, investing more administrative capacity in developing more 
advanced monitoring and forecasting techniques will reduce the unpredictability of 
intergovernmental financial institutions and improve system capacity for parallel 
processing. Given the potential long-term financial risks on LG finances, the financial 
stability of the systems would benefit from not only monitoring LG current expenditure 
but also the conditions of LG capital investment. 
Second, the findings demonstrate that LG debt, in its various measurements, is a 
relevant indicator for policymakers to monitor the financial condition of LGs. 
Policymakers in the Dutch system reflect this awareness as LG debt has been made one 
of the core financial stress indicators monitored by the provincial regulators since 2014. 
Third, the findings illustrate that low local borrowing costs contribute to financial error 
accumulation in the three European cases. LGs with deplorable finances do not face any 
penalty costs in the form of higher interest rates. As all three systems generate uncertainty 
regarding the responses of the regulatory regimes in the case of defaulting LGs, increased 
divergence in LG borrowing costs constitutes a relevant error correction mechanism to 
increase system stability. A reassessment of the regulatory regimes based upon a realistic 
evaluation of their regulatory performance, as well as the actual regulations in place, will 
most likely reduce the debt enhancing effect of borrowing costs, since LGs with 
problematic finances will be charged higher interest rates. Divergence in borrowing costs 
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may well have a positive financial effect as it will put pressure on LGs to improve their 
financial decision-making.  
A fourth policy recommendation relates to the findings on grant systems. It is 
demonstrated that a larger transparency in the design and operation of grant systems 
(NRW) positively affects intergovernmental support for grant funding systems, as 
opposed to grant mechanisms where the motivations behind the design and operational 
decisions remain disclosed (England). Hence, if grant funding bodies want to raise 
intergovernmental support for distributional choices, they should aim for greater 
transparency by setting out the basis for their judgements and how they affect the 
distribution of grants. Increased transparency of grant funding systems will also help to 
clarify to what extent LG financial stress is caused by the intergovernmental 
arrangements, or, instead, has primarily a ‘homemade’, local background.  
 
7.8 Limitations 
This study has applied a mixed method research design. Using quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques in a study on intergovernmental finances offers substantial benefits. 
The triangulation of the quantitative findings with qualitative material improved 
understanding of the public finance mechanisms at work, and strengthened the reliability 
of research findings. Notwithstanding the strong results, an evaluation of the selected 
quantitative and qualitative techniques is not out of place.  
 As the first empirical chapter of the thesis, chapter 4 investigates the relationship 
between interest rates and debt accumulation at the local level. OLS cross-sectional 
estimations are run using three equations. The first equation (4.1) uses debt as 
independent variable and interest rates as the dependent variable, with results 
demonstrating that LGs with higher debt levels pay, on average, lower interest rates. In 
line with the literature (Robbins & Simonsen, 2012; Simonsen et al., 2001), this is 
explained by the better loan conditions larger LGs are able to realise due to their higher 
treasury capacity. The second model (4.2) uses interest rates as a dependent variable, 
whilst the third model demonstrates that, if interacting with local income size, borrowing 
costs enhance local debt accumulation. Although results are robust following different 
measurements for interest rates and local debt, the relationship between both variables 
might be endogenous, with the OLS estimation picking up both forwards and backwards 
effects, thereby leading to biased and inconsistent coefficients that might lead to incorrect 
causal statements (Wooldridge, 2010).  
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A possible strategy to guard against endogeneity is to estimate the models using 
two-stage-least-square (2SLS) with instruments for LG debt. Gordon and Slemrod (1986) 
have found that communities in which people live with low marginal tax rates will prefer 
debt financing compared to communities in which individuals live with high income tax 
rates. As town specific income tax rates are difficult to obtain, several studies use the 
homeownership rate as a proxy for whether or not residents itemize their deductions, a 
good indicator of residents’ after-tax cost of borrowing (Capeci, 1991; Robbins & 
Simonsen, 2012). As the instrumental variable strategy represents a suitable option to 
address potential sources of endogeneity, future research on the relationship between LG 
interest rates and debt is likely to benefit from developing an instrumental variable based 
upon homeowner rate statistics.  
Although the problem of endogeneity cannot completely be ruled out in case of 
the debt-grant relationship investigated in chapter 5, the problem of reverse causality is 
highly unlikely to occur in the debt-grant relationship because during the period covered 
by the dataset used in this research, grant funding has not been affected by a locality’s 
debt size, either as a formal or informal distribution criterion. This is partly explained by 
the fact that awareness of LG debt trends is highly limited among grant providers. 
Another restriction of the study follows from its limitation to the use of time series 
and cross-sectional data. Some of the intergovernmental financial institutions have strong 
spatial components, especially local tax space. While the cross-country design of this 
research prevented conducting a spatial regression analysis, future single country studies 
should account for the spatial dimension of LG financial stress.  
With respect to the operationalisation of LG financial stress, a limited number of 
indicators have been used in this thesis. Additional indicators, e.g. based upon data related 
to LG pension liabilities or local asset statistics, would provide relevant alternative LG 
financial stress indicators. However, an increase in the number of variables will equally 
complicate country comparative research into LG financial stress, and technical questions 
related to measurement invariance of local financial accounting categories have to be 
answered.  
Another limitation follows from the country comparative research design. As this 
thesis has investigated one case per constitutional system, the findings are only applicable 
to a confined set of comparable intergovernmental contexts where cause-effect links recur 
as they are identified in the selected cases. A possible way to alleviate this limitation in 
future research is to extend the country selection by focusing upon most-similar 
constitutional systems. An extended country selection will help to answer, for example, 
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the question whether the institutional dynamics behind LG financial stress as identified 
in this thesis for the federal German case, also occur in other federal systems (e.g. 
Switzerland or the US).   
A final limitation relates to the material that was gathered during the interview 
phase of the research. While the interview findings provide valuable information 
regarding the political and interest group aspects affecting grant funding systems, 
interviewees often provided general comments on the non-technical aspects of grant 
funding rather than detailed information related to specific cases or incidents. Partly, this 
attitude can be explained by the complexity of the system which prevents interviewees 
from being able to provide detailed information on partisan effects. However, given the 
political sensitivities surrounding the topic, some interviewees were deliberately reluctant 
to provide detailed information. The acquisition of qualitative evidence in future research 
projects is likely to benefit from building long-term relationships with policymakers. 
 
7.9 Future research 
The institutional dimension of intergovernmental financial systems remains poorly 
understood in the literature – this is despite its far-reaching impact, including the day-to-
day lives of citizens. Hence, there are strong future research needs in the area of 
intergovernmental finance, both from a theoretical, methodological and policymaker’s 
perspective.  
There are strong needs to continue country comparative research into LG financial 
stress. Comparative investigations will help to identify how a definition of the 
sustainability of LG financial conditions is determined by the country-specific features of 
the institutional framework in place. Future empirical research efforts are required to 
identify the relationship between grant mechanisms and local finances, and to investigate 
whether similar types of grants carry similar risks across constitutional systems. This 
research would contribute to stronger theory development in second-generation fiscal 
federalism, especially by improving our understanding of the relationship between, on 
the one hand governments’ fiscal performance, and on the other hand interactions 
between ‘lower level’ (Von Hagen, 2008) constitutional structures, budgetary processes, 
exogenous factors, and intrinsic motivations of political actors. With financial tensions 
mounting in intergovernmental systems and decentralisation processes widespread 
(Snyder, 2001), comparative research into grant mechanisms offers an invaluable insight 
for government scholars and policymakers alike. 
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The field of intergovernmental finances also offers major opportunities to test and 
advance policy theories on how multi-level governance systems process and respond 
differently to financial information carried in the policy environment. A longitudinal 
analysis of IGR financial institutions will generate important knowledge on the nature of 
policy dynamics in dissimilar IGR contexts. It will identify the drivers behind changes in 
error correction capacity, and provide important knowledge on policymakers’ behaviour. 
In particular, it will clarify the exact relationship between constitutional structures and 
how policymakers respond to error accumulation processes. Changes in error correction 
mechanisms, and their capacity, are likely to reflect policymaker responses to error 
accumulation processes, but constitutional structures will fundamentally affect the nature 
of this relationship, such as the speed and adequateness of the response. The findings of 
this study underline the relevance of taking a longitudinal approach when analysing error 
accumulation processes and error correction mechanisms. What might be an error 
correction mechanism in the short-term, can lead to error accumulation in the long-term 
and, vice versa. 
The findings also demonstrate that the design of institutions has a fundamental 
effect on how cognitive limitations among policymakers affect policymaking processes. 
Future research should more systematically explore under what institutional conditions 
policymakers design financial arrangements that carry less or more risks to the financial 
position of the local level. This research would also benefit from taking a longitudinal 
approach, given the fact that, as this research indicates, some institutional structures only 
provide correction capacity in the short run, but contribute to error accumulation in the 
long term. A major determinant at which this research hints is the power constellation 
among grant funding government departments. A relevant question to be answered in 
future research is the interdepartmental position of the department that represents the local 
level at the centre, and whether a more prominent positioning of this department reduces 
the financial risks exported by grant funding arrangements to the local level. 
The findings from this thesis also have some implications regarding the 
methodological and disciplinary approach for future research on local and 
intergovernmental finances. The thesis demonstrates the importance of cross-fertilisation 
and integration among disciplines in order to successfully investigate a multi-causal 
phenomenon such as LG financial stress (Schick, 2014). In particular, an increased fusion 
between political economy, public finance, and government studies provides a promising 
framework for understanding cross-country differences in intergovernmental financial 
dynamics. The thesis also shows that in an era in which public administration research 
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transforms from being largely qualitative to increasingly quantitative (Groeneveld, 
Tummers, Bronkhorst, Ashikali, & Van Thiel, 2014), the advantages of mixed method 
research should be explored more systematically. Using qualitative research methods to 
investigate policy events linked to intergovernmental financial structures, such as reforms 
in grant systems, and linking these events with statistical analyses drawing on long-term 
datasets, will generate fundamental knowledge on the determinants of intergovernmental 
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Table  Overview of conducted interviews 
England 
Organisation Location Date 
Audit Commission London, Home Office 30/12/2013 
Centre for Cities London, Centre for Cities office 13/01/2014 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
London, CIPFA Head Office 06/11/2012 
 
Core Cities Group (CCG) Manchester, CCG office 06/02/2013 
District Councils’ Network (DCN) Nottingham, Rushcliffe 
Borough Council 
10/01/2014 
HM Treasury London, HM Treasury 11/02/2013 
House of Commons, Communities 
and Local Government Select 
Committee 




Localis London, Localis office, 
Westminster 
12/02/2014 
London Councils London, London Councils 
Headquarter 
21/12/2012 
New Local Government Network 
(NLGN) 
London, NLGN office 06/01/2014 
Society of County Council Treasurers 
(SCCT) 
Oxford, Oxfordshire County 
Council, County Hall 
04/01/2013 
 
Society of District Council Treasurers 
(SDCT) 
Hemel Hempstead, Dacorum 
Borough Council, Civic Centre 
04/02/2013 
 
Society of London Treasurers (SLT) Conference call 07/02/2014 
Special Interest Group of 
Metropolitan Authorities (SIGOMA) 
Barnsley, Barnsley 




Former DCLG civil servant, public 
sector consultant 
London, Senate House, 





Organisation Location Date 
Association of Cities and 
Municipalities in NRW (Städte- und 
Gemeindebund NRW – StGb NRW) 
Düsseldorf, StGB NRW 
headquarter 
22/04/2013 
Association of Cities in NRW 
(Städtetag NRW – ST NRW) 
& 
German Association of Cities 
(Deutscher Städtetag – DST) 




Association of Cities in NRW 
(Städtetag NRW – ST NRW) 
& 
German Association of Cities 
(Deutscher Städtetag – DST) 
Bonn, city hall (Stadthaus) 10/07/2013 
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Association of Districts in NRW 
(Landkreistag NRW – LKT NRW) 
Düsseldorf, LKT NRW 
headquarter 
22/04/2013 
Federal Ministry of Finance 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen – 
BMF) 




Finance Ministry NRW 
(Finanzministerium NRW – FM 
NRW) 




German Association of Cities and 
Communities (Deutscher Städte- und 
Gemeindebund – DStGB) 
Berlin, DStGB headquarter 29/04/2013 
 
German Association of Counties 
(Deutscher Landkreistag – DLT) 
Berlin, DLT headquarter 26/04/2013 
 
Ministry for the Interior and Local 
Government NRW (Ministerium für 
Inneres und Kommunales NRW – 
MIK NRW) 




NRW state parliament (Landtag), 
Local Government Select Committee 




Expert / Association of Cities in 
Rhineland Palatine (Städtetag 
Rheinland-Pfalz – ST RLP) 




Organisation Location Date 
100,000+ Municipal Treasurers 
Association 
Tilburg, city hall 20/01/2014 
Association of Municipalities 
(Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Gemeenten – VNG) 
The Hague 30/01/2014 
Association of Provinces 
(Interprovinciaal Overleg – IPO) 
The Hague, IPO head office 21/01/2014 
 
BBV committee (Commissie BBV – 
Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording 
Gemeenten en Provincies) 




Dutch Municipal Bank (Bank 
Nederlandse Gemeenten – BNG) 
The Hague, head quarter BNG 28/01/2014 
 
Expert group of provincial 
supervisors on municipal finances 
(Vakberaad Gemeentefinanciën) 




Financial Relations Council (Raad 
voor de financiële verhoudingen – 
Rfv) 
The Hague, Rfv head office 21/01/2014 
 
G32, cooperation of 34 biggest Dutch 
cities, excluding the biggest 4/G4 
Nijmegen, city hall 20/01/2014 
 
G4, cooperation of the four biggest 
Dutch cities 
Rotterdam, city hall 29/01/2014 
House of Representatives (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten Generaal) 
The Hague, Tweede Kamer 23/01/2014 
 
Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van 
Financiën) 
The Hague, head quarter 





Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken & 
Koninkrijksrelaties – BZK) 
The Hague, BZK 23/01/2014 
 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken & 
Koninkrijksrelaties – BZK) 
The Hague, BZK 23/01/2014 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken & 
Koninkrijksrelaties – BZK) 
The Hague, BZK 23/01/2014 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken & 
Koninkrijksrelaties – BZK) 
The Hague, BZK 23/01/2014 
 
National Court of Audit (Algemene 
Rekenkamer) 
The Hague, Algemene 
Rekenkamer head office 
22/01/2014 
 
P10, cooperation of 10 largest Dutch 
rural municipalities 

























Table Credit ratings English LGs (2013) 
LG entity Long term issuer rating 
Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
London Borough of 
Wandsworth 
 Aaa AA+ 
Royal Borough of 
Kensington and 
Chelsea 
AAA   
Guildford Borough 
Council 
 Aaa  
Cornwall County 
Council 
 Aaa  
Birmingham City 
Council 
AA+ Aaa  
Greater London 
Authority 
AA+   
Lancashire County 
Council 
 Aa1  
Woking Borough 
Council 
AA-   
    
Spectrum Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
Prime AAA Aaa  AAA 
High grade AA-plus Aa1 AA-plus 
High grade AA Aa2  AA 
High grade AA-minus Aa3 AA-minus 
Upper medium grade A-plus A1 A-plus 
Upper medium grade A A2 A 
Upper medium grade A-minus A3 A-minus 
 













Table Dutch municipalities placed under preventive provincial supervision, numbers 
by province and aggregated totals, 2005-2014 
                                            2005 
Total LGs province 
Total LGs under  
preventive supervision 











































































































































































































































































supervision as % of 










































Source: own table; data from CBS, Dutch Interior Ministry (BZK), and Provincial Reports (e.g. Drenthe, 












Table  NRW population size classification system 
 
Population class Population weight 
25,000 100.0 
37,000  103.0 
51,500  106.0 
68,500  109.0 
88,000  112.0 






















Table     Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of institutional variables on total grant allocations, panel data .                 
.             2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt p/c (log), lagged, including robustness check dependent variable total debt as   
.              % of total income. Fixed effects    
 
   England The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
         
Lagged DV 0.184*** 0.003*** 0.137*** 0.096*** 0.001*** 0.002** 
 (0.024) (0.001) (0.029) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) 
politicalsym*totalgrants -0.621*** -0.121 -0.125** -0.192*** -0.190* -0.117* 
 (0.190) (0.137) (0.053) (0.072) (0.099) (0.071) 
staffcapacity*totalgrants 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
income 0.979 -1.237** 0.765** -0.404 0.982*** -1.368*** 
 (1.037) (0.580) (0.365) (0.740) (0.237) (0.147) 
totalgrants 1.144 2.628*** 0.383*** 0.583*** 0.096* 0.488*** 
 (1.039) (0.947) (0.093) (0.146) (0.153) (0.111) 
taxes 4.038*** 1.851*** 0.079 0.287*** -0.239*** -0.031 
 (1.054) (0.672) (0.061) (0.102) (0.062) (0.067) 
expenditure -1.078* -0.775* -0.458 -0.846 -0.432** -0.148 
 (0.631) (0.433) (0.341) (0.707) (0.218) (0.136) 
politicalsym 2.152*** 0.443 0.391** 0.593*** 0.532** 0.325* 
 (0.612) (0.412) (0.168) (0.224) (0.268) (0.188) 
staffcapacity -0.001 0.001 -0.055 0.155 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.065) (0.112) (0.002) (0.001) 
density 3.358*** 1.361*** 0.563 0.824 0.408* -0.034 
 (0.863) (0.471) (0.450) (0.890) (0.215) (0.236) 
unemployed 0.026** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.018* -0.002 0.028*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) 
constant -18.204*** -8.107*** 0.934 4.065** 0.455 7.883*** 
 (5.316) (2.756) (1.013) (1.794) (1.001) (0.931) 
Observations 2,512 2,512 2,542 2,542 3,300 3,300 
Number of LGs 391 391 367 367 432 432 
Adj. R² .29 .14 .14 .13 .09 .13 













Table   Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of party political variables on 
total grant allocations, panel data 2005-2012. Dependent variable: total debt p/c (log), 
including robustness check dependent variable total debt as % of total income. Fixed effects 
 
   The Netherlands NRW 
 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total debt % total 
income 
total debt p/c 
(log) 
total  debt % total 
income 
       
Lagged DV  0.133*** 0.001*** 0.015** 0.006** 
 (0.029) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) 
mayorsym*totalgrants -0.117** -0.167** -0.147* -0.006 
 (0.055) (0.073) (0.079) (0.041) 
councilsym*totalgrants 0.062 0.020 -0.011* 0.005 
 (0.085) (0.115) (0.060) (0.031) 
income 1.288*** 0.362 0.295** -0.986*** 
 (0.267) (37.11) (0.133) (0.096) 
totalgrants 0.368*** 0.522*** 0.147* 0.107** 
 (0.096) (0.137) (0.087) (0.048) 
taxes 0.089 0.307*** -0.067 -0.018 
 (0.064) (0.103) (0.059) (0.024) 
expenditure -0.959*** -1.510*** -0.192 -0.115 
 (0.174) (0.251) (0.139) (0.082) 
mayorsym 0.365** 0.516** 0.386* 0.147 
 (0.171) (0.227) (0.209) (0.107) 
councilsym -0.192 -0.061 -0.083 -0.084 
 (0.265) (0.359) (0.158) (0.082) 
staffcapacity -0.016 -0.008 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.036) (0.049) (0.000) (0.001) 
density 1.111*** 1.702*** 0.003* -0.193 
 (0.407) (0.601) (0.002) (0.156) 
unemployed 0.022*** 0.018* 0.001** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) 
constant 1.637* 4.506*** 5.481*** 4.500*** 
 (0.974) (1.525) (0.837) (0.587) 
     
Observations 2,542 2,542 3,300 3,300 
Number of LGs 367 367 432 432 
Adj. R² .13 .14 .17 .04 






Table   Effect of total grants on debt, and the moderating effect of country specific 
institutional variables on total grant allocations, panel data 2005-2012. 
Robustness tests dependent variable: total debt minus reserves the Netherlands. 
























 The Netherlands 
 
total debt p/c minus 
unallocated reserves (log) 
total debt minus 




mayorsym*totalgrants -0.545** -0.243** 
 (0.238) (0.095) 
councilsym*totalgrants 0.095 -0.078 
 (0.336) (0.142) 
income 6.919*** 0.794* 
 (0.904) (0.457) 
totalgrants 0.938** 0.495*** 
 (0.413) (0.166) 
taxes 1.184*** 0.513*** 
 (0.284) (0.135) 
expenditure -6.007*** -1.999*** 
 (0.558) (0.299) 
mayorsym 1.690** 0.757** 
 (0.743) (0.296) 
councilsym -0.282 0.245 
 (1.051) (0.441) 
staffcapacity -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.006) 
density 8.240*** 2.454*** 
 (1.375) (0.733) 
unemployed 0.048* 0.022* 
 (0.025) (0.013) 
constant 3.408 4.527** 
 (3.751) (1.972) 
   
Observations 2,054 2,054 
Number of LGs 335 335 
Adj. R² .06 .08 




Table Summary of the statistical findings of redistribution mechanisms, sign only included when interaction term and component  .     .   . .   
.           variables have significant sign 
 
   England Netherlands NRW 





























































 + (**) +(**) / +(**) +(**) +(**) +(**) / +(*) +(***) / 
 Political 
symmetry: 
mayorsym*totalgrants     -(**) -(**) -(**) / / -(*) -(**) 
  councilsym*totalgrant
s 
/ -(*) / -(*) / / / / / / / 
 staffcap*tot
algrants 




with  debt: 





    / / / / -(**) / -(***) 
  councilsym*specificgr
ants 
/ -(*) -(**) -(*) / / / / -(***) -(**) -(***) 
 staffcap*sp
ecificgrants 
 -(*) -(**) -(**) / / / / / -(**) -(***) / 
 





Table Seven major German social welfare tasks performed by LGs, federal level data 
 (2007) 
















1,697,554 614,216 936,172 50,358 96,808 









2,244,861 581,150 994,226 7,055 662,430 











11,450,466 1,731,049 4,176,228 62,571 5,480,618 













2,101,685 785,727 1,033,742 35,461 246,755 




20.0 12.7 11.7 -22.3 194.7 
Youth care 2007 1,000 
€ 
6,373,807 2,358,947 3,066,373 869,510 78,997 










12,393,387 4,096,650 1,645,935 6,623,683 27,119 












12,235,876 5,028,320 7,064,380 143,176 - 




17.5 24.1 11.1 4279.8 - 
Source: Destatis 2007 
260 
 
Note: the data in the table relate to all German LGs, since social welfare data specified by type of 
LG and social welfare field are only available at the federal level (Destatis). Since 2008, the Federal 
statistical office no longer provides micro level data, with only aggregate data on social welfare 
spending available. The general character of the social spending statistics, which has partly been 
caused by the non-federal wide introduction of the double bookkeeping system, substantially 
complicates intergovernmental negotiations on social welfare spending. Incentivised by the increase 
of social welfare costs, local government interest groups have been lobbying to improve the quality 

































Table     NRW LGs, relative income share selected income categories, as % of income, 
    2012 




Average Minimum Maximum 
Business tax     
  total 396 34.7 3.3 78.0 
  abundant 47 62.1 38.7 78.0 
  non-abundant 349 30.9 3.2 63.2 
Property tax A     
  total 396 0.5 0 2.9 
  abundant 47 0.2 0 1.3 
  non-abundant 349 0.5 0 2.9 
Property tax B     
  total 396 11.8 3.9 26.3 
  abundant 47 10.0 3.9 15.1 
  non-abundant 349 12.1 7.7 26.3 
LG share income tax    
  total 396 27.8 13.6 49.9 
  abundant 47 23.9 13.6 43.2 
  non-abundant 349 28.3 15.4 49.9 
LG share VAT     
  total 396 2.8 0.5 7.9 
  abundant 47 3.7 1.4 5.9 
  non-abundant 349 2.7 0.5 7.9 
Specific 
transfers 
    
  total 396 22.4 0 55.4 
  abundant 47 0 0 0 
  non-abundant 349 25.4 0.7 55.4 
 
Source: own illustration, based upon IT.NRW statistics. 
 
Note: The distinction between abundant and non-abundant LGs refers to LGs that have own 
source taxes below and above a certain threshold. Abundant LGs have taxes above the threshold 
which makes that they are no longer entitled to grant funding.  
 
 
 
 
 
